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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the legal shortcomings flowing from Manchester City 
Council v Pinnock.1 Following Pinnock tenants of local authorities may have the 
proportionality of a possession order considered by the court in light of art.8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. However, 
there are questions outstanding from Pinnock. Firstly, there has been a failure 
within the courts to appreciate the importance of the home to the individual, their 
family, and society in general. Secondly, domestic courts have not provided 
adequate reasons for limiting art.8 to proceedings involving a local authority. 
Thirdly, the nature of proportionality within possession proceedings has been poorly 
conceived thereby marginalising art.8’s effects. 
This thesis draws support from philosophical and sociological literature to illustrate 
the deep connection a person feels towards their home. These connections exist 
irrespective of ownership yet it is these non-legal interests which are often 
overlooked by the courts. It is argued here that art.8 may protect these non-legal 
interests. 
Further, this thesis questions why art.8’s protection ought to be limited to 
proceedings involving a public sector landlord. The thesis provides an overview of 
the competing theories concerning horizontal effect and their related shortcomings. 
The work of Alexy is used to argue that horizontal effect is a singular phenomenon 
thereby making art.8 applicable in private proceedings. The public/private divide is 
then critiqued to demonstrate the theoretical viability of horizontal effect where a 
person’s home is at risk. 
The final strand of this thesis is concerned with how the competing interests of 
landlords and tenants may be adjudged. To this end a structured proportionality 
model is developed to replace the general proportionality exercise utilised by the 
courts following Pinnock. This proportionality model is then applied to existing case 
law to demonstrate its viability and context sensitivity. 
                                                        
1 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Need for Increased Security of Tenure in Rented 
Accommodation 
This study explores an alternative approach to assessing the weight to attribute to 
one’s home in legal proceedings. The idea of the home incorporates a person’s non-
monetary links to a particular place. The nature of the home is particularly relevant 
for the purposes of art.8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
Convention) as incorporated into domestic law via the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA 1998). Article 8 creates a right to respect for one’s private and family life, 
home and correspondence. Any critical analysis of the term ‘home’ will therefore 
overlap with ideas of private and family life. The idea of the home is particularly 
interesting within the context of possession proceedings between a landlord and a 
tenant as a home may exist independent of any proprietary interest. Moreover, these 
interests may arise in all instances of rented accommodation and so seem to suggest 
that one’s right to respect for their home should be pervasive in possession 
proceedings. This thesis places a focus upon possession proceedings as these have 
become something of a lightning rod for art.8.1 In light of these general observations 
this thesis explores the disparate application of art.8 which has arisen following 
art.8’s arduous journey through the courts. This is evident most prominently in the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010].2 
Following Pinnock tenants are now able to invoke art.8 in an effort to resist a 
landlord’s claim for a possession order. In such instances the court must ask 
whether a possession order would be a ‘proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim’.3 However, this protection will only arise in proceedings concerning 
local authorities (or other bodies deemed to be acting in a public fashion). 
Therefore, such protection will only apply to a limited number of tenants to the 
exclusion of their private sector counterparts. This immediately raises questions as 
to why one tenant’s home interests are in practice afforded more weight than 
another’s in otherwise analogous circumstances. This is particularly the case as the 
facts of Pinnock are common in possession proceedings. Pinnock, which is discussed 
and referenced throughout this work, concerned Mr Pinnock who was a demoted 
                                                        
1 See the following cases in particular Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2003] 
UKHL 43, [2004] 1 AC 983; Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465; 
Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
2 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
3 Ibid [52].  
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tenant due to the anti-social behaviour of his partner and children. Demoted tenants 
being those tenants who have formerly been secure tenants but due to some 
misconduct now enjoy lower security of tenure.4 The local authority pursued a 
possession order against Mr Pinnock due to the anti-social behaviour of his family 
some of whom resided with him and some of whom did not. Mr Pinnock was, in the 
eyes of the court, blameless in this anti-social behaviour. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court found that whilst art.8 was applicable to the proceedings it was proportionate 
to make an order. This stands in contrast to cases such as McDonald v McDonald5 
and Malik v Fassenfelt6 in which the courts have held that art.8 has no bearing upon 
private sector possession proceedings.  
The findings of the Supreme Court in Pinnock might seem appropriate on their face 
due to the historic understanding of human rights existing to protect the individual 
from the power of the State but upon further reflection, and in light of a burgeoning 
private rented sector, the position creates an arbitrary distinction between different 
types of tenant, resulting in variable protection based on the type of tenancy a 
person enjoys over the severity of the interference with a person’s rights. In cases 
following Pinnock the domestic courts have considered the possible application of 
art.8 to private sector tenancies but thus far the courts have denied art.8 any 
bearing in such cases. The courts have based their reasoning in such cases upon the 
legal framework created by the HRA 1998 and the apparent preservation of the 
public/private divide in human rights adjudication. However, this approach 
contradicts the findings of the courts in other areas of law which have been receptive 
to human rights arguments and fails to engage with the arguments in favour of a 
robust approach to art.8.  
This study is necessary in large part due to the comparatively lower security of 
tenure enjoyed by tenants in both the public and private rented sectors over the 
course of the past 40 years.7 At present whilst landlords must broadly speaking 
acquire a court order before recovering their property,8 the instances in which an 
order will be denied are few.9 Therefore, it is timely and essential to study the effects 
of art.8. There is a wealth of literature considering the effects of the HRA 1998 upon 
English law generally together with some appreciation of the effects art.8 may have 
                                                        
4 For a statutory overview of demoted tenancies see ibid [5]-[13]. 
5 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28, [2016] 3 WLR 45. 
6 Malik v Fassenfelt [2013] EWCA Civ 798, [2013] 28 EG 84 (CS). 
7 See the following for an assessment of housing law over this period, McDonald v McDonald 
[2016] UKSC 28, [2016] 3 WLR 45 [11]-[28]. 
8 Protection from Eviction Act 1977. 
9 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28, [2016] 3 WLR 45 [11]-[28]. 
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upon possession proceedings.10 However, a study of this depth, taking account of the 
theoretical underpinnings in the areas related to the core questions raised by art.8 
in the context of possession proceedings has not yet emerged. This is in spite of 
recent efforts by, for example, Shelter in their ‘Great Home Debate’ which has 
invited participants to give their views on what makes a place feel like home.11 The 
issue of dispossession is all the more pressing as 350,000 tenants were at risk of 
being removed from their home between April 2015-April 2016.12 In light of this the 
questions outstanding from Pinnock and related cases as to the application of art.8 
are not only legal in nature but have wider practical utility to those tenants (and 
landlords) who face possession proceedings. The potential role of art.8 in possession 
proceedings is all the more pressing given that the current rental market is 
increasingly inhabited by those who are unable to buy their home and so reside in 
the private rented sector long term.13 This is reflected in the private housing sector 
now being larger than the public housing sector with the private rented sector more 
than doubling in size between 1992 and 2014.14  
The growth of the private rented sector is due in part to the reduction in the 
availability of social housing. This reduction may be linked in large part to two 
central Government p0licies; the right to buy scheme together with a failure to 
replace diminishing housing stock. The right to buy scheme allows sitting council 
tenants to purchase their home at a discount based upon the length of time a tenant 
has resided at the property. From 1980 to 2015 the total right to buy sales made by 
                                                        
10 See for example D Feldman, 'The Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles' 
(1999) 19 Legal Studies 165; Lord Irvine of Lairg, 'The Impact of the Human Rights Act: 
Parliament, the Courts, and the Executive' (2003) PL 308; H Fenwick, G Phillipson and R 
Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge 
University Press 2007); S Nield, 'Thumbs Down to the Horizontal Effect of Article 8' (2015) 
Conv 77; S D Pattinson, 'The Human Rights Act and the Doctrine of Precedent' (2015) 35 
Legal Studies 142; I Loveland, 'Horizontality of Article 8 in the Context of Possession 
Proceedings' (2015) EHRLR 138. 
11 Shelter, 'The Great Home Debate' (Shelter, 2016) 
<https://www.greathomedebate.org.uk/> accessed 15 June 2016. 
12 Shelter, Renters Put At Risk (June, 2016). 
13 P Toynbee, 'Those Who Can't Afford a Home are Being Abandoned' The Guardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/18/home-council-social-housing> 
accessed 20 April 2016; P Sherlock, D Wainwright and P Bradshaw, ''Sky-High' Rental 
Hotspots Across England Revealed' (BBC, 5 August 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-36794222> accessed 5 August 2016. 
14 D Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2011) 86-87; Department 
for Communities and Local Government, 'FT1101 (S101): Trends in Tenure' (Live Tables on 
Social Housing Sales, 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/451203/
FT1101_Trends_in_tenure.xls> accessed 13 August 2015; D Cowan, Housing Law and 
Policy (Cambridge University Press 2011) 87. 
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English local authorities was 1,805,282.15 Sales made under the right to buy have 
not been spread equally across England nor has there been parity in the quality of 
housing stock being bought.16 Homes of the ‘best quality ... [and the] most spacious, 
traditionally-built houses with gardens tend to be those which were most popular 
and in highest demand.’17 Many of the homes sold under the right to buy scheme 
have not remained in owner-occupation but have instead become privately rented. 
These private rented properties are predominantly taken up by low-income renters 
who might previously have found accommodation in the public sector.18  
The diminution of public housing has been exacerbated by a failure to replace 
depleting stock due to the restrictions placed upon local authorities in the use of 
proceeds from right to buy sales.19 This failure is evident in the fact that in 1986 local 
authorities owned 91% of all social housing in Great Britain, as of 2006 local 
authorities in Great Britain owned 56% of all social housing.20 In the financial 
periods 1979-80 to 2015-16 423,400 social housing units were built by English local 
authorities.21 In the same period 713,110 housing association units were built.22 
Alongside the sale of council housing the upshot of this for the wider rented sector is 
a reduced (and reducing) public sector. As a result of this tenants, including those 
who are unable to become owner-occupiers as well as those who prefer to be in the 
rented sector, are being pushed into the private sector.23 Within the private sector 
                                                        
15 Department for Communities and Local Government, 'Table 671: Annual Right to Buy 
Sales for England' (Social Housing Sales (Including Right to Buy and Transfers), 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/406316/
LT_671.xlsx> accessed 13 June 2016. 
16 R Forrest and A Murie, Selling the Welfare State (Routledge 1988) 80. 
17 A Murie, 'Linking Housing Changes to Crime' (1997) 31 Social Policy and Administration 
22, 28; C Jones, 'The Right to Buy' in Peter Malpass and Rob Rowlands (eds), Housing, 
Markets, and Policy (Routledge 2010) 65; B A Searle, 'Recession, Repossession, and Family 
Welfare' (2012) 24 Child and Family Law Quarterly 1, 3-4. 
18 C Jones, Exploitation of the Right to Buy Scheme by Companies (Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, 2003). 
19 G A Jones, 'Assessing the Success of the Sale of Social Housing in the UK' (2007) 29 
Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 135. 
20 P Malpass and R Rowlands, 'Introduction: Transformation and Change in Housing' in 
Peter Malpass and Rob Rowlands (eds), Housing, Markets, and Policy (Routledge 2010) 9; S 
Wilcox, UK Housing Review 2006/7 (Chartered Institute of Housing/Council of Mortgage 
Lenders, 2006). 
21 Department for Communities and Local Government, 'Table 209: Permanent Dwellings 
Completed, by Tenure and Country' (Live Tables on House Building, 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/454681/
LiveTable209.xlsx> accessed 13 June 2016. 
22 Ibid. 
23 P Toynbee, 'Those Who Can't Afford a Home are Being Abandoned' The Guardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/18/home-council-social-housing> 
accessed 20 April 2016; S Clarke, 'Home Ownership Struggle Reaches Coronation Street' 
(The Resolution Foundation, 2 August 2016) 
<http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/blog/home-ownership-struggle-reaches-
coronation-street/> accessed 5 August 2016. 
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there is now also a large group of families for whom assured shorthold tenancies 
offer little advantage given that the assured shorthold framework was implicitly 
designed for ‘young and mobile households’.24 With such tenants in the low security 
private sector the research questions of this thesis become all the more prescient. 
The problems noted above in relation to right to buy have been exacerbated by the 
financial crisis of 2007/08 with the private rented sector unexpectedly growing 
despite the resultant barriers created by the crisis for those who wish to enter 
owner-occupation (higher unemployment and stricter mortgage requirements).25 
Notwithstanding these barriers those able to invest in property have done so using 
buy to let mortgages thereby increasing private rented housing stock.26 Many of 
these buy to let mortgages were utilised by small-scale landlords, often with only 
one rental property, attracted to the rental market by its comparatively higher 
capital growth over other forms of traditional investment such as ‘stock markets, 
bank deposits, and pension annuities’.27 These landlords saw investments in rented 
property as a more secure pension fund.28 
The above changes to the housing sector have given rise to ‘generation rent’,29 a 
group of young people who are in effect locked out of owner-occupation and so 
instead make their long term home in the rented sector. These individuals have 
fallen into the ‘rent trap’30 in which they have few legal rights, little security, and no 
means of escape.31 This lurch towards the private rented sector for young people 
                                                        
24 P A Kemp, 'Private Renting After the Global Financial Crisis' (2015) 30 Housing Studies 
601, 610. 
25 K McKee, 'Young People, Homeownership, and Future Welfare' (2012) 27 Housing Studies 
853, 858-860; J Hoolachan and others, ''Generation Rent' and the Ability to 'Settle Down': 
Economic and Geographical Variation in Young People's Housing Transitions' (2016) 
Journal of Youth Studies 1, 2; P A Kemp, 'Private Renting After the Global Financial Crisis' 
(2015) 30 Housing Studies 601, 614. 
26 P A Kemp, 'Private Renting After the Global Financial Crisis' (2015) 30 Housing Studies 
601, 606-611. 
27 Ibid, 608-609. 
28 D Rhodes, 'Buy-to-Let Landlords' in David Hughes and Stuart Lowe (eds), The Private 
Rented Housing Market: Regulation or Deregulation? (Ashgate 2007); P A Kemp, 'Private 
Renting After the Global Financial Crisis' (2015) 30 Housing Studies 601, 609. 
29 R Ramesh, 'UK Housing Shortage Turning Under-30s into 'Generation Rent'' (The 
Guardian, 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/jun/13/generation-rent-uk-
housing-shortage> accessed 11 July 2016; K McKee, 'Young People, Homeownership, and 
Future Welfare' (2012) 27 Housing Studies 853. 
30 R Walker and S Jeraj, The Rent Trap: How We Fell Into It and How We Get Out of It 
(Pluto Press 2016). 
31 P Sherlock, D Wainwright and P Bradshaw, ''Sky-High' Rental Hotspots Across England 
Revealed' (BBC, 5 August 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-36794222> 
accessed 5 August 2016. 
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creates worrying problems for the future.32 In a neoliberal landscape housing assets 
are ‘at the heart of a new social contract between the state and its citizens in which 
individuals are to assume much greater responsibility for securing their own future 
welfare.’33 In this sense the home’s character as a financial asset comes to the fore 
and serves as a notional insurance policy with cash available in an emergency or for 
later in life.34 However, this is the institution which generation rent are being 
excluded from with little likelihood that they will be able to benefit from the same 
‘one-off bonanza’ of advantageous socio-economic circumstances that allowed older 
generations to accumulate housing wealth.35 Low security of tenure in the private 
rented sector is therefore becoming the norm for a majority of young people. The 
ramifications of this are seen in predictions that by 2025 more than half of those 
under 40 years old will rent their home.36 
The precarious position of those in (public or private) rented accommodation is 
made worse again by the broad definition given to anti-social behaviour which is 
more likely to affect renters on low-incomes than owner-occupiers.37 Anti-social 
behaviour legislation is couched in such a way that even those who are not guilty of 
misconduct may be removed from their home.38 For instance, Bryant v Portsmouth 
City Council39 concerned a secure tenant under the Housing Act 1985 who was 
dispossessed of her home due to the anti-social behaviour of her grandsons despite 
being at ‘no personal fault’.40 Ground 2 of sch.2 to the Housing Act 1985 allows for a 
tenancy to be determined where the tenant or a person residing with them is 
involved in anti-social behaviour. Due to the mandatory nature of the legislation the 
                                                        
32 J Hoolachan and others, ''Generation Rent' and the Ability to 'Settle Down': Economic and 
Geographical Variation in Young People's Housing Transitions' (2016) Journal of Youth 
Studies 1, 8. 
33 K McKee, 'Young People, Homeownership, and Future Welfare' (2012) 27 Housing Studies 
853, 856.  
34 See the phenomenon of asset-based welfare, J Doling and R Ronald, 'Home Ownership 
and Asset-Based Welfare' (2010) 25 Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 165; B A 
Searle and D McCollum, 'Property-Based Welfare and the Search for Generational 
Inequality' (2014) 14 International Journal of Housing Policy 325; L Fox O'Mahony and L 
Overton, 'Asset-Based Welfare, Equity Release and the Meaning of the Owned Home' (2015) 
30 Housing Studies 392. 
35 B A Searle and D McCollum, 'Property-Based Welfare and the Search for Generational 
Inequality' (2014) 14 International Journal of Housing Policy 325, 329. 
36 H Osborne, 'Generation Rent: The Housing Ladder Starts to Collapse for the Under-40s' 
(The Guardian, 22 July 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/jul/22/pwc-
report-generation-rent-to-grow-over-next-decade> accessed 5 August 2016. 
37 J McNeill, 'Regulating Social Housing: Expectations for Behaviour of Tenants' in Malcolm 
Harrison and Teela Sanders (eds), Social Policies and Social Control: New Perspectives on 
the 'Not-So-Big Society' (Policy Press 2016). 
38 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.1(1); Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 pt 2; Housing Act 
1985 ss.82A-85A. 
39 Bryant v Portsmouth City Council (2000) 32 HLR 906. 
40 Ibid, 909. 
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court found that there was no discretion as to whether an order should be made. 
This approach ignores a wealth of literature which suggests that anti-social 
behaviour is the product of ‘socio-economic disadvantage, marginalisation, and 
social exclusion’41 experienced by young people.42 This legislative approach towards 
anti-social behaviour and low security in general serves to make the position of 
those who would benefit from increased security of tenure more precarious by 
pushing those who are found guilty of anti-social behaviour into the private sector. 
This begs the question of whether art.8, and the right to respect for one’s home, 
ought to have a more pronounced role in housing proceedings. If art.8 were to offer 
those who make their home in the private rented sector enhanced security of tenure, 
in effect making it difficult for a landlord to dispossess without reasoned grounds, 
this would counter the shortcoming of the current law. A robust approach to art.8 
would assist those who have struggled due to the uncertainty of the rented sector to 
make a home. The desires of tenants in this regard are clear in the following excerpt: 
We do want to have a family, we do want to get married, there are not 
going to be any of those things unless we have a solid house! If we 
rented, I could be 8 months pregnant and get a Notice to Quit and be 
exited out, next month! ... 43 
Those in the private rented sector are often reliant upon the goodwill of their 
landlords to upkeep their property for fear that they may be evicted if they look to 
enforce their statutory rights.44 This results in many private tenants residing in 
substandard accommodation largely due to their weak security of tenure. Therefore, 
the outcomes of this work may benefit a great number of tenants (and landlords) in 
the rented sector. In determining the scope of art.8 it must therefore be asked 
precisely what it is that the right to respect for the home is seeking to protect. If it is 
                                                        
41 R Arthur, 'Recognising Children's Citizenship in the Youth Justice System' (2015) 37 
Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 21, 28. For further discussion of the effects of 
dispossession on those who are already marginalised in society see M T Fullilove, 'Root 
Shock: The Consequences of African American Dispossession' (2001) 78 Journal of Urban 
Health 72. 
42 See in particular, A Millie, M Hough and J Jacobson, 'Finding a Balance for Tackling Anti-
Social Behaviour' (2005) 154 Criminal Lawyer 3; J Morgan, 'Family Intervention Tenancies: 
The De(marginalisation) of Social Tenants?' (2010) 32 Journal of Social Welfare & Family 
Law 37; J Neary and others, 'Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don't: Negotiating the 
Tricky Context of Anti-Social Behaviour and Keeping Safe in Disadvantaged 
Neighbourhoods' (2013) 16 Journal of Youth Studies 118. 
43 J Hoolachan and others, ''Generation Rent' and the Ability to 'Settle Down': Economic and 
Geographical Variation in Young People's Housing Transitions' (2016) Journal of Youth 
Studies 1. 
44 See for example Shelter, Can't Complain: Why Poor Conditions Prevail in Private Rented 
Homes (March, 2014); Shelter, 'True Scale of ‘Revenge Evictions’ Exposed by Shelter 
Investigation' (Shelter, 2014) 
<http://media.shelter.org.uk/home/press_releases/true_scale_of_revenge_evictions_expo
sed_by_shelter_investigation> accessed 2 April 2014. 
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an attachment to a place and the feelings that this place engenders how, if at all, is a 
public sector tenant’s attachment to their home any different to that of a private 
sector counterpart. If their attachment is akin, then why should one tenant’s home 
be afforded legally enshrined respect and not the other? 
1.2 The Objectives and Structure of this Thesis 
This study draws together the questions arising from the shortcomings in the 
current law and asks the following research questions: 
1. what is the underlying importance of the home as conceived by art.8(1) and 
how should this inform art.8’s application? 
2. what is the theoretical and legal basis for arbitrarily limiting art.8’s 
application to local authority tenants? and 
3. what is required by proportionality in possession proceedings? 
These questions have been considered to some degree in the literature, however, 
these analyses have often been limited to general queries such as the nature of 
horizontal effect or the scope of proportionality.45 The importance of these issues 
has been noted by academics writing in housing law.46 One of this work’s original 
contributions is the depth with which the problems associated with art.8 and 
possession proceedings are considered. To date the literature has been limited to 
considering the most recent case law in the area rather than a detailed analysis of 
the overall body of law, in particular art.8. This work goes further than this in 
critically engaging with sociological understandings of the home which in turn 
informs the application to be given to art.8. This study provides a replicable 
proportionality model for the courts to apply in possession proceedings going 
forward thereby demonstrating the workability of art.8 in a wide range of 
proceedings. This study goes beyond the contemporary literature which has at most 
summarily argued that proportionality, via art.8, ought to have a more robust 
application than is currently the case. This work’s original contribution is 
strengthened in its exploration and provision of a replicable model of 
proportionality which as a minimum provides a signpost for landlords and tenants 
as to the effects of art.8 (and art.1 of the First Protocol) on possession proceedings. 
                                                        
45 See for example M Hunt, 'The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act' (1998) PL 423; 
G Phillipson, 'The Human Rights Act, "Horizontal Effect" and the Common Law: A Bang or a 
Whimper?' (1999) 62 MLR 824; J Rivers, 'The Presumption of Proportionality' (2014) 77 
MLR 409; N Lacey, 'The Metaphor of Proportionality' (2016) 43 Journal of Law and Society 
27. 
46 S Nield, 'Thumbs Down to the Horizontal Effect of Article 8' (2015) Conv 77.  
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For the courts this work offers a clear framework through which to balance the 
disparate rights of all parties involved in possession proceedings. 
The case law prior to and following Pinnock is considered in detail in Chapter 2 to 
provide an essential review of the changing judicial approach towards art.8 in 
possession proceedings. Chapter 2 elaborates on the difficulties faced by those in the 
rented sector and demonstrates the important contribution that this work makes to 
academic study in this area, but also to the security of tenure of private sector 
tenants. Having identified the interests which attach to a person’s home in Chapter 
3, Chapter 4 will analyse the differential application of art.8 between public and 
private tenants. This distinction cuts to the core of what has been termed vertical 
effect and horizontal effect. Vertical effect looks to the relationship between the 
individual and the State,47 whereas horizontal effect relates to the relationship 
between individuals.48 Chapter 4 considers the legal and theoretical basis for 
horizontal effect from numerous perspectives including the HRA 1998 and the 
Convention. Building on the arguments made in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 comes 
to the conclusion that a horizontal reading of art.8 is not only possible but required. 
This addresses the second research question identified above and forms part of the 
original contribution of this work in its deep consideration of issues which have 
hitherto only been summarily discussed in the related literature. Chapter 4 develops 
the arguments made in Chapters 2 and 3 in its analysis of wider matters over and 
above a pure question of horizontal effect such as the requirements of art.14 of the 
HRA 1998. This amounts to a novel holistic view of art.8’s potential application to 
possession proceedings. 
If a person’s attachment to their home exists independent of the institutional 
character of their landlord then the resultant question is whether there exists a 
theoretical underpinning which would allow for human rights to have a bearing on 
proceedings concerning only private individuals. This requires consideration of the 
traditional role of human rights instruments within the context of the public/private 
divide. Historically the divide has conceived human rights as part of public law 
thereby protecting the individual from the actions of the State.49 If, as argued in 
Chapter 4, art.8 ought to have a role in all possession proceedings regardless of the 
institutional character of the parties involved then the ongoing propriety of the 
                                                        
47 D Friedmann and D Barak-Erez, 'Introduction' in Daniel Friedmann and Daphne Barak-
Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart 2001) 1. 
48 S Gardbaum, 'The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights' (2003) 102 Michigan Law 
Review 387. 
49 D Dyzenhaus, 'The New Positivists' (1989) 39 University of Toronto Law Journal 361. 
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public/private divide seems uncertain. Therefore, Chapter 5 looks to reconceptualise 
the public/private divide in light of the findings in Chapters 2-4 and to account for 
the core submissions of this work. The depth of analysis within Chapter 5 is a 
welcome addition to the existing literature which has recognised the influence of the 
public/private divide on the courts’ thinking around art.8.50 
Chapters 2-4 set out the case for art.8’s application in all possession proceedings 
due to the importance of the home to the individual alongside the legal and 
theoretical framework provided by the relevant human rights instruments. Chapter 
6 is concerned with the practical requirements of art.8, that is, what the parties 
must demonstrate to the court when it is considering a possession order, and what 
the court must consider in determining the proportionality of an order. The wider 
jurisprudence around the role of proportionality has been coloured by the disparate 
objectives of various sources of law. This has resulted in the courts adopting a 
number of proportionality analyses. Following Pinnock the courts’ approach to 
proportionality in possession proceedings might be termed ‘flexible unstructured 
proportionality’ which asks generally whether dispossession ‘is a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim.’51 Proportionality’s form is particularly pressing 
if art.8 is to have a role in all possession proceedings irrespective of the institutional 
character of the parties. Possession proceedings will involve competing interests be 
they interests grounded in proprietary interests or in HRA rights such as art.1 of the 
First Protocol. Article 1 of the First Protocol protects an individual’s right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of their property in much the same way as the home is protected 
in art.8. Interferences with art.1 of the First Protocol are permitted only where it is 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. At 
present the unstructured approach utilised following Pinnock affords almost 
insurmountable weight to a landlord’s proprietary interest. This is true of public 
sector landlords and, if art.8 was deemed to be applicable in private proceedings as 
is argued here, private sector landlords. The approach to proportionality 
demonstrated in Pinnock has resulted in a proportionality test calibrated in favour 
of landlords. In asking the general question of whether an interference is 
proportionate the courts in effect come to defer to the institutional competence of 
the party seeking to dispossess a tenant. No doubt in local authority possession 
proceedings the authority will often benefit from a wealth of experience and 
knowledge as to how best manage their housing stock.52 However, efficacy at 
                                                        
50 S Nield, 'Strasbourg Triggers Another Article 8 Dialogue' (2013) 77 Conv 148, 156. 
51 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104 [52].  
52 Ibid. 
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managing housing stock is not synonymous with proportionality. Therefore, the 
question becomes why in such instances prima facie contraventions of art.8 ought 
not be exposed to an inquisitive proportionality analysis? These issues are examined 
in depth in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 therefore makes clear how art.8 may be given effect 
in practice through a replicable model of proportionality usable in all possession 
proceedings. 
1.3 Methodology 
This study argues that art.8 affords the courts the opportunity to give additional 
weight to a person’s home within the existing panoply of housing law. This is a 
problem of doctrinal making and so a doctrinal approach has been taken to the 
research questions outlined above. The methodology utilised here takes account of a 
particular doctrinal method influenced by the work of Unger53 and Singer.54 
Specifically this research project argues for the: 
expansion of legal protection of certain important interests … [and] … 
established legal doctrines by reinterpreting existing law to 
demonstrate its principles and counterprinciples ... [thereby] ... 
arguing for expanded protection of interests already protected to 
some extent by rules in force.55 
This naturally necessitates a doctrinal analysis of legislation and case law.56 This 
work seeks to strengthen protection for the home through the reinterpretation of 
existing law to draw out principles and counterprinciples which support a robust 
application of art.8 with further insight gained from extra-legal understandings of 
the home. These extra-legal understandings of the home form part of the social 
world within which the law operates. It is accepted that this approach at a minimum 
argues for a change in the courts’ attitude to the law. The argument draws support 
from the common law’s pervading sensitivity to ‘changing social values and social 
conditions.’57 This method of considering and applying law is said to be intuitive for 
common lawyers, a mixture of ‘analogy, discrimination, and deduction’58 couched in 
                                                        
53 R M Unger, 'The Critical Legal Studies Movement' (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561. 
54 J W Singer, 'Legal Realism Now' (1988) 76 California Law Review 465; J W Singer, 'The 
Reliance Interest in Property' (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611; J W Singer, 'The Reliance 
Interest in Property Revisited' Unbound: Harvard Journal of the Legal Left 
<http://legalleft.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Singer_Reliance-Interest-
Revisited.pdf> accessed 15 December 2015. 
55 J W Singer, 'The Reliance Interest in Property' (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611, 629. 
56 T Hutchinson and N Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research' (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 98. 
57 J W Singer, 'The Reliance Interest in Property' (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611, 629.  
58 O W Holmes, 'The Path of the Law' (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 466. 
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rhetoric.59 However, it does not follow that doctrinal legal research is self-defining 
and unworthy of further elaboration.60 Rather doctrinal research ‘involves rigorous 
analysis and creative synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly 
disparate doctrinal strands, and the challenge of extracting general principles from 
an inchoate mass of primary materials.’61 This vigorous analysis and creative 
synthesis of existing law with disparate doctrinal strands has allowed for a 
reconsideration of art.8 as it applies to possession proceedings. This approach is 
particularly beneficial in the sense that art.8 has already been utilised in areas of law 
where a person’s home is not at risk, therefore, the task of extracting general 
principles from supposed discrete areas of law is key. This method is evident in 
particular in Chapters 3 and 4 which demonstrate the permeability of law together 
with the disadvantages of perceiving law as compartmentalised. This in turn 
strengthens the original contribution of this work in its depth of analysis and 
application of general legal principles and understandings to the specific field of 
possession proceedings. This method allows for the conceptualisation of structured 
proportionality which has taken root in areas outside of housing law and provides a 
significant improvement over the current Supreme Court guidance in that it affords 
appropriate weight and some procedural certainty to the competing interests at 
play. 
The advances made in Chapters 3-6 take place through what Unger terms ‘internal 
development’62 of the law through ‘deviationist doctrine’63 which focuses upon the 
conflicts within the law and pushes for changes in the law based upon these 
conflicts.64 This approach is best described as follows: 
Legal rules and doctrines define the basic institutional arrangements 
of society. These arrangements determine the limits and shape the 
content of routine economic or governmental activity. The rules that 
define these formative practices must be interpreted and elaborated 
as expressions of a more or less coherent normative order, not just as 
a disconnected series of trophies with which different factions mark 
their victories in the effort to the enlist governmental power in the 
service of private advantage … Deviationist doctrine sees its 
                                                        
59 See generally, R A Posner, 'Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous 
Discipline' (1988) 38 University of Toronto Law Journal 333. 
60 T Hutchinson and N Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research' (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 100. 
61 Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement on the Nature of Legal Research (May and 
October 2005, 2005); cited at T Hutchinson and N Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What 
We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research' (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 105. 
62 R M Unger, 'The Critical Legal Studies Movement' (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561, 
580. 
63 Ibid, 582. 
64 Ibid, 580. 
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opportunity in the dependence of a social world upon a legally 
defined formative context that is in turn hostage to a vision of right.65 
This understanding of legal research underpins this work with an emphasis on what 
Hutchinson and Duncan call the second stage of doctrinal research, ‘deductive logic, 
inductive reasoning, and analogy’.66 This approach draws out the disharmonies in 
the law thereby allowing for development of the system in a narrow sense whilst 
taking account of the macro body of law.67 Of course Hutchinson and Duncan’s first 
step, the identification of primary sources of law such as statute and case law, must 
be completed before moving on to advanced deduction and reasoning and so in 
Chapter 2 the overarching law and themes of this work are drawn from art.8 case 
law before being critiqued thereafter. Chapters 3-6 go on and seek to internally 
develop conceptions of the home, the application of human rights in horizontal 
proceedings, the public/private divide in law, and the nature of proportionality. This 
is premised upon the idea that the home has been underappreciated in law generally 
and especially so in modern housing law. Deductive logic, inductive reasoning, and 
analogy allow for the development of law within the wider order of the law. The later 
Chapters of this thesis take the view of Singer in arguing that there is an overarching 
coherent legal order allowing for ideas and principles to be drawn from one 
purportedly discrete area of law and utilised in another where the overarching 
principles of the law require. This method allows for the conclusions reached in 
Chapters 3-5 which take a holistic view of the law and seek to draw out some 
coherence within the law. This coherence is informed by the conception of a social 
world informed by a vision of right in which a person’s home is afforded due weight 
in circumstances where that home is at risk. This vision of right serves to underpin 
the core arguments of this work, that the home ought to have more protection whilst 
acknowledging the dependence of society upon a social world which shapes and is 
shaped by law. 
The arguments made in this work are largely a qualitative endeavour drawing upon 
the ‘voice and experience’ of the researcher.68 We each operate within and give 
meaning to constitutional values and constitutional rights in accordance with our 
                                                        
65 Ibid, 582-583. 
66 T Hutchinson and N Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research' (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 111. 
67 R M Unger, 'The Critical Legal Studies Movement' (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561, 
578. 
68 T Hutchinson and N Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research' (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 116. See also J Rawls, Political Liberalism: 
Expanded Edition (Columbia University Press 2011) 54-58. 
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‘own [internal] constitution.’69 After all, ‘there is no such thing as a neutral 
constitution.’70 In essence this is a social vision as informed by literature around the 
home together with property theory.71 This social vision as informed by the cited 
literature allows for the rejection of the assumptions which have permeated and 
allowed for the liberal conception of ownership to subsist.72 Lastly, a social vision 
‘may include judgements about how society should be organised and what 
relationships are good and [ought] to be fostered.’73 The lens through which to 
interpret art.8 is not premised solely on internal logic as such but also the emotional 
coherence of a person’s feelings towards their home which are extrapolated in 
Chapter 3. It may appear that this edges away from the doctrinal approach as 
traditionally understood. However, this is in keeping with the deviationist doctrine 
as legal researchers ought to use non-legal ‘ ... disciplines and knowledge that will 
help us understand what the effects of ... [legal rules] ... are likely to be ... ’74 In other 
words understandings of the world external to law may inform understandings of 
legal rules, the law is not to be understood as hermetically sealed from other 
disciplines or the outside world.75 This project does not purport to outline the only 
possible view upon an assessment of the relevant theory and law in the area of 
human rights and housing rather this study more modestly suggests that the views 
taken are but one perspective within a ‘constellation of positions’,76 in other words a 
possible hypothesis. However, what is suggested, on the basis of internal 
development of the law alongside deviationist doctrine, is that the argument made 
within this work, that a tenant ought to be able to rely upon art.8 to robustly protect 
their home irrespective of the prima facie legal right of a landlord to recover 
possession, is the most powerful and persuasive position yet presented. 
                                                        
69 A Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 33. 
70 K D Ewing, 'The Unbalanced Constitution' in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam 
Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2001) 107. 
71 J W Singer, 'The Reliance Interest in Property' (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611, 627. 
72 See the endearing influence of the First Aquisitionists together with the work of Robert 
Nozick discussed in Chapter 3.  
73 J W Singer, 'The Reliance Interest in Property' (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611, 627. 
74 Ibid, 630. 
75 R M Unger, 'The Critical Legal Studies Movement' (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561, 
578. 
76 J W Singer, 'The Reliance Interest in Property' (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611, 628. 
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2 The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the English Court in Relation to Article 8 
The most controversial issue at the intersection between the law of 
leases and human rights concerns the role of the residential tenant’s 
article 8 rights in summary proceedings by a landlord seeking 
possession of the subjects.1 
This Chapter critically examines the development of art.8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) in relation to possession 
proceedings in both the European Court of Human Rights and the English courts 
following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (the HRA 1998). Article 8(1) 
is concerned with the right to respect for one’s home which may only be interfered 
with in the prescribed circumstances listed in art.8(2). On its face art.8 appears a 
straightforward and non-contentious provision. However, art.8 has given rise to a 
litany of cases concerning the continuing probity of mandatory possession 
proceedings. Mandatory possession proceedings are those proceedings in which the 
court is afforded no discretion as to whether an order ought to be made thereby 
allowing a landlord to recover possession of their property, provided a number of 
prescribed circumstances are fulfilled.2 
The reasons proffered by the Government in favour of incorporating the Convention 
into domestic law included the prohibitive cost and burden placed upon British 
citizens enforcing their rights at the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.3 However, the most noteworthy argument for consideration of art.8’s 
influence upon domestic law is that: 
rights will be brought much more fully into the jurisprudence of the 
courts throughout the United Kingdom, and their interpretation will 
thus be far more subtly and powerfully woven into our law. And there 
will be another distinct benefit. British judges will be enabled to 
make a distinctively British contribution to the development of the 
jurisprudence of human rights in Europe.4 
The Government was aware of the significant constitutional change which would be 
triggered by the HRA 1998 and the subsequent positive obligation placed upon 
                                                        
1 F McCarthy, 'Human Rights and the Law of Leases' (2013) 17 Edinburgh Law Review 184, 
201. As to the interdisciplinary nature of housing law, public law, and human rights see 
generally L Whitehouse, 'The Home-Owner: Citizen or Consumer?' in Susan Bright and John 
Dewar (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford University Press 1998). 
2 For example see Housing Act 1988 s.21 and Housing Act 1985 s.84A. 
3 Home Office, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (Cm 3782, 1997) [1.11]. 
4 Ibid [1.11]-[1.14]; E Wicks, 'The United Kingdom Government's Perceptions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights at the Time of Entry' (2000) PL 438. 
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public authorities (including courts) to observe the rights therein.5 However, there is 
no apparent recognition in the Government’s white paper6 of the difficulties which 
might be faced by the courts, as a public authority,7 when dealing with matters 
between individuals. This query was raised in the HRA 1998’s passage through the 
House of Commons. The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, opined that the intention of 
the HRA 1998 was to protect individuals from the State and so the rights therein 
were not justiciable in actions between private individuals.8 The clarity of the Home 
Secretary was not echoed in the House of Lords. The Lord Chancellor foresaw that 
giving the term ‘public authority’ a wide definition and including the courts within 
this may lead to an obligation to enforce the HRA 1998 rights and develop the 
common law ‘in disputes between private individuals’.9 Clearly in the eyes of the 
Lord Chancellor the door was open for the development of the common law in light 
of the HRA.10 Further, any such developments would be equally applicable in 
relationships between public authorities and private individuals. To do otherwise 
would not be, in the eyes of the Government, justifiable.11 This line of thought from 
the Lord Chancellor is not unheard of given that bills of rights tend to place the 
judiciary in a more assertive role than would otherwise be the case.12 
The above debates over the HRA 1998 during its passage through Parliament 
provide a starting point for a consideration of the scope of the Act. To give more 
weight than this to such debates would vest too much weight in the views of the 
Government of the day rather than the will of Parliament.13 With this in mind it is 
accepted that it is: 
 ... the language of the Act itself … [which] … Parliament has itself 
approved as accurately expressing its intentions. If the meaning of 
those words is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to a result 
that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, it would be a confidence 
                                                        
5 Home Office, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (Cm 3782, 1997) [2.2]. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Human Rights Act 1998 s.6. 
8 HC Deb 17 June 1998, vol 314, col 406. 
9 HL Deb 24 November 1997, vol 583, col 771. 
10 I Leigh, 'Horizontal Rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the 
Commonwealth?' (1999) 48 ICLQ 57, 58. 
11 HL Deb 24 November 1997, vol 538, col 783. It is assumed that the Lord Chancellor, due to 
the nature of his office and his use of the term ‘we’, was speaking on behalf of the 
Government rather than an independent member of the House. 
12 P Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press 1999). 
13 J Morgan, 'Questioning the 'True Effect' of the Human Rights Act' (2002) 22 Legal Studies 
259, 260.  
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trick by Parliament and destructive of all legal certainty if the private 
citizen could not rely upon that meaning … 14 
However, the meaning of the right to respect for the home is ambiguous in the HRA 
1998 and so the question of what will amount to a person’s home and how this ought 
to be protected in light of art.8 has been ‘left to the courts’.15 These uncertainties 
have manifested in possession proceedings with the question becoming whether a 
tenant can draw upon art.8 ‘in order to resist an order for possession when domestic 
law leaves him defenceless.’16 
2.1 Housing Law and Human Rights 
The law concerning the relationship between landlord and tenant is an ‘amalgam of 
statute and common law’17 which has led to a ‘labyrinth and jungle’18 of legal 
principles. This labyrinth of legal principles makes housing law a challenging area 
for landlords and tenants to charter. Before examining the effects of the Convention 
and the HRA 1998 on housing law it is first necessary to briefly outline some 
foundations of English property law. There exist two possible estates of land in 
English law: the ‘fee simple absolute in possession’ (freehold) and ‘a terms of years 
absolute’ (leasehold).19 It is leasehold estates which are the core concern of this work 
as it is these situations in which the home of a tenant is carved out of the freehold 
interest of a landlord. A leaseholder should be distinguished from a licencee who 
rather than holding an estate in land merely has permission to be on the land and 
does not benefit from security of tenure. The distinction between leases and licences 
was explored in the 1980s primarily due to the efforts of landlords to avoid the Rent 
Act 1977 which sought to redress the strong bargaining position of landlords.20 
However, these efforts were quelled by the Court of Appeal in Street v Mountford.21 
Much of the common law rules which grew to protect tenants have been superseded 
by statute. Such legislation’s primary concern is the process by which a tenancy may 
be determined. On this front, housing legislation may be broadly placed in one of 
two categories: 
                                                        
14 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251, 279-280. 
15 HC Deb 17 June 1998, vol 314, col 420. 
16 Patel v Pirabakaran [2006] EWCA Civ 685, [2006] 1 WLR 3112 [41]. 
17 N Madge, 'Time to Clear the Forest' The Times 
<http://www.nicmadge.co.uk/housing_law_reform.php> accessed 12 October 2015. 
18 Parry v Harding [1925] 1 KB 111, 114. 
19 Law of Property Act 1925 s.1(1) 
20 Horford Investments Ltd v Lambert [1976] Ch 39, 52. 
21 Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809. 
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1. legislation which requires the court to consider the reasonableness of a 
possession order and consequently only make a possession order when it is 
reasonable;22 or 
2. legislation which requires the court to make a mandatory order irrespective 
of the reasonableness of an order.23 
The duality of the Rent Act 1977 provides an opportunity to illustrate the two 
approaches. Section 98(1) of the Rent Act 1977 states that ‘a court shall not make an 
order for possession … unless the court considers it reasonable to make such an 
order’. Further in addition to the reasonableness of an order it is required that a 
ground for possession is present.24 The idea of reasonableness was considered by the 
Court of Appeal in Whitehouse v Lee25 in which the court confirmed that the 
assessment of reasonableness was usually best left to the trial judge who will take 
account of ‘all the relevant circumstances’.26 The court added that in assessing 
reasonableness courts should ask what the consequences of granting an order would 
be along with the consequences of refusing an order for each party.27 In other words, 
if the tenant would suffer from a possession order whilst the landlord would not 
suffer from the tenant’s continued occupation then the court should not make an 
order. 
The approach to reasonableness under s.98(1) of the Rent Act 1977 should be 
contrasted with s.98(2) of the Act, which allows a landlord to regain possession 
notwithstanding the reasonableness of an order provided one of the grounds in pt II 
of sch 1 of the 1977 Act is made out. Clearly s.98(2) is an example which would fall 
into the second category above. The courts have shown some judicial creativity to 
quell the harshness of mandatory possession proceedings.28 However, the powers 
available for this end have been reserved for ‘extremely rare occasions’.29 This 
legislative aversion to a consideration of reasonableness continues in the Housing 
Act 1988 and the Housing Act 1996. In the contemporary housing market this is 
most prevalent with the use of introductory tenancies and demoted tenancies. Each 
                                                        
22 Rent Act 1977 s.98(1); Housing Act 1985 s.84; Housing Act 1988 sch.2 pt.II. 
23 Rent Act 1977 s.98(2); Housing Act 1985 s.84A;Housing Act 1988 sch.2 pt.1; Housing Act 
1988 s.21; Housing Act 1996 ss.127-128. 
24 See Rent Act 1977 sch.15 pt.I. 
25 Whitehouse v Lee [2009] EWCA Civ 375, [2010] HLR 11. 
26 Ibid [23]. See also Cumming v Danson [1942] 2 All ER 653; Cobstone Investments Ltd v 
Maxim [1985] QB 140. 
27 Whitehouse v Lee [2009] EWCA Civ 375, [2010] HLR 11 [24]-[26]. 
28 See generally D Cowan and others, 'District Judges and Possession Proceedings' (2006) 33 
Journal of Law and Society 547. 
29 Vandermolen v Toma (1983) 9 HLR 91, 101. 
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of these tenancies minimises judicial discretion as to whether a possession order 
should be made. Local authorities may now operate an introductory tenancy scheme 
in which all new tenants will be introductory tenants as opposed to secure tenants.30 
The political intention of the introductory tenancy scheme was to allow for tenants 
to demonstrate to the local authority that they are ‘responsible’31 whilst at the same 
time allowing the local authority to quickly recover possession if the tenant is shown 
to be irresponsible. After demonstrating a responsible nature the tenant becomes a 
secure tenant which affords increased security of tenure.32 During the course of the 
introductory tenancy the tenant may be dispossessed using a mandatory procedure 
which precludes any discretion by the court.33 Demoted tenancies function in much 
the same way as introductory tenancies but allow for existing secure tenancies to be 
downgraded to a demoted tenancy. Tenancies will be demoted by a local authority 
attaining a demotion order which the court may only make where it is reasonable 
and there has been anti-social behaviour or a threat of such behaviour.34 A local 
authority may then recover possession of a demoted tenancy in much the same way 
as an introductory tenancy.35  
Against this backdrop is the emergence of a low security private sector 
predominantly made up of assured shorthold tenancies.36 Under an assured 
shorthold tenancy a landlord may recover possession of the property after the fixed 
term has ended provided that 2 months notice is given.37 Provided the landlord has 
complied with the procedural requirements of notice the court has no discretion as 
to whether to make a possession order. The ease with which a landlord may end an 
assured shorthold tenancy is reflected in the fact that in England in 2013/14 the 
termination of an assured shorthold tenancy was the most common cause of 
homelessness (26%).38 The private rented sector now eclipses public housing for 
numerous reasons discussed at 1.1.  
                                                        
30 Housing Act 1996 s.124. 
31 Southend-on-Sea BC v Armour [2014] EWCA Civ 231, [2014] HLR 23 [12]. 
32 Housing Act 1996 ss.124-125. 
33 Ibid ss.127-128. 
34 Housing Act 1985 s.82A. 
35 Housing Act 1996 ss.143D-143F. 
36 As at 1993/94 assured shorthold tenancies accounted for around 40% of the private rented 
sector this increased to near 70% at 2007/08. See Department for Communities and Local 
Government, Fifteen Years of the Survey of English Housing From 1993-94 to 2007-08 
(London, 2009) 31. 
37 Housing Act 1988 s.21. 
38 Department for Communities and Local Government, 'Table 774: Reason for Loss of Last 
Settled Home' (Statutory Homelessness and Prevention and Relief Live Tables, 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/416902/
Table_774.xls> accessed 12 July 2016. 
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2.2 The Shortcomings of Article 8 Jurisprudence 
On its face art.8 of the HRA 1998 offers respite to beleaguered tenants who face 
mandatory dispossession. Such protection would be welcome in the case of either 
public or private tenancies due to the difficulties faced by all tenants in the rented 
sector. In the case of public sector tenancies the courts have accepted that where an 
order is sought at the behest of a local authority then it is open to the tenant to argue 
that an order would be disproportionate.39 However, the courts have rejected the 
argument that art.8 may have a part to play in proceedings excluding a local 
authority due to the requirement that only public authorities are bound by the HRA 
1998.40 Therefore, tenants who appear to be in analogous positions but for the 
institutional character of their landlord do not benefit from the protection afforded 
by art.8. The remainder of this Chapter analyses the case law surrounding art.8 in 
possession proceedings and highlights the unprincipled approach of the courts 
thereby emphasising judicial shortcomings with respect to the research questions 
identified in Chapter 1: 
1. what is the underlying importance of the home as conceived by art.8(1) and 
how should this inform art.8’s application? 
2. what is the theoretical and legal basis for arbitrarily limiting art.8’s 
application to local authority tenants? and 
3. what is required by proportionality in possession proceedings? 
2.2.1 What is the Underlying Importance of the Home as Conceived by 
Article 8(1) and How Should this Inform Article 8’s Application? 
Article 8(1) creates a right to respect for a person’s private life, home, and 
correspondence. Therefore, before any consideration of the ramifications of art.8 
can be assessed it is first necessary to determine when art.8(1) will be triggered due 
to the presence of a person’s home. The domestic courts first considered the 
application of art.8(1) in the context of the home in Harrow London Borough 
Council v Qazi.41 Mr Qazi was a secure joint tenant with his ex-wife and therefore 
enjoyed significant security.42 Under the terms of their lease it was possible for 
either Mr Qazi or Mrs Qazi to terminate the lease by serving four weeks’ written 
notice to quit on Harrow London Borough Council, which Mrs Qazi did therefore 
determining the secure joint tenancy for both herself and Mr Qazi. Thereafter, Mr 
                                                        
39 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
40 Human Rights Act 1998 s.6. 
41 Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2001] EWCA Civ 1834, [2002] HLR 14. 
42 Housing Act 1985 s.82. 
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Qazi sought permission to remain in occupation. Permission was refused by the 
council on the grounds that the property was now under-occupied with Mr Qazi 
being the sole occupant. Soon after this refusal, Mr Qazi remarried with his new wife 
and her five-year-old son moving into the property and then argued that to 
dispossess him would breach art.8. Nevertheless, the judge at first instance found 
that the secure joint tenancy had already come to an end if not only due to the 
conditions of the lease but also the common law rule in Hammersmith v Monk.43 
The rule from Hammersmith being that where one joint tenant serves notice to quit 
the tenancy will be terminated notwithstanding the other tenant’s wishes to stay in 
occupation. 
In assessing the application of art.8(1) on appeal, Arden LJ identified the duty 
placed upon the court under s.2 of the HRA 1998 and highlighted Buckley v United 
Kingdom44 as representing the view of the European Court on art.8 in such cases. In 
Buckley the European Commission held the term ‘home’ to be ‘an autonomous 
concept … which … will depend on the factual circumstances, namely, the existence 
of sufficient and continuous links [to the property]’45 (emphasis added). What is 
most compelling about this finding is that the lawfulness of an individual’s 
occupation appears not to be relevant as to whether art.8(1) is applicable. It is only 
when considering art.8(2) that the legality of a person’s home will be relevant. 
However, since Buckley the European Court has reconsidered its stance. In 
Chapman v United Kingdom46 the European Court held that where an occupier ‘in 
conscious defiance of the prohibitions of the law’ establishes a home, the court 
would be ‘slow to grant protection’.47 Based upon this it would seem that the time at 
which a person makes their home and the legality of that home may be relevant to 
art.8’s application, in such a case the creation of a legal interest would lend weight to 
the property being a person’s home as this could be described as a ‘continuing and 
sufficient link’.48 In Mr Qazi’s case it is in the least arguable that he established his 
home in accordance with the law when he rented the property with his first wife. In 
the same sense it is also arguable that, after Mrs Qazi served notice to quit, the 
property continued to be Mr Qazi’s home. Applying the test from Buckley, there is 
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nothing to suggest that Mr Qazi did not have ‘sufficient and continuous links’ to the 
property. 
In light of the above, the Court of Appeal held that the evolutionary nature of 
European jurisprudence was ‘inexorably moving in one direction’49 which was to 
allow for art.8 to have a role in possession proceedings. On that basis art.8(1) was 
engaged and, as a result of s.6(1) of the HRA 1998, it must be asked whether an 
interference with art.8(1) was justified by art.8(2). However, the effects of art.8 were 
to be minimal in Qazi as, in the opinion of the House of Lords, contractual and 
proprietary claims could not be defeated by art.8. 
The approach of the Court of Appeal in Qazi was met with criticism from Loveland. 
Loveland argues that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in citing 
Buckley as the leading authority on when a property will be a ‘home’ for the 
purposes of art.8 was ‘stretching’50 Convention jurisprudence beyond what had been 
intended. In support of this proposition Loveland relies upon Wiggins v United 
Kingdom51 and the European Commission’s observation that the property in this 
case was ‘lawfully bought’.52 The facts of Wiggins are similar to that of Qazi in that 
Mr Wiggin’s was no longer permitted to reside at the property following a separation 
from his wife.53 
However, for the purpose of understanding Qazi, Wiggins seems an unhelpful 
authority for Loveland’s proposition that a legal interest is required before a ‘home’ 
will be present for the purposes of art.8. Firstly, the abstract to the case states: 
[a] dwelling house, legally acquired by a person and occupied for 
several years does not cease to be his ‘home’ within the meaning of 
art.8 (1) merely because due to unforeseen circumstances, this person 
is no longer authorized to reside therein.54 
Applying this same proposition to Qazi, Mr Qazi acquired a statutory interest to 
reside there as a tenant and so there seems little scope to argue that the property 
was not his home despite the lack of legal interest at that time. Therefore, it appears 
that the property in question could be described as Mr Qazi’s home from the point 
he became a tenant. The property would not cease to be his home due to the 
unforeseen breakdown of his marriage and resultant determination of his tenancy. 
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It would be unreasonable to expect Mr Qazi to foresee the dissolution of his 
marriage ‘and thereby also the precariousness of his future housing situation’.55 The 
second point to note in relation to Wiggins is that, in the same paragraph referred to 
by Loveland, the European Commission confirmed that the dwelling remained Mr 
Wiggin’s home ‘after his separation from his wife ... [with her departure giving] … 
rise to no changes in that respect.’56  
Loveland contends that the European Commission and the European Court of 
Human Rights have emphasised the requirement that a legal interest is required 
before art.8(1) is triggered in a line of decisions.57 However, it appears that the 
statements relied upon by Loveland are a result of the way in which the Commission 
and the Court have drafted their respective reports and judgments rather than an 
indication as to firm guidance. It is suggested therefore that the Court of Appeal’s 
approach in relation to art.8(1) and its application to Qazi, recognises the ‘evolutive 
approach’58 of the European Court of Human Rights and an emerging line of 
thought which can be traced to Wiggins. After a finding that art.8(1) of the 
Convention applies, the question ought to become whether the purported 
interference falls within the derogations allowed in art.8(2). 
The relative clarity of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Qazi was not to last with the 
council appealing to the House of Lords.59 On appeal the question of art.8 and 
whether the property amounted to Mr Qazi’s home was again raised. For the House 
of Lords this was a straightforward query with the Lords unanimously finding that 
the property was a home for the purposes of art.8. Lord Steyn’s views act as a 
response to the criticisms proffered by Loveland with strong warnings against 
colouring the Convention jurisprudence with notions of domestic concepts such as 
‘title, legal and equitable rights’ as this would empty art.8 ‘of any or virtually any 
meaningful content.’60 It is clear from this that for Lord Steyn the importance of the 
home stretches beyond legal constructs, however, beyond these allusions there is no 
attempt made by the House of Lords to conceptualise the precise feelings a person 
may have towards their home beyond the acceptance that ‘ ... few things are more 
central to the enjoyment of human life than having somewhere to live.’61 This 
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aversion to discussing the importance of the home to an individual’s wellbeing is 
also present in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
In Buckley v United Kingdom the Commission for the European Court made clear 
that ‘home’ was an ‘autonomous concept’.62 Whilst this is a useful yardstick for 
determining the existence of a home and as such when a right to respect for the 
home will arise, it does not explore the importance of the home to the individual and 
thereby the importance of art.8 itself. The closest the European Court have come to 
acknowledging the non-legal importance of the home is in Connors v United 
Kingdom in which the court confirmed that the right to respect for the home 
concerned ‘ ... rights of central importance to the individual's identity, self-
determination, physical and moral integrity, maintenance of relationships and a 
settled and secure place in the community ... ’.63 But Connors seems to offer only a 
glimpse of what is bound up within a person’s home with the majority of case law 
seemingly concerned with how the court might identify the home as opposed to 
what it is about the home which makes it worthwhile to protect. The European 
Court’s focus upon the existence of a home over the attachment and links conjured 
by the home for the individual is explored by Buyse in his overview of the court’s 
case law.64 Buyse concludes that, in the case law of the European Court, attachment 
is the key determinative factor in assessing whether the property in question is the 
applicant’s home. The case law following Buyse’s study has been bereft of any 
analysis of the precise interests and feelings that are protected within the right to 
respect for the home with the European Court repeatedly referring to the Gillow test 
requiring ‘sufficient and continuing links’ before art.8(1) will be triggered to protect 
a person’s home.65 These shortcomings are reiterated in the European Court’s 
Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria which confirms the Gillow approach.66  
The failings of the European Court and the English courts in developing a concept of 
the feelings and interests which arise from the home and attach to its occupants 
makes application of art.8 all the more unprincipled. In the event that art.8(1) is 
engaged the follow up enquiry will always be whether such interference is allowed 
for by the qualification built into art.8(2). This will doubtless involve a balancing of 
the competing interests through the application of proportionality as explored below 
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in Chapter 6. The focus which has been placed upon determining the bare existence 
of a home foregoes a wider understanding of the importance of the home to the 
individual and to wider society. This narrow sightedness is detrimental for both 
parties as the deeper interests in play in all possession proceedings remain hidden 
behind the legal rhetoric of title and estates whilst the importance of the home 
which may exist apart from legal interests is lost in adjudication. However, this 
misunderstands and ignores the wealth of literature around the home which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and frustrates the realisation of Convention rights 
due to a misunderstanding of the interests protected by those rights. The failings of 
the courts regarding the nature of the home continue into the recurrent questions as 
to scope of art.8 in instances not involving a public authority. 
2.2.2 What is the Theoretical and Legal Basis for Arbitrarily Limiting 
Article 8’s Application to Local Authority Tenants? 
Manchester City Council v Pinnock represents the first acknowledgment by 
domestic courts that, where a possession order is sought at the behest of a local 
authority, a tenant must be able to have the proportionality of that order considered 
by the court. However, whilst this is a welcome change of course from earlier cases67 
there are still outstanding questions as to art.8. In making any argument that art.8 
ought to apply in possession proceedings one will soon have to address the question 
of whether art.8 should have a role in private sector proceedings. This is particularly 
pertinent given the makeup of the rented sector.68 The issue of horizontal effect is 
primarily a concern of the domestic courts in their interpretation of the HRA 1998, 
however, there is some limited commentary from the European Court of Human 
Rights as to the horizontal nature of art.8. 
The first case to address the question of horizontal effect in detail following Pinnock 
was Malik v Fassenfelt.69 Malik involved a group of squatters who had made their 
home on privately owned land near Heathrow Airport. The owner of the land, Mr 
Malik, sought to regain possession. In their defence the squatters claimed that under 
art.8 it would be disproportionate to dispossess them of their home. At first instance 
the county court judge found that ‘ ... as the court is a public authority … Article 8 is 
capable of application even though the landowner is a private individual and the 
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occupiers are trespassers.’70 That being the case it will only be in ‘a highly 
exceptional case where the protected rights of a private landowner under art.1 [of 
the First Protocol] could be interfered with by reason of the Defendant’s art.8 
rights’.71 
On appeal the county court judge’s assessment of art.8 was not contested as the 
proceedings turned on another point of law therefore the opinions of the Court of 
Appeal on art.8 should only be treated as persuasive. Nevertheless in a dissenting 
opinion Sir Alan Ward agreed with the county court judge that art.8 was engaged 
between private parties.72 Sir Alan’s reasoning rested upon s.6 of the HRA 1998 
which defined the courts as public authorities and therefore bound to observe and 
give effect to art.8. Sir Alan’s opinion is useful for this work in that it shows some 
desire within the courts to recognise the role that art.8 may have. However, the 
shortcomings of this dissenting judgment are noted by Lord Toulson in Malik who 
made clear that to give art.8 horizontal effect could lead to a ‘considerable expansion 
of the law’ imposing a positive obligation on the State which would need to be 
carefully thought out.73 This careful consideration of art.8’s horizontal effect is a key 
aim of this thesis in light of the apparent unwillingness of the domestic judiciary to 
grapple with the questions raised by art.8 and its disparate application established 
in Pinnock and propagated in cases such as McDonald v McDonald.74 
The property in question in McDonald was bought by the tenant’s parents to house 
the tenant who had been evicted from local authority housing, therefore, the 
property acted as something of a last chance for the tenant. The property was 
subsequently let by the tenant’s parents to the tenant in breach of numerous 
conditions of the mortgage. Sometime later the tenant’s parents fell into mortgage 
arrears which led to the appointment of receivers who were able to exercise the 
same powers as a landlord. The receivers sought to recover possession of a property 
utilising the mandatory procedures of the Housing Act 1988. The receivers opted for 
this approach over s.36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 which would have 
allowed for the court to consider the reasonableness of a possession order and, if 
there was a reasonable prospect of the repayment of rent arrears, adjourn the 
proceedings.75 In the context of art.8 this is all the more concerning given the 
tenant’s mental health issues which resulted in her being particularly sensitive to 
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changes in her environment and unable to work making it ‘very difficult’76 for the 
tenant to find alternative accommodation. The judgments of the Court of Appeal 
and Supreme Court in McDonald significantly overlap and so will be considered 
alongside one another. This approach has the advantage of insight from 
commentators on the Court of Appeal’s judgment as the equivalent commentary has 
yet to emerge in relation to the Supreme Court’s verdict.  
The opinions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court are based upon two 
planks. The first is the purported lack of a ‘clear and constant line of [Strasbourg] 
decisions’77 in favour of horizontal effect. The second is the dissenting opinion of De 
Gaetano J in Buckland v United Kingdom78 which sought to limit the apparently 
general application of art.8 to those instances in which a public authority was 
involved. The shortcomings of McDonald and the wider trepidation around 
horizontal effect are discussed by Loveland,79 Nield,80 and Lees81 who offer a variety 
of views on the ‘significant practical consequences’82 of the case. In the work of each 
of these writers a theme of judicial wariness emerges further necessitating the need 
for a comprehensive analysis of the issues identified at 1.2. 
There are immediate issues with the courts’ understanding of the European Court’s 
‘clear and constant’ jurisprudence. Claiming that there is a lack of ‘clear and 
consistent jurisprudence’ discounts the institutional limitations placed upon the 
European Court of Human Rights. Articles 33 and 34 of the Convention make clear 
that applications to the European Court may only be made against States rather 
than individuals.83 Therefore it is little surprise that there is limited analogous 
Strasbourg case law on the subject of art.8 in private possession proceedings as 
private sector tenants do not have the necessary locus standi to resort to the 
European Court. The absence of a ‘clear and consistent’ line of jurisprudence is not 
indicative of a latent opinion in the European Court.84 Furthermore, even if there 
was a lack of clear and constant case law in the realm of possession proceedings this 
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discounts the jurisprudence of the European Court in other areas of law. For 
example, Loveland argues that the Convention jurisprudence is not hermetically 
compartmentalised and rather the nature of art.8 in housing law is informed by a 
range of cases in varying areas of law such as the development of a privacy tort.85 
The ‘ … collapsing of cases concerned with different aspects of art.8 of the [the 
Convention] into a common principle rather suggests that there is no good basis for 
recognising horizontal effect in privacy cases, but not in possession proceedings.’86  
Further testing Arden LJ’s judgment Loveland goes on to note the curious binding 
value attributed to Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community Association Ltd v 
Donoghue,87 following West Kent Housing Association v Haycraft.88 Donoghue 
concerned the interpretation to be given to s.21 of the Housing Act 1988 in light of 
art.8. Due to the mandatory nature of s.21, which requires a possession order to be 
made where the procedures within the 1988 Act have been complied with, it was not 
necessary for the court to reinterpret s.21 as the question of proportionality had 
been pre-emptively considered by Parliament in enacting the Housing Act 1988. 
This presumption clearly contrasts with the views of the Supreme Court in Pinnock 
which were subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Haycraft. Haycraft 
concerned the same s.21 procedure as Donoghue, however, the Court of Appeal 
found in Haycraft that it was able to assess the proportionality of any order 
notwithstanding the mandatory nature of s.21. Therefore, as Loveland suggests, it 
seems the legal basis for McDonald is in the least shaky.89 There was no reliance 
upon Donoghue or Haycraft in McDonald. Rather the Supreme Court found itself 
unable to read proportionality into s.21 due to the lack of public law duties placed 
upon private individuals (both in the sense of judicial review and s.6 HRA 1998) and 
the intentions of the Housing Act 1988 as opposed to the Housing Act 1996. For the 
Supreme Court there was: 
not the same flexibility inherent in the language of section 21(4) of 
the 1988 Act as there is in the language of sections 143D and 127(2) 
of the 1996 Act such as to enable the court to read into it a 
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requirement that the court consider the proportionality of making an 
order for possession.90 
The same criticism can be made here as above. Conceptualising s.21 in this way 
suggests that areas of the law are hermetically sealed from one another. There is no 
good basis for allowing art.8 to have a role in relation to one provision and not 
another when each seeks the same essential outcome – the removal of someone 
from their home.91 
Nield is also critical of the Court of Appeal’s decision in McDonald with the same 
shortcomings applicable to the Supreme Court’s judgment. For Nield the question of 
whether the European Court of Human Rights applies the proportionality test in 
horizontal proceedings is ‘too generally framed’.92 Nield submits that the correct 
question to ask is: 
whether the particular statutory framework of s.21, in interfering 
with respect for the home, serves a legitimate aim which could fall 
within the UK’s margin of appreciation and be proportionate in 
balancing the tenant’s art.8 rights and the property rights of the 
landlord.93 
This reformulation would have allowed the court to consider the facts of the case 
from all angles and take a view on the ‘procedural side-stepping’94 of s.36 of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1970 which would have afforded the tenant in 
McDonald a degree of protection. This also appreciates the connected nature of 
horizontal effect and proportionality, questioning the basis of one necessarily opens 
up questions about the other. A related weakness in McDonald is the failure to take 
account of the tenant as both ‘a legal subject and a human subject’95 operating in the 
domestic jurisdiction. A legal subject of course has the benefit of arguing that an 
order is disproportionate within which there is the human subject which may inform 
this disproportionality due to the detrimental effects a possession order may have 
upon the individual.96 This is compounded by undue assumptions as to the weight of 
De Gaetano J’s opinion in Buckland which is open to an alternative view which 
would see the opinion of the majority disagreeing due to their apparent comfort in 
the face of De Gaetano J’s concerns. 
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The final criticism made of McDonald by Nield is the failure of the Court of Appeal 
to acknowledge the positive obligations created by art.8. This same shortcoming is 
present in the Supreme Court’s judgment. For instance Khurshid Mustafa v 
Sweden97 is described as of ‘peripheral relevance’98 by Arden LJ and is not 
mentioned at all by the Supreme Court. This description undermines the 
importance the European Court of Human Rights has attributed to the positive 
obligations of the Convention which ‘may involve the adoption of measures designed 
to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of relations of individuals 
between themselves’.99 This sentiment is echoed in Khurshid with the European 
Court recognising that it cannot remain inactive where a State acts inconsistently 
with ‘the principles underlying the Convention.’100 
Lees, discussing the Court of Appeal’s judgment in McDonald, takes a different view 
to Loveland and Nield in finding that ‘ ... [t]he result in [McDonald] is correct — 
there is no opportunity within the statutory scheme for a proportionality 
assessment.’101 However, Lees is equally critical of the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeal due to its failure to distinguish between direct horizontal effect, statutory 
horizontal effect, and ‘“common law” horizontal effect’102 which may give rise ‘to the 
potential for confusion in future cases.’103 The same failure to take account of the 
various arguments as to the form of horizontal effect is present in the Supreme 
Court. Lees suggests that this confusion has clouded the correct question which 
ought to have been asked which is whether, after finding that art.8(1) was 
applicable, there has been an interference with those rights by the court itself acting 
as a public authority.104 This form of horizontal effect is defined as ‘strong indirect 
horizontal effect’ by Hunt105 and is assessed in detail in Chapter 4. Leading on from 
this finding Lees suggests that the relevant question becomes whether there is ‘clear 
and consistent’ Strasbourg case law to the effect that art.8 has horizontal effect. 
However, this question suffers from the difficulties noted above in that it discounts 
the institutional limitations placed upon the European Court by arts.33 and 34 
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together with the nascent power of the domestic courts to go beyond the 
jurisprudence of the European Court.106 
McDonald is the most overt Supreme Court discussion of the role of art.8 in 
horizontal possession proceedings. The Supreme Court has followed the same 
course as the Court of Appeal in finding that the ramifications of art.8 are limited to 
those instances which involve a public authority. However, as noted by Nield and 
Loveland there are significant shortcomings in this view which allows for private 
sector tenants to be excluded from art.8’s protection. These shortcomings flow from 
a recognition of the changes which would be wrought from recognising that art.8 
had a role in private sector possession proceedings. This reiterates the overall theme 
of this Chapter, which is the failure of the courts to recognise and address the 
questions raised by art.8. In both Malik and McDonald the courts have not provided 
an adequate theoretical or legal basis for limiting art.8’s application to public sector 
tenants. This failure to consider the ramifications of a horizontal reading of art.8 for 
fear that this is a step too far undermines the importance of art.8 and the interests 
which it protects. Therefore, the arguments given by the domestic courts do not 
provide a sufficient basis for denying art.8’s protection to private sector tenants.  
The shortcomings of the art.8 jurisprudence in English courts and at Strasbourg in 
relation to horizontal effect are stark. The courts ought to grasp the nettle and 
develop an understanding as to the nature of a person’s home and how it ought to be 
protected for the purposes of art.8: 
There is understandable concern about the possibly horizontal effect 
of Convention rights, particularly art.8, upon the property rights of 
private parties. However, the way to allay those concerns is to gain a 
proper understanding of the different ways in which horizontality can 
operate and then to appreciate what lies at the heart of the 
justification for an infringement of respect for the home, including 
the concept of proportionality ... The answer should remember that 
under art.8 the home encapsulates values beyond property rights, 
which prompts the call for some mechanism by which these values 
can find expression and be accorded appropriate recognition … 107 
The analysis of the above case law has demonstrated the steadfast resistance of the 
domestic courts to recognising the horizontal effect of art.8 despite the paucity of 
theoretical and legal arguments in favour of this position. There are hints of a 
floodgate argument at work in the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the 
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Supreme Court; a fear that extending art.8’s protection to private sector tenant 
would overload county court possession lists thereby undermining the procedural 
ease with which tenants may be dispossessed. However, this seems a logistical 
hurdle rather than a reason for denying the protection of a purported fundamental 
right. The current approach to art.8’s horizontal effect creates an arbitrary 
distinction that the courts have failed to justify. Chapter 4 below looks to 
deconstruct the various understandings of horizontal effect which have arisen in 
other areas of the law and cogently outlines the viability of horizontal effect within 
possession proceedings. The deficiencies in the courts’ reasoning in relation to 
horizontal effect are visible in their discussions of proportionality which has 
received equally little consideration. However, if it is possible for the courts to give 
horizontal effect to art.8 thereby allowing for private sector tenants to plead 
proportionality in possession proceedings, questions remain as to precisely how 
proportionality might be applied. This is particularly pressing where art.8 interests 
are at issue given the unique attachment a person has to their home in opposition to 
the legally defined proprietary interests of an owner or landlord. The remainder of 
this Chapter will draw out the shortcomings of the case law to date concerning 
proportionality and art.8. 
2.2.3 What is Required by Proportionality in Possession Proceedings? 
It is settled that a person who is dispossessed of their home at the behest of a local 
authority should be able have the proportionality of any possession order 
determined by the court.108 In giving effect to this, judicial review was deemed to be 
inadequate for assessing each case’s particular facts due to its inability to take 
account of a tenant’s personal circumstances.109 However, whilst the personal 
circumstances of a tenant will be considered within proportionality, the courts have 
made clear that significant weight will be attached to ‘[u]nencumbered property 
rights, even where they are enjoyed by a public body such as a local authority … ’.110 
This assertion regarding unencumbered property rights suggests that where a tenant 
has no proprietary or contractual protection then art.8 will be of limited use.  
It is not clear why the Supreme Court in Pinnock found it necessary to limit the 
application of proportionality to a summary assessment. This is particularly so given 
that proportionality requires similar analysis to those raised by a review of 
reasonableness in possession proceedings.111 Therefore, the proposition that 
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proportionality arguments would ‘play havoc with possession lists in county 
courts’112 seems unfounded.113 Undoubtedly the summary procedure which 
permeates through possession lists would require closer judicial scrutiny but it is 
not a given that this would cause havoc in the county courts as these courts have 
successfully considered similar arguments under existing housing legislation.114 This 
aversion to accepting proportionality continues in Hounslow LBC v Powell.115 
Hounslow followed soon after Pinnock with similar facts, a local authority pursuing 
a possession order against a tenant. In considering the proportionality of an order 
the court reiterated the need for exceptionality before the courts will go beyond a 
summary assessment of proportionality.116 This line of thought suggests that where 
an order seeks to vindicate the local authority’s property rights and enables the 
authority to discharge its public duties in managing its housing stock, then ‘in the 
overwhelming majority of cases’ there will be no need for the authority to explain or 
justify its reasons for seeking possession.117 This fortification of a local authority’s 
property rights indicates that the presumption in favour of a local authority’s actions 
is near ‘irrefutable’.118 Therefore, following Powell, any tenant arguing that a 
possession order would be disproportionate is limited to arguing that an order is 
disproportionate due to their personal circumstances rather than the lack of 
necessity attached to a possession order. This is contrary to proportionality as it 
ought to be understood in light of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the English courts as it foregoes key requirements of a proportionality 
assessment. Therefore the failings of the current law are stark in relation to 
proportionality’s application. 
It has been suggested by Loveland that there are advantages for the courts in leaving 
the nature of proportionality vague to allow the courts flexibility in dealing with the 
range of circumstances in which art.8 may arise.119 This advantage is perhaps 
evident in Holmes v Westminster City Council120 which concerned a local authority 
                                                        
112 N Madge, 'Article 8 - La Lutta Continua?' (2009) 12 JHL 43, 46. 
113 By way of context county courts will typically see around 50 – 60 cases in a possession list 
in any given day, D Cowan and E Hitchings, ''Pretty Boring Stuff': District Judges and 
Housing Possession Proceedings' (2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 363, 364. 
114 J Luba, 'Is There a "Human Rights Defence" to a Possession Claim Brought by a Private 
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115 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2010] EWCA Civ 336, [2010] HLR 35. 
116 Hounslow LBC v Powell [2011] UKSC 8, [2011] 2 AC 186 [36]-[42]. 
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119 I Loveland, 'The Holy Grail as an Empty Chalice? Proportionality Review in Possession 
Proceedings After Pinnock and Powell' (2013) JPL 622, 622. 
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tenancy held by Mr Holmes, who suffered from various mental illnesses. The 
possession proceedings arose out of Mr Holmes’ alleged assault of two of his 
landlord’s employees. In the county court Mr Holmes argued that a possession order 
would be disproportionate as he refuted the assault allegation. However, this was 
summarily dismissed due to the lack of supporting evidence in his favour. On appeal 
Eady J found that where a local authority wishes to evict a tenant following 
‘shortcomings in [the tenant’s] behaviour … it will have to be shown that there are 
substantial grounds ... if summary imposition of a possession order is to be 
avoided.’121  
The vagueness which has been exhibited by the courts in relation to proportionality 
has resulted in a haphazard application of art.8 at a time when what is most needed 
from the superior courts is clarity and consistency. This is true not only of the 
structure and robustness of proportionality but also the factors which should be 
considered within a proportionality analysis under the nebulous term ‘personal 
circumstances’.122 This is evident in possession proceedings which have on their face 
similar facts but nevertheless result in disparate outcomes such as Birmingham City 
Council v Lloyd123 and Southend-on-Sea v Armour.124  
Birmingham City Council v Lloyd125 provides an example of the current confusion 
in the lower courts as to what circumstances ought to be considered within an 
assessment of proportionality. The facts of Lloyd are most unusual. Mr Lloyd and 
his brother, Mr Gibb, were secure tenants of separate properties let by Birmingham 
City Council. Following Mr Gibb’s death, Mr Lloyd moved into Mr Gibb’s flat in spite 
of warnings from the local authority that he remained liable for the rent of the 
property let in his name until the tenancy over that property was determined. In 
addition, the local authority explained to Mr Lloyd that he would not be granted a 
tenancy of the late Mr Gibb’s property. Nevertheless, Mr Lloyd served notice 
determining his tenancy and remained in Mr Gibb’s property thereby forcing the 
authority to initiate possession proceedings. 
The basis of Mr Lloyd’s defence in the county court was, that to evict him would be 
an interference with his rights under art.8 as it would be disproportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. The recorder sitting in the county court agreed with Mr 
Lloyd for the following reasons:  
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1. Mr Lloyd had a history of depression which was likely to worsen if he was 
evicted and made homeless; and  
2. there was purported confusion on the part of Mr Lloyd in the circumstances 
under which he gave up his original tenancy.126 
The Court of Appeal was not so receptive to these arguments with Lord Neuberger 
finding that there was no evidence to suggest that, if evicted, Mr Lloyd’s depression 
would worsen. Lord Neuberger’s comments on the point are noteworthy; with his 
Lordship stating that whilst the court was sympathetic to Mr Lloyd’s depression the 
circumstances were not exceptional. This is in itself a reiteration of the principle that 
the court’s sympathy should not colour its consideration of proportionality.127 This 
assertion misunderstands the significance of the home to the individual and the 
nature of the proportionality test to be applied when considering such interests.128 
Moreover, it begs the question that if the deterioration of a tenant’s mental health is 
not weighty enough to make an order disproportionate then precisely what will tip 
the balance. 
Southend-on-Sea v Armour129 is the only successful pleading of art.8. The 
proceedings arose out of Mr Armour, an introductory tenant, allegedly being 
involved in anti-social behaviour including: threatening neighbours, aggression 
towards housing officers, and abusive behaviour towards local authority electricians 
working on his property. In the county court the judge found that at the time which 
the matter reached the court, notwithstanding the fact that it may have been 
proportionate to make an order at the time of issue, making a possession order at 
the hearing would be disproportionate. The Court of Appeal agreed with this verdict. 
Giving the sole judgment Lewison LJ found that the facts of the case had sufficiently 
changed from the point at which the claim was issued as compared to the facts 
considered by the county court. Therefore, it would be disproportionate to 
dispossess Mr Armour of his home. In reaching this decision the Court of Appeal 
showed significant deference to the ‘value judgment’130 of the county court. The 
appeal court found that the question was not whether the judgment of the county 
court was the same as the Court of Appeal but rather whether the decision was open 
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to the county court judge.131 In assessing this, the Court of Appeal took notice of the 
aim of the Housing Act 1996 which was to ‘test the tenant’s behaviour over a one 
year period in order to see whether he can be a responsible tenant.’132 In Armour the 
period between issuing the proceedings and the first hearing reportedly 
demonstrated Mr Armour’s good behaviour thereby making the county court judge’s 
decision, that to make a possession order would be disproportionate, viable. 
The precedential value of Armour is limited as the findings of the county court, High 
Court, and Court of Appeal seem highly sensitive to the facts of the case. Prior to 
Armour it was expected that a successful art.8 argument would be based upon a 
well-prepared defence.133 The judgment in Armour was instead a result of the 
changing facts of the case creating something of a paradox.134 It is common for a 
tenant’s circumstances to change between the issuing of a proceedings and the 
county court hearing during which time an already vulnerable tenant is likely to 
suffer increased distress. Therefore, there is scope for the approach of Armour to be 
common in county courts. For the purposes of this work Armour provides little 
guidance as to the precise application of proportionality in future possession 
proceedings with proportionality remaining ‘incorporeal’.135 This is all the more 
confusing in light of comments from a previous Court of Appeal decision in which 
changed circumstances or a ‘last minute redemption’136 were deemed insufficient to 
reach the highly exceptional threshold.137 
The above analysis examined the nature of proportionality in relation to art.8 and 
has demonstrated the lack of a principled and replicable model which might be 
applied by county courts when weighing the conflicting rights of a tenant and 
landlord, be they public or private in nature. This underwhelming development of 
proportionality following Pinnock is disappointing considering the progress the 
courts have made in human rights adjudication generally.138 The courts appear to be 
wary of developing a model of proportionality that would weaken a landlord’s 
proprietary rights and in so doing undercut the advantages granted to landlords by 
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summary possession proceedings. However, this aversion to developing art.8 
jurisprudence empties art.8 of its meaning. If art.8 is not to have a meaningful role 
in proceedings where a person’s home is at risk then the value of art.8 becomes 
questionable. This is not to say that art.8 will always defeat a landlord’s claim for 
possession but stating that it will only be in exceptional circumstances that a 
possession order will be disproportionate does not assist tenants or landlords in 
determining whether their own case is sufficiently exceptional and if so how the 
court will assess proportionality. This is evident in Southward in which the 
circumstances that gave rise to a successful art.8 defence were the product of court 
delays rather than a particularly virtuous argument.  
2.3 Conclusions on Article 8 Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court has come a long way since first deciding in Qazi that the 
enactment of the HRA 1998 had no effect in mandatory possession proceedings due 
to the recovery of possession being ‘in accordance with law’ and therefore falling 
under the qualifications of art.8(2). Following Pinnock and Powell it is now 
accepted that a tenant facing dispossession at the suit of a local authority is entitled 
to argue that a possession order would be disproportionate notwithstanding any 
lack of discretion afforded to the court by that particular legislative scheme. 
Nevertheless, there continues to be a lack of appreciation at all levels of the judiciary 
as to the ramifications of this finding for landlords and tenants in the public and 
private sectors.  
The root of the difficulties faced by the courts in relation to art.8 is the 
underappreciation for the importance of the home to the individual. Therefore, even 
in cases where art.8(1) is engaged the interests which rest at its core are not fully 
conceptualised to the extent that they can be weighed against the considerable 
interests of a landlord. Any such understanding of the importance of the home to 
the individual and wider society does not depend upon or relate to the institutional 
nature of a person’s landlord and so may inform the extent to which art.8 has 
horizontal effect. The arbitrary distinction created by Pinnock is all the more 
difficult to justify in the face of these concerns as to the nature of the home which 
are explored in full in Chapter 3. A principled and replicable model of 
proportionality has yet to emerge which exacerbates the underwhelming case law 
around the importance of the home and the horizontal effect of art.8. In light of the 
difficulties faced by tenants in the rented sector the courts have given no legitimate 
reason for a haphazard approach to proportionality. The preceding analysis of art.8 
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case law in this Chapter has bolstered the necessity of this thesis which will address 
the following areas: 
1. the underlying importance of the home as conceived by art.8(1) and how 
should this inform art.8’s application; 
2. the theoretical and legal basis for arbitrarily limiting art.8’s application to 
local authority tenants; and 
3. what is required by proportionality in possession proceedings. 
In addressing these research questions it will be demonstrated that there is a strong 
basis for a robust application of art.8 which, in the contemporary housing 
landscape, would serve to protect those who would otherwise be without a legal 
remedy.139 In the absence of a firm understanding of art.8 and its potential 
requirements tenants, both public and private, are left in a position which is less 
advantageous than their historical counterparts.140 
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3 The Underlying Importance of the Home as 
Independent From Private Property 
3.1 The Nature of Private Property 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and 
engages the affections of mankind, as the right to property; or that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any 
other individual in the universe.1 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter critically analysed the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the English courts drawing out the tripartite difficulties which 
have arisen in relation to art.8. Firstly, there has been a failure to fully articulate and 
account for the importance of the home to the individual beyond determining the 
presence of a home. Secondly, the courts have created an apparently arbitrary 
distinction between public and private sector tenants. Thirdly, there has been little 
engagement with the nature of proportionality and how the proportionality of a 
possession order will be assessed in art.8 arguments. This Chapter deals with the 
first of these concerns, the nature of the home. Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) states everyone ‘ … has the right to 
respect for … his home … ’. In searching for any meaning to the term home the 
enquiry inevitably turns to understandings of property and ownership. This Chapter 
analyses the theoretical underpinnings of competing conceptions and justifications 
for the ownership of private property. Any protection of the home via the human 
rights of a tenant will likely result in the deprivation of property in some sense for a 
third party be they a local authority or a private landlord. This outcome is implicitly 
recognised in the Convention in art.1 of the First Protocol which secures the right to 
respect for a person’s property. For the purposes of this thesis this will 
predominantly occur where a landlord is prevented from recovering their property 
due to it being disproportionate to remove a tenant from their home. In which case a 
landlord will be unable to enter a new lease with another tenant, live in the property 
themselves, or sell the property with vacant possession. Therefore, before making 
any argument for a more robust application of art.8 an understanding of the 
interests that might suffer as a result is necessary. For these reasons this Chapter, 
firstly, examines the philosophical idea of and justifications for private ownership 
and related rights and, secondly, looks to the idea of the home and the unique place 
of the home in sociological thought. It is argued below that despite a lack of 
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appreciation for the home within property theory discourse there is scope for a 
robust application of human rights within litigation concerning the competing rights 
of a landowner and a person in their home. This Chapter therefore identifies the 
theoretical foundations upon which later Chapters build. 
3.1.2 What is Property? 
The widely accepted understanding of property is based upon ‘an ownership model’2 
giving precedence to the rights of owners. This in an important distinction which 
observes the difference between property as an institution and ownership as an 
entry point to that institution.3 The ownership model is taken from Hohfeld’s 
conceptualisation of property rights4 together with the supplementary work of 
Honoré.5 The work of Hohfeld and Honoré will be considered below at 3.1.4. 
However, at this stage Hohfeld’s work may be summarised in the terms for which it 
has become famous in property theory – namely, that property rights, which arise 
from ownership, may be described as a ‘bundle of sticks’6 owing to their correlative 
rights and no-rights or privileges and duties7 between individuals.8 Honoré follows 
Hohfeld’s intellectual thread by transposing recognised property rights into 
Hohfeldian terms. For example, Honoré talks of exclusive control being the most 
important of the rights attached to land. Honoré describes this as the right for 
landowners to exclude unwanted guests against the correlative no-right of a guest to 
enter without the landowner’s permission. This leads to a ‘self-regarding’ 
understanding of property: ‘in that only the owner is legitimately interested and 
others have no legitimate claims to control what the owner does with her own 
property’9 irrespective of who may be making a home on the land. Clearly these 
approaches presuppose a legal system and a societal acceptance of private 
ownership but they do not question the justification for ownership of a resource 
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which may form the core of a person’s relationship with the State.10 The justification 
for private ownership becomes all the more noteworthy when considered against the 
view that private ownership may lead to and exacerbate inequalities among society.11 
The difficulty presented by this absolutist view of property is apparent in conflicts 
between property rights (necessarily linked to a legal or equitable interest) and 
personal rights (independent of legal interests) which may often have good reason to 
take precedence.12 This is a theme which runs throughout this thesis and is apparent 
in the case law analysed in Chapter 2 in the ease with which the courts have 
favoured property interests over art.8 considerations. Therefore, the arguments and 
justifications for private ownership which are typically advocated in opposition to 
art.8 claims are critically analysed below. 
3.1.3 Justifications for Property and Ownership 
Justifications for private property stretch back to Aristotle and Plato. For the 
purposes of this work their thoughts offer justifications for why private property has 
been protected to such an extent in English law. This prevailing view is strengthened 
by the common law view that the State has no business in interfering with a person’s 
property.13 However, this view does not account for the unique nature of the home, 
often the primary purpose for which a person acquires land. These shortcomings are 
recognised by Singer who proposes a proprietary solution to instances where the 
freedom of an owner to do with their property as they wish ought to be curtailed for 
the advantage of the wider community. Singer’s theory is not directly applicable to 
instances in which a person’s home is at risk as such. Nevertheless, as discussed in 
detail below, Singer provides an inception point for accepting that property interests 
may yield to competing interests such as art.8 arguments. However, before looking 
for gaps which might allow for the stymying of property interests the justifications 
for property and the interests which attach to ownership must first be established.  
3.1.3.1 Human Perfectionists14 
For Aristotle the basis for private ownership rests on the understanding that private 
property assisted in the realisation of Greek virtues, those virtues being: 
1. knowing oneself; 
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2. moderation or nothing in excess; and 
3. each person should do in life what they are best suited to do.15 
The first of Aristotle’s substantive arguments in favour of private ownership rests on 
the idea that decisions are best made by private actors.16 This might be seen as an 
extension of the first Greek virtue as Aristotle believed that the best person to make 
specialised decisions as to the course of action in a given situation is the person with 
an interest in the outcome. Grunebaum uses the example of community 
disagreement over the use of land in support of Aristotle’s view.17 The basis for this 
view is the specialised knowledge that the individual has in relation to the land in 
question, for example the terrain and fertility of the land which may be ‘very 
expensive to centrally acquire’.18 It is not clear from Aristotle or Grunebaum why an 
individual would be better placed to ‘assimilate and comprehend’19 the matrix of 
information which will arise in determining how land should be used. However, this 
is based on the assumption that there exists a common and objective end which a 
private owner is best placed to implement. Immediately this is problematic as in the 
modern context it is public bodies (not private individuals), in some cases with 
democratic accountability in others not, which make decisions as to how to 
effectively use land for the benefit of the community at large. There does not exist, 
nor does Aristotle appear to argue there should, an entirely private domain in which 
individuals are free from the impositions of the community. This realisation 
therefore allows for instances in which a person’s holdings might be rebalanced in 
favour of some wider benefit to the community or perhaps the benefit of a needier 
individual.20 The limitations upon a purely private approach to ownership are 
recognised within the Convention at art.1 of the First Protocol which allows for the 
enforcement of ‘such laws as [the State] deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest’.21 Aristotle’s writings fail to 
account for the nuances of the modern framework for property ownership in English 
law22 and whilst there is some agreement with Aristotle that the virtues deemed 
worthwhile in pursuit of ownership are concomitant with ideas around the home 
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discussed below at 3.2 there is no acknowledgement from Aristotle that absolute 
rights over private property may also run counter to these virtues. In addition to 
this, Aristotle’s arguments fail to recognise that these virtues are not necessarily 
limited to the ownership of private property but rather having a place to call home. 
Plato serves as a useful counter to Aristotle. Plato developed a more restrained 
approach to private ownership which identifies the pursuit of wealth as the ill to be 
tempered by any system of ownership.23 To his detriment Plato, like Aristotle, 
appears to focus on private ownership from the sense of value and scarcity of land as 
a resource at the expense of overlooking the most fundamental use of land – that is 
as a home. Both Plato and Aristotle seem fixated on the creation of wealth. It might 
be that this is the other side of the coin to equality but a complete lack of 
consideration of this important sociological aspect to property, which may exist 
independent of ownership, is clearly insufficient for establishing any justification for 
the absolute domain which traditionally attaches to private property. 
Some indirect appreciation for the importance of the home comes from Aquinas. 
Aquinas’s approach to material goods is indicative of an absolute but attractive 
maxim; ‘everything is in common.’24 There is some virtue in the view that all 
property is common as this idea leaves open the possibility that it is for society to 
express its will (through law) as to how competing values ought to be weighed where 
a person’s home is at risk.25 In the context of housing this conflict will often arise 
between a tenant and their landlord. It is not proposed that a reading of Aquinas’s 
work allows for the Convention to provide hierarchy of rights which directs the 
judiciary to the weight to be afforded to certain rights nor is it suggested here that a 
hierarchical view of rights is correct.26 Rather Aquinas’s view that everything is in 
common provides an inception point allowing for a reading of art.8 (and art.1 of the 
First Protocol) which accepts the possibility that hard legal rules supporting the 
absolute rights of an owner might be softened through the operation of human 
rights, specifically in this case art.8. 
Nozick is most notable for his opposition to the view that resources may be 
redistributed. Nozick’s aversion to this is explained in his entitlement theory which 
serves as an extension of the core of Nozick’s views on the State. If there is to be a 
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process to allow for redistribution of holdings one would expect that this would be in 
some way an emanation of the State (including the courts), in line with Nozick’s 
favour of the minimal State this would be unacceptable.27 For Nozick and his 
entitlement theory property may only be used by the legal owner who will be the 
legal owner by way of a just acquisition or transfer.28 Going further if a person’s 
‘holdings are just [that is to say they have been acquired by just acquisition or 
transfer], then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just’.29 In other words, 
redistribution of property or enforced alternative use of property at the behest of the 
State would be unjust.  
In the context of the protection of one’s home, Nozick’s argument against 
interference with property is based on a general assumption against State intrusion. 
However, Aquinas’s view, in the equivalent situation, has the potential to create a 
specific avenue for the staying of property rights in certain instances, due to 
everything being in common as a starting point.30 If this thought is carried forward 
it would appear that there is certainly a case to be made for an individual facing 
eviction to argue that via the powers granted by the HRA 1998,31 which like all 
legislation is the imperfect ‘expression of the will of the people in a democracy’,32 a 
court, as the personification of the community’s wishes,33 is able to and in some 
cases must curtail a landlord’s absolute right to their property.34 This duty is 
effectively echoed in law and the interpretation given to art.8. Therefore, in 
balancing the competing interests of a landlord and of a tenant it may be argued that 
the tenant’s home interests might outweigh the absolute ownership rights of the 
landlord. This would also necessarily include those instances in which a court is 
afforded no discretion as to the making of an order due to the powers created by the 
HRA 1998.35 
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There is contemporary support for this view from Singer,36 who argues that in 
certain instances the court may be under a duty to rebalance property interests from 
one person to another: 
At crucial points in the development of these [social] relationships 
[such as landlord and tenant] – often, but not always, when they 
break up – the legal system requires a sharing or shifting of property 
interests from the "owner" to the "non-owner" to protect the more 
vulnerable party to the relationship.37 
Singer makes this assertion alongside his argument in favour of a ‘reliance interest’, 
an interest which will arise where A is to be significantly disadvantaged by the 
exercise of absolute legal control of property owned by B.38 Singer utilises various 
established contract and tortious actions which allow for the courts to stymie the 
intentions of a legal owner where they have a negative effect on the community.39 
The case study for Singer’s article is the ‘Steel Valley’ community of Youngstown, 
Ohio, who faced social and economic ruin due to the closure of the local steel plants 
which employed the majority of people in the area. In this example Singer argues 
that the relationship between the owner of the plant and the local community ought 
to be reconceptualised to take account of the power imbalance between the parties 
giving rise to various options to keep the plants open. The same argument could be 
made in relation to landlord and tenant relationships which regularly involve 
landlords who are often economically and institutionally more powerful than their 
tenants. 
The relationship between landlord and tenant could be described as one of ‘mutual 
dependence’.40 This idea of mutual dependence is akin to Aquinas’s thoughts on 
community and all things being in common therefore providing a basis for the 
court’s ability to rebalance proprietary interests.41 Due to the premise of Singer’s 
argument being based in the common law, it would seem that this would be limited 
to instances in which common law rules are under scrutiny and thereby open to 
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judicial interpretation and development,42 such as Hammersmith v Monk.43 
However, giving effect to these ideas where statute dictates a particular course of 
action, such as mandatory dispossession, is more difficult but for those cases which 
fall under the interpretative powers the HRA 1998. This dichotomy is insightfully 
highlighted by Fox: 
The line of cases from Qazi to Pinnock provides a fascinating 
illustration of the ways in which doctrinal commitments — and the 
values, explicit or implicit, that underpin these: property values, 
which are not self-defining but themselves require interpretation — 
can reach beyond the common law to shape the norms of property 
law across the ‘categories’ of our property law system.44 
3.1.3.2 First Acquisition of Property45 
Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas provide justifications for ownership from a common 
belief that ownership contributes to the betterment of society overall. The discussion 
above at 3.1.3.1 focused upon these writers to demonstrate that whilst they might be 
described as the ‘human perfectionists’ the method by which people may be 
‘perfected’ differs between Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. The above analysis 
highlighted Aquinas and Singer’s work and an approach which would allow for a 
softening of ownership rights on the basis of the needs of the community or those 
individuals in need. An alternative thread of property theory has sought to justify 
ownership on the basis of ‘first appropriation’.46 Proponents of first acquisition 
differ somewhat from the human perfectionists in that their starting point is how 
property comes to be acquired rather than justifying property on the basis of its 
purported virtue. However, the arguments made in favour of first acquisition lead 
into justifications for ownership. The idea of first appropriation requires there to be 
acceptance of state of nature theory predating civil society which hypothetically 
explains the method by which the opportunity to appropriate resources came about. 
Like the human perfectionists, these theorists suffer from a general lack of 
appreciation for the home together with an acceptance of the inequities which flow 
from the state of nature to modern society. 
Locke is the leading first acquisitionist. Locke proposed that in a state of nature, 
antecedent to civil society, people were able to dispose of their possessions freely 
without any interference from the law (or society). As to how people are to acquire 
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property in the first instance Locke proposed a mixed labour theory. Locke’s theory 
rests on the premise that the core of property is a person’s labour.47 It is through 
labour that Locke believes people are able to first acquire property in both the sense 
of moral and practical justification, where a person’s labour is mixed with the land 
that land is removed from the state of nature and becomes the property of the 
labourer.48 Immediately, Locke’s theory is problematic due to the possibility for 
people to work in groups or some form of cooperation in the state of nature. If a 
group’s labour becomes mixed with the land does that land become jointly owned by 
the group or is each member of the group entitled to discernible portions of the land 
which they own individually.49 The problems with Locke’s approach continue where 
people enter civil society which requires certainty as to title and the precise rights 
which flow from ownership, therefore, it is unsurprising that Locke advocates a 
State created legislative system that respects the outcomes of the state of nature.50 
The enduring influence of Locke’s work is visible in the contemporary common law 
approach to property ownership. The emergence of this view in the common law 
courts is evident in landmark cases such as Ashby v White51 and Entick v 
Carrington52 which continue to inform the courts’ conception of ownership. 
Notwithstanding Locke’s wish for a system of property which might serve to provide 
a logically structured system of ownership the problem of Locke’s work remains the 
focus upon labour which looks at property as a store or culmination of wealth rather 
than as a home. Moreover, there is the question as to how much labour one must 
expend before ownership arises, is this an aggregative test or de minimis.53 The 
problem is best put by Nozick asking if a can of tomato juice is spilt in the ocean 
would that be sufficient to amount to a mixture of labour thereby making the ocean 
the property of the careless party.54 Furthermore, Locke overlooks the importance of 
the home to the individual. If the state of nature theory is accepted a person’s first 
step would surely be the pursuit of shelter or somewhere which may be called home 
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and would act as a base.55 In spite of these shortcomings, it is Locke’s understanding 
of first acquisition which has gained ground in the common law.56 
The problems continue in the submissions made by other first appropriationists. 
Kant’s arguments in favour of first appropriation rests on what Kant calls first 
declaration. Unlike Locke, who requires some expenditure of labour to be expended 
upon and mixed with the land, Kant merely requires a declaration of a person’s 
intent to claim property: ‘[w]hen I declare … “I will that an external thing … be 
mine,” I thereby declare it obligatory for everyone else to refrain from the object of 
my will.’57 Kant’s approach is equally subject to Nozick’s criticisms regarding the 
mixture of labour. If Nozick’s criticism is recalibrated in Kantian terms, it seems 
preposterous to suggest that any person seeking to lay claim to the ocean by virtue 
of a declaration should be able to enforce such a claim against others. Without the 
‘limiting condition’ of Locke’s labour principle Kant’s approach is excessive and 
untenable.58 
Rousseau might also be termed a first appropriationist due to his work regarding 
social contract theory.59 Rousseau approached the question of appropriation from 
two perspectives. The first is analogous to Locke’s view of a state of nature in which 
people are able to gain ownership of property through ‘first occupancy’.60 The use of 
the word occupancy is immediately appealing when looking to identify a 
justification for ownership which recognises the primary purpose for occupying land 
in the state of nature or in civil society is to make a home. Taking this view would 
allow for Rousseau’s work to be utilised in the context of the home. This implied 
acknowledgment of the use of land for shelter carries on into Rousseau’s framework 
for determining whether first occupancy has occurred: 
1. the land must not be inhabited; 
2. the land must not be more than is necessary for subsistence; and 
3. there must be signs of ‘labour and cultivation’ to allow for others to respect 
first occupancy.61 
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Rousseau’s view of first occupancy within a state of nature recognises how land is 
commonly utilised. The first limb of Rousseau’s test and specifically the word 
‘inhabit’ demonstrates the importance that may be placed upon the home, with the 
definition for ‘inhabit’ being ‘live in or occupy (a place or environment)’ (emphasis 
added).62 Moreover, words such as inhabit have been found to be synonymous with 
the home: 
The words ‘dwell’ and ‘dwelling’ … are ordinary English words, even 
if they are perhaps no longer in common use. They mean the same as 
‘inhabit’ and ‘habitation’ or more precisely ‘abide’ and ‘abode’, and 
refer to the place where one lives and makes one's home. They 
suggest a greater degree of settled occupation than ‘reside’ and 
‘residence’ … 63 
Rousseau goes further in his second criterion, and appears to show some overlap 
with Aquinas, in his requirement that there must be some consideration of what is 
necessary for survival and impliedly that limited resources must be utilised on the 
basis of necessity.64 Coming to the third of Rousseau’s requisites for first occupancy, 
Rousseau appears to soften the mixed labour analogy from Locke and instead 
requires outward signs of ‘labour and cultivation’. This test in itself would appear to 
be more viable in the context of modern housing law given the courts’ willingness to 
assess a tenant’s outward intention to return to their home.65 
The shortcomings in Rousseau’s approach become apparent, however, where the 
state of nature gives way to civil society. Whilst first occupancy is antecedent to civil 
society once society is inaugurated then the first occupant will necessarily gain a 
property right which ‘excludes him from everything else [that is not his]’.66 In this 
sense, ‘individuals who possess little or nothing may lose a great deal or 
everything’.67 This creates the potential for civil society to be, using Rousseau’s 
terms, less fair than any state of nature irrespective of the argument that it is the 
social compact which gives ‘full moral and legal status’68 to an individual’s rights. 
This is in spite of Rousseau’s contention that the right ‘ … each individual has to his 
own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over all …’.69 
However, Rousseau is unclear precisely what is being suggested here, does he mean 
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to say that there ought to mechanisms in place to stay property rights where the 
needs of the community outweigh those of the individual landowner or is Rousseau 
simply reiterating his view that following the social compact ultimate ownership 
rests with the sovereign state or people.70 If it is the former then it is arguable that 
there is scope within the Rousseau’s theory to allow for human rights considerations 
to overreach conceptions of private ownership where it is deemed necessary in the 
interests of the community. However, even if the latter position is adopted it is 
possible to argue that the community, which expresses its will through Parliament, 
is able to curtail the apparent absolute rights of an owner. This would also in 
principle allow for human rights considerations to stymie proprietary rights. 
Nozick is the final of the first appropriationists considered. Nozick follows in the 
Lockean tradition on the basis that he believes that justice in private ownership is 
rooted in history. Nozick differs from Locke, however, in that he rejects the labour 
principle and instead argues that the acquisition of property is just where the 
acquisition does not worsen the position of others.71 Nozick uses the example of a 
grain of sand on this point to demonstrate that if a grain of sand is removed from 
the beach there are plentiful other grains for appropriation. However, Nozick 
oversimplifies his appropriation stance on the assumption that all land, like a grain 
of sand, is equal to all other pieces of land thereby overlooking inherent competition 
and trade-offs in land use.72 Nozick’s requirement that acquisition is only just where 
resources are plentiful and remain available for others does not account for the 
differing utility of land. For example, if a piece of land is on the meander of a river 
stocked with fish and well-placed to act as a port then those who have not 
appropriated this land are immediately disadvantaged when it is claimed.73 Nozick 
also fails to appreciate that the ‘possession of exclusive rights to something that is 
scarce and valuable necessarily implies the possession of power over others who also 
desire the scarce and valuable.’74 For these shortcomings it is submitted that 
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Nozick’s theory does not provide an accurate basis for understanding ownership of 
property. 
3.1.3.3 Law Gives Rise to Ownership 
Grunebaum identifies the final group of theorists as those who believe that law gives 
rise to ownership.75 It might be said that these theorists are more grounded in their 
approach as they seek to demonstrate that ownership stems from ‘political or legal 
conventions’.76 Rawls is the most notable of these writers for the purposes of this 
work. Rawls tables the idea that the rules which define justice, the acquisition of 
property, and the rights attached to property ought to be the product of a 
hypothetical original position. This original position is perhaps Rawls’s ‘single most 
important departure from traditional social contract theory.’77 Rawls’s original 
position exists to ‘set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just’ 
and utilises the ‘veil of ignorance’ to hypothetically allow for people to make 
decisions without any prior knowledge of the society in which they exist or of their 
own place in that society.78 
In the sense of justification for ownership Rawls’s theory flows from the ownership 
of oneself.79 This approach has some echoes of Locke’s theory of ownership which, 
as stated above, deems a person’s property to be their labour. In Rawls’s view there 
are two related groups of ownership; the first is natural talents which form part of a 
community’s common assets80 and the second is natural abilities which are also a 
collective asset.81 Rawls does not articulate the distinction between these two groups 
and so they may be considered ‘freely interchangeable stylistic variants of one 
another’.82 Although Rawls talks of common and collective assets it appears fair to 
say that Rawls’s theory is one based upon private ownership albeit private 
ownership of one’s physical self.83 Rawls’s theory is certainly useful therefore in 
demonstrating that there may be justifications for the collective use of assets that 
flow from the actions of the individual however there is perhaps a problem in 
stretching this to apply to privately owned natural resources such as land.84 This 
problem is noted by Grunebaum who gives the example of B finding oil on his land 
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which increases his wealth. However, imagine that B did nothing to assist in the 
discovery of this oil but rather rode on the coattails of A, his prospector neighbour, 
who expended the lion’s share of effort in discovering oil. Grunebaum addresses this 
apparent inequity in the following terms: 
If a person’s talents and abilities are a natural endowment which 
belong to everyone, it is difficult to see why land and resources which 
are nature’s endowment should not also belong to everyone ... [justice 
involves] the distribution of what is needed for each person to try to 
achieve the good life as he himself conceives of it.85 
If justice, in the normative sense tabled by Rawls, involves the distribution of the 
means to allow a person to achieve a good life it seems consistent to suggest that 
within any such system of justice there ought to be a robust protection of a person’s 
home where that home is key to the realisation of a good life as she (or the 
community) conceives it. 
3.1.3.4 Conclusions on the Justifications for Property 
The above analysis of the theoretical justifications for private property demonstrates 
that whilst there are those theorists who consider it unjust for the courts to interfere 
with a person’s holdings such as Nozick, there are others such as Aquinas, Rawls, 
and Singer who recognise that there are instances in which a person’s property 
rights may be curtailed for the benefit or protection of others. Aquinas’s work is 
instructive on this point. Aquinas advocates common ownership and therefore 
recognises instances in which property rights may be rebalanced in favour of a 
vulnerable party. This approach is amenable to the human rights perspective 
advanced in this thesis. For example, this accords with the positive obligations 
which may arise out of art.8.86 There is weight given to Aquinas’s work by 
Rousseau’s ideas around first appropriation notwithstanding the problems 
identified with state of nature theories above. Rousseau’s theory of first 
appropriation allows for appropriation through a person claiming a piece of 
property as their home. However, and more interestingly for this work, there is 
scope within Rousseau’s theory to allow for human rights to reach into the property 
regime where it is necessary and in the interests of the community.  
There is also support for this approach from Rawls who believes that a person’s 
natural talents and abilities ought to come under the collective ownership of the 
community. Looking at the idea of property ownership overall it is possible to take 
Rawls’s theory further. Rawls accepts his theory of justice may involve the 
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distribution of the means to allow a person to achieve a good life in this sense it 
seems appropriate to mobilise human rights for the protection of one’s home. There 
are therefore a number of theoretical justifications for a robust utilisation of art.8 
where a person’s home is at risk that may allow for property rights to be curtailed. 
To talk of property in absolute terms therefore accounts for only a fraction of the 
positions one may take in relation to property notwithstanding the confidence with 
which the courts talk of ‘unencumbered property rights’.87 Any talk of affording a 
priori weight to a person’s property rights seems to be short-sighted. Moreover, it is 
unclear, beyond the right to recover possession, precisely what the courts are 
referring to when they use the term property rights and how this might interfere 
with the protections afford by art.8. The discussion below takes account of the rights 
which attach to property and the effects these rights may have upon other 
individuals. 
3.1.4 The Rights Attached to Property 
The theoretical justifications for private ownership were analysed above. Within this 
discussion it has been demonstrated that there is no one property theory which 
engages with and develops the conception of the home as such. However, there are 
theories which allow for absolute property rights to be stayed leaving room for 
human rights arguments to have effect. The justifications for private property have 
focused largely upon philosophical and moralistic considerations in favour of private 
ownership. However, once private ownership is justified in some sense, allowing for 
ownership to be softened in certain instances, focus turns to what one can do with 
the property they own and equally what limitations might be placed upon this. The 
most pressing question for the purposes of this thesis is when these rights may be 
stayed or recalibrated to allow for tenants to remain in their home despite the 
apparent absolute rights of the landlord arising from the ownership model. 
Hohfeld and Honoré are most notable for their work in identifying and codifying the 
precise rights which may be exercised by the owner of property.88 Hohfeld’s work is 
not solely concerned with property as such89 rather Hohfeld sought to identify 
general and basic legal rights which arose across a legal system.90  
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'Ownership' in Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 1961). 
89 But for occasional mentions of property rights, W N Hohfeld, 'Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' (1916-1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710, 719-733; 
54 
 
It is Honoré who directed Hohfeld’s work towards property theory, developing the 
following body of property rights: 
1. the right of use; 
2. the right of exclusion; 
3. the right to compensation; 
4. the rights to destroy, waste or modify; 
5. rights to income; 
6. absence of term; 
7. liability to execution; and 
8. power of transfer.91 
This body of rights is the dominant ‘understanding of property in what might be 
called mainstream Anglo-American legal philosophy … [the so-called] “bundle of 
rights”.’92 The lack of reference to using property as a home within Honoré’s 
calculation is immediately apparent. Moreover, this approach to property theory has 
in itself been problematic in that it has not quelled outstanding questions as to 
property rights but rather over time has led to the identification of areas of theory 
which require further consideration. MacLeod demonstrates this point astutely and 
highlights four prevalent gaps in the current literature.93 
The first gap identified by MacLeod relates directly to Honoré’s work and is known 
as ‘Wood-Trees Gap’.94 The core of this criticism is that any kind of Hohfieldian 
approach to property rights overstates the certainty of property at the expense of 
realising that ‘property is intelligible only as a social construct, as a perfect malleable 
category wholly at the service of collective goals.’95 This is akin to Aquinas and 
Rawls’s views discussed above at 3.1.3. In this sense it seems it has been forgotten 
that the absolutist nature of the ownership model may in certain circumstances yield 
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to the well-being of others. Both Munzer and Penner accept to some degree that the 
core right attached to ownership is the ability to exclude others.96  
The second gap identified by MacLeod, the justification gap, deals with the issues 
around the plethora of proposed justifications for private property which have been 
analysed at 3.1.3. It is not intended to recant the discussion above analysing the 
justifications for private ownership. However, MacLeod makes similar criticisms of 
the following; the acquiescence to private ownership on a historical basis,97 state of 
nature theories,98 and a conventionalist approach to justification.99 It was 
established above that many of these approaches to private property are flawed as 
they fail to recognise the importance of the home and fail to account for those 
instances in which a person’s property rights might be amended by law. Rather it is 
the work of writers such as Aquinas, Rousseau, and Rawls who may be read to allow 
for community interests to defeat the interests of private property. 
The third area of scholarship highlighted by MacLeod is the agency gap which 
recognises the core dichotomy of private property that is the conflict between the 
rights of the individual and wider community interests:100 
In a simplified version of this dichotomy, property is either an 
absolute, pre-political right enjoyed by an individual to disregard the 
public good or simply whatever privileges are left over after the state 
has finished regulating (for now). Property ownership is thus placed 
in conflict with political powers.101 
This highlights a key line of thought in property theory and wider legal thinking that 
might be termed the public/private divide102 or ‘the core relations ... between the 
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state and the citizens concerning the general interest’.103 The full ramifications of the 
public/private divide will be addressed in Chapter 5. However, at this stage the gap 
identified by MacLeod is noteworthy due to the focus placed on ‘the emotional 
sources of successful institutions’.104 The agency gap therefore cuts across three 
areas of this work, namely, the nature of the public/private divide (that is the 
application of public law in the form of human rights to housing law), the necessary 
balance to be accorded to competing interests in the context of property, and the 
lack of consideration for the ‘emotional’ aspects of property, specifically in the 
context of the home detailed at 3.2.  
The final gap for MacLeod is the rights gap which focuses upon the legal nature of 
the rights which attach to property. As opposed to the popular bundle approach to 
rights which provides a convenient shorthand within philosophical circles, lawyers 
rather focus upon legal constructs.105 It is this style of legal argumentation which has 
narrowed literature around the absolute nature of rights which attach to ownership 
of property. The law favours certainty and in so doing opts for absolutes where 
possible, this is no more evident than in such foundational common law concepts 
like stare decisis. From a rule of law standpoint this is sensible in that it makes the 
law ‘accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear, and predictable.’106 However, 
this drive for predictability betrays an equally valid observation: ‘in law, “context is 
everything.”’107 Therefore, attributing greater weight to the interests of a landlord 
over the personal circumstances of a tenant on the basis of the landlord’s property 
rights seems overzealous. This is particularly so in light of the range of personal 
circumstances which might arise in possession proceedings.108 This same 
observation might be levelled at the literature considering the role of human rights 
as applicable to housing law and so opens the door for a wider view of the 
justifications for human rights to play a role within housing law beyond legalistic 
arguments. 
This self-contained approach within legal literature exacerbates the problem which 
forms the basis of this thesis, that is the lack of a unified approach to the role of 
                                                        
103 J Bell, 'Public Law in Europe: Caught between the National, the Sub-National and the 
European' in Marc Van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law 
(Hart 2004) 259, 259. 
104 C M Rose, 'Psychologies of Property (and Why Property is not a Hawk/Dove Game)' in 
James Penner and Henry Smith (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 288. 
105 A J MacLeod, 'Bridging the Gaps in Property Theory' (2014) 77 MLR 1009, 1024-1025. 
106 T Bingham, Rule of Law (Penguin Books 2011) 37. 
107 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432 [69]. 
108 See for example Chapter 2 for discussions of some of this case law. 
57 
 
human rights where a person’s home is at risk and the precise application of human 
rights law in an area essentially concerned with resource allocation. This issue in 
itself feeds into the overarching gap found by MacLeod, the theory-doctrine gap. 
This problem is visible in the phenomenon of ‘property outsiders’.109 Property 
outsiders are those who ‘have less or no property’110 due to the current focus within 
property literature upon ‘certainty, autonomy, and efficiency’.111 It is these property 
outsiders who often make their homes in the rented sector which, as highlighted in 
Chapter 1, is increasingly made up of poor housing stock and marginalised people. It 
is these same individuals who would be protected by the argument at the core of this 
thesis, that art.8 ought to have a pervasive influence in all instances where a 
person’s home is at risk at the behest of a landlord. 
The gaps identified in the literature around property rights broadly demonstrate the 
paradox at the core of property: 
Property, understood as absolute control over one’s own, is self-
defeating. If there were no limits on one’s ability to use one’s 
property, one could use it to destroy the property of others. Because 
others have property rights too, protection of property requires limits 
on property rights to ensure that one’s legal rights are compatible 
with the rights of others. Property – the paragon of absoluteness, the 
quintessential example of complete control – is inherently limited ... 
Property, then, is a paradox ... Entitlement initially appears to abhor 
obligation, yet on reflection we can see that it requires it. Indeed, it is 
the tension between ownership and obligation that is the essence of 
property.112 
This understanding of property rights has much in common with the view that 
property may be justified on the premise that it is allowed for by law.113 This finding 
demonstrates the patchwork nature of property theory and highlights the futility of 
seeking to explain property in one monolithic theory. This paradoxical 
understanding of property allows us to conceive something which is collectively 
constructed in a social and legal sense.114 This social collective construction is no 
more present than in the sociological understandings of the home discussed below 
at 3.2. Entitlements and obligations are bound up in property. The question is in 
what circumstances these may out shadow one another.115 In this work the question 
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might be reformulated to ask when it is correct for the right to respect for a person’s 
home under art.8 to supersede a landlord’s entitlement to a mandatory order for 
possession. The legal argument in favour of this began in Chapter 2 and continues in 
Chapter 4. The remainder of this Chapter engages with sociological literature in 
favour of this view and bolsters the argument that art.8 ought to be readily 
applicable in all possession proceedings. 
3.2 The Inherent Non-Legal Importance of the Home to the 
Individual and Society 
I mean [possession proceedings are] pretty boring stuff. It’s not 
intellectually demanding, as you’ve seen. And my response is largely 
instinctive rather than intellectual but it’s important, and what could 
be more important than, well, what could be more important? Life 
and death, I suppose. But otherwise taking you out of your, of your 
home, Article 8, and all the rest of it. So that’s what sort of keeps me 
[a district judge] going doing this stuff.116 
At the end of the day you’re talking about somebody’s home. There is 
nothing more fundamental, it seems to me, apart from taking 
someone’s children away but somebody’s home is actually one of the 
most fundamental things.117 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The following makes use of sociological understandings of the home as opposed to 
the philosophical and legal understandings of ownership which have been primarily 
concerned with the identifiable monetary nature of the home as a legal construct.118 
The home is more than a physical space and attaches to a person’s identity and 
wellbeing by providing a secure private place for an individual or group of people to 
retreat.119 In the context of a landlord and tenant the home is a product of the 
unique and interdependent relationship between the two parties.120 This analysis 
serves as the basis for arguing that art.8 ought to be robustly applied in possession 
proceedings as these ‘ethical considerations cannot be excluded from the 
administration of justice.’121  
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3.2.2 More than Simply Ownership 
The importance of the home whilst underrepresented in traditional legal discourse 
is ‘widely accepted as a universal human experience by Western philosophers and 
writers’.122 This is in spite of the fact that one’s legal relationship with their home 
acts as the foundation that gives rise to a plethora of complicated contextual 
feelings.123 This phenomenon has been noted by socio-legal scholars who have 
recognised that an ‘analysis of emotions may develop further an understanding of 
ideological processes in legal regulation which have so far focused on macro aspects, 
such as grand-scale political ideologies’124 which are visible in housing law. 
Searching for the meaning of the protections afforded by art.8 is made difficult by 
use of the word ‘home’ over, for example, residence, dwelling, or even house.125 The 
travaux préparatoires of the Convention makes no mention of how the term home is 
to be interpreted.126 The travaux préparatoires instead shows that the wording of 
art.8 was transposed from art.12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).127 Many of the articles to the UDHR are inspired by a multitude of national 
constitutions and bills of rights.128 Article 12 is no different in this regard in being 
partially based upon the suggestions of the Chinese delegation to the December 1947 
Committee tasked with drafting the UDHR.129 The sentiments of art.12 are also 
similar to the requests of Latin American nations at the time of the UDHR’s drafting 
and the idea of the ‘inviolability of the home’.130 For the drafters of the UDHR the 
inviolability of the home flowed from a person’s inherent right to have their privacy 
protected.131 However, due to protestations from the UK delegation the idea of 
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inviolability was dropped in recognition of instances in which a person’s home will 
be interfered with in some way, for example, by a landlord recovering possession.132 
The use of the word ‘arbitrary’ over ‘unreasonable’ or ‘illegitimate’ within art.12 is 
noteworthy in the composition of the UDHR with the delegates favouring arbitrary 
for two reasons. The first is a matter of consistency with other articles of the UDHR, 
specifically arts.9 and 15. The second is more substantive, in that ‘arbitrary 
interference’ suggested that a breach of art.12 would arise where ‘everything was not 
in accordance with well-established legal principles’.133 The debate around the 
precise wording of art.12 is indicative of the emotive nature of the home and its 
unique place in the minds of its drafters. What is clear from the debates around 
what became art.12 is that the interests protected by art.12 exist apart from property 
which is the subject of art.17 of the UDHR. Based upon these findings it is difficult to 
say precisely what is meant by the term home and how it ought to be interpreted by 
individuals or nations looking to cite the UDHR and, relatedly, art.8 of the 
Convention. The difficulty of determining the extent of art.8 is made more difficult 
by the use of ‘domicile’ in the French version of the Convention which the European 
Court of Human Rights has found to have a wide definition.134 Nevertheless, the 
protection of the home tallies with the protection of the individual at the core of 
human rights instruments135 and transcends easily quantifiable physical assets such 
as land and the ownership thereof which the law has come to efficiently recognise 
and protect.136  
This idea of the home and private life transcending ownership has been alluded to 
by the European Court of Human Rights in Niemietz v Germany.137 In Niemietz the 
European Court held the right to respect for one’s private life must ‘comprise to a 
certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with human 
beings’.138 This necessarily requires that an individual is able to develop their 
personality and relationships with others. The notion of ‘family life’ cited in art.8 is 
interpreted widely and goes beyond legal understandings and instead focuses on the 
facts of a given case such as whether there ‘exists [a] de facto family life where 
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persons live together on a permanent basis and share a home so as to constitute 
themselves as a family.’139  
Radin seeks to explain this phenomenon of the home through her theory of property 
and personhood140 in which she argues that a person’s attachment to property may 
be placed on a spectrum of two diametric forms of property; personal property and 
fungible property.141 This approach rests upon the proposition that ‘most people 
possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves’.142 Within this scale 
Radin uses the example of a wedding ring to demonstrate the differing personal 
attachments a person may exhibit: 
One may gauge the strength or significance of someone’s relationship 
with an object by the kind of pain that would be occasioned by its 
loss. On this view, an object is closely related to one’s personhood if 
its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object’s 
replacement ... For instance, if a wedding ring is stolen from a 
jeweller, insurance proceeds can reimburse the jeweller [fungible 
property], but if a wedding ring is stolen from a loving wearer, the 
price of a replacement will not restore the status quo – perhaps no 
amount of money can do so [personal property].143 
Radin makes the same claim in relation to a person’s home by using the example of 
a commercial landlord who will undoubtedly have a different attachment and feeling 
towards his property than the tenant who calls that property their home.144 In the 
case of a landlord the property in question is fungible whereas for a tenant the same 
property would be personal due to the way in which they are invested in their home. 
It may be that the landlord is resident on the property so the property may be the 
home of the landlord and the tenant.145 However, this does not undermine the 
feelings a tenant may have towards their home, rather, this simply allows for a 
conceptualisation of these interests which may be understood in the same way as a 
landlord’s. The key is determining whether the property is personal or fungible for 
the relevant party.146 
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Radin’s theory is inspired in part by the work of Hegel who, in the tradition of Kant, 
saw the person as ‘an abstract autonomous entity capable of holding rights, a device 
for abstracting universal principles and hence by definition devoid of individuating 
characteristics.’147 From this proposition it may seem contradictory to argue that a 
person may be bound up with an external object, however, viewed in another 
fashion it becomes clear that the only manner in which a person may express their 
personhood is to take action in the actual world over and above their abstract selves. 
This idea is apparent in the steps tenants may take to modify their home to 
‘appropriate what they themselves have not created … [but which are] … 
constructive of social relations’.148 In this sense the home is recognised as ‘a moral 
nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of association’149 where a person can 
‘embody and constitute’ themselves.150 Additionally, whether a place is a person’s 
home is independent of ownership.151 The home acts as a private sanctuary which 
assists in the development of a personhood.152 The higher status given to personal 
property, and specifically the home, in such instances flows from a person’s reliance 
upon continuity and self which requires ‘an ongoing relationship with the external 
environment’.153 The forfeiture of such connections via dispossession leads to a great 
sense of loss.154 Radin’s approach to personhood presents a basis upon which art.8 
may be anchored to recognise a person’s intimate connection to their home. 
Moreover, the personhood theory does not concern itself with the institutional 
character of actors in a given case. Instead Radin demonstrates that some 
attachments, such as those concerned with the home,155 are so strong that they 
ought to be given precedence. The concept of personhood is not unique to Radin 
with Griffin arguing that human rights exist to protect one’s personhood.156 In 
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Griffin’s work personhood may be distilled to autonomy and liberty.157 In this sense 
art.8 may directly link with the development of one’s personhood in that the home 
may allow for one to enjoy autonomy from the outside world alongside the liberty to 
act as one wishes within their home (or in the least a part of their home). This 
linking of personhood, autonomy, and liberty is evident in the empirical evidence 
discussed below in which tenants cite a lack of liberty and autonomy as 
undermining their attachment to the home. 
The strongest criticism of Radin is offered by Blumenthal who suggests that there is 
little empirical evidence to support Radin’s theory, particularly in the sense of 
affording increased protection to the home.158 Blumenthal also contends that one’s 
feelings towards their home are contextual.159 For instance, in some studies women 
have been shown to develop stronger ties to their homes than men.160 Blumenthal 
therefore asks whether a woman’s home should be afforded more protection than a 
man’s. The same point could be made in relation to children who might often have a 
stronger connection to the home (and particularly their own space) than adults due 
to the refuge provided by the home in an otherwise adult world. However, whilst 
Blumenthal’s point is an interesting observation it is suggested that rather than 
focusing on a monolithic approach that would apply to a given gender, age, or other 
grouping of people, focus should be placed upon the individual at risk of losing their 
home in a given case. A context sensitive approach recognises the common thread 
running through literature on the home which makes clear that the home is a ‘ ... 
private and personal place that is highly idiosyncratic, whose shape changes fairly 
frequently, and whose image can be both multifaceted and also highly ephemeral.’161 
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This dynamism towards the home is echoed in a person’s differential feelings 
towards individual areas or rooms of the home.162 
Taking the first point of a lack of empirical evidence for a close connection between 
a person and their home it should be noted that Blumenthal begins from a 
misunderstanding of Radin’s work by saying Radin’s theory is presumed on the 
submission ‘ ... that control over private property is paramount in developing a 
healthy self-identity ... ’.163 This is not the case. Radin’s discussion of landlord and 
tenant relationships makes clear that personhood is not limited to ownership of 
private property but can attach to objects which may be owned by another. This is 
evident in the positive characteristics of the home not being ‘inherently enhanced by 
home ownership, particularly where the occupier’s status becomes unsustainable.’164 
Moreover, there is empirical support for Radin’s work offered by Smith165 and 
Sixsmith.166 In Smith’s study, 23 subjects167 participated in interviews which sought 
to draw out their feelings towards their homes.168 In these interviews the 
participants noted the following qualities which attached to the home: ‘continuity, 
privacy, self-expression and personal identity, social relationships, warmth, and a 
suitable physical structure’.169 During interviews the subjects also identified 
ownership and the security that this provides as a desirable, but not essential, 
feature of a home. This point is supported by Hiscock: 
[B]ecoming a home owner does not in itself guarantee feeling more 
protected in or by the home … [although] owner-occupation can 
provide financial backup in times of trouble, interviewees who 
considered what this would mean in reality were less convinced of its 
advantages as housing wealth is likely to be realised at a great 
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emotional cost: the loss of the home … owner occupation could 
[therefore] actually provide less security than social renting … ’170 
The remainder of the descriptors used by the subjects in Smith’s study are equally 
applicable to rented accommodation such as the ‘atmosphere of the home’ and 
‘internal social relationships’.171 Of these themes a ‘significant proportion’ of the 
participants noted the ability for self-expression allowed them to develop a self-
identity.172 Further, restrictions on self-expression due to short-term tenure led to a 
feeling that the place was not a home.173 In view of the commonality of the responses 
from the interviewees Smith concluded that there was empirical support for 
‘continuity, privacy, self-expression, social relationships, warmth, and ... physical 
structure’174 being essential characteristics of a home. Applying this finding to art.8 
would appear to suggest that anyone claiming an interference with art.8 and their 
right to respect for their home is necessarily holding themselves out as having these 
feelings towards the property in question. 
Additional empirical support for the unique position of the home in the minds of 
individuals is offered by Sixsmith.175 Sixsmith begins by asking a simple question: 
‘what does “home” mean?’176 In answering this question Sixsmith’s study in contrast 
to Smith looked at the experiences of postgraduate students living in university 
accommodation.177 This group of participants has the potential to undercut the 
proposition that the essential characteristics of the home which have been identified 
within the work of Radin and Smith are focused upon a middle class nuclear 
family.178 It might seem that postgraduate students do nothing to assuage this 
middle class image given that many postgraduate students will come from an 
advantaged background.179 However, this misses the point of Sixsmith’s work. In 
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selecting postgraduate students as subjects Sixsmith’s strengthens the proposition 
that one’s feelings towards their home arise independent of the location being a 
family or cohabited home. Postgraduate students ‘have often lived in a range of 
different residential arrangements’.180 Therefore, any common ground between 
Sixsmith and Smith’s work suggests some universality as to the phenomenon of the 
home. The participants’ answers to the ‘meaning of the home’ were grouped into 20 
categories by Sixsmith, of these categories the three most common feelings were; 
belonging, happiness, and self-expression.181 Although these characteristics were not 
seen as essential for the existence of a home they are indicative of a person’s general 
feelings towards the place which they call their home which Sixsmith categorises in 
three broad groupings; personal, physical, and social.182 In a personal sense ‘[t]he 
home can be seen as an extension of oneself, perhaps in two senses … between the 
subjective self (the “I”) and the objective self (the “Me”)’.183 This echoes the 
observations made by Radin in relation to the abstract self and the expression of 
that self in the physical space such as a home. Leading from this the home becomes 
a physical and emotional centre point essential to a sense of being.184 On the basis of 
her findings Sixsmith determines: 
Home is a multidimensional phenomenon, neither unidimensional 
nor created from a set of standard qualities pertaining either to the 
person or the place. Rather, each home features a unique and 
dynamic combination of personal, social and physical properties and 
meanings.185 
The home is more than merely a physical structure and encompasses a range of 
social and emotional ties.186 It is the loss of these multidimensional ties that Radin is 
seeking to conceptualise and prevent.  
Blumenthal’s second criticism of Radin, the contextual nature of the home, is 
supported by the empirical work of Smith and Sixsmith. However, this is not a 
reason to disregard the idea that the home ought to be respected by the law rather 
Blumenthal’s concern simply reminds us that the home holds different meanings for 
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different people.187 For example, in homes where social relationships have soured or 
where a person has been the victim of domestic violence then the home may 
understandably conjure negative feelings.188 Equally, negative (or positive) feelings 
may arise following tragedy or loss, for example, where a friend or family member 
passes away.189 The negative feelings an individual may feel towards a certain place 
have been explored by Manzo,190 who notes ‘[much] critique [which highlights the 
negatives experiences of the home] stands in sharp contrast with the metaphorical 
meaning of the home … by describing the residence as a haven.’191 However, negative 
feelings towards the home may be better described as the ‘shadow side’ of home 
life.192 In effect what these negative feelings show is the ‘dynamic’ nature of an 
individual’s feelings towards a given place.193 In this sense what is required from the 
perspective of the courts looking to give protection to a person’s home through art.8 
is a context-sensitive approach which takes account of this dynamism. Taking a view 
of the whole circumstances of the case where a person’s home is at stake would 
allow the court to assess a person’s attachment to that home and the ramifications of 
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a person being dispossessed of their home.194 To be clear this is not to say that a 
place with negative feelings for a person is any less their home in a de facto sense 
but rather seeks to highlight a person’s connection based upon individual 
experience. These potential negative feelings are open for consideration by the 
courts under the current approach of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
domestic courts.195 Concomitantly the court may consider the ‘significant negative 
psychological impacts from [involuntary] moving’.196 
Criticism of Radin is also offered by Stone who suggests that it is the law of property 
itself which leads to a person becoming attached to their home: 
In other words, one can draw … a reversal in the chain of logic, from 
the idea of the subject grounding the law of property to the law of 
property producing some of the constitutive elements of our political 
and legal embodiment.197 
Stone argues that this understanding results in Radin’s theory being ‘pervasively 
conservative’.198 It is true that some of the examples used by Radin fall within what 
might be termed conservative institutions such as a wedding ring199 or the 
ownership of a suburban family home.200 However, the arguments used by Radin in 
favour of property and personhood are not restricted to instances of ownership but 
transcend to instances where a person does not necessarily own the property which 
they are attached to. In the case of rented homes a tenant will not own the property 
they consider home and yet they may have much the same feelings towards their 
home as an owner-occupier.201 This view is best put by Radin saying that a tenancy 
ought to carry the same ‘moral weight … [as an owner-occupier’s home] … because 
… it is the tenant’s home in the same sense.’202 In those instances where tenants are 
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dissatisfied with their lack of ownership it seems their dissatisfaction flows from 
limitations enforced by their landlord.203 This observation is confirmed by the work 
of Saunders who when interviewing owner-occupiers found that his subjects often 
draw a line between renting and owning one’s home to the effect that when a home 
is owned the occupier is free to do to the property as they choose.204 Again, these 
observations do not suggest that a tenant’s feelings towards their home are any 
greater or lesser than those of an owner-occupier, rather their attachment is simply 
contextual. This is evident in the fact that renters often see home as a place closely 
linked with family and neighbours whereas owner-occupiers see home as a place of 
relaxation and personal possessions.205 In each case the consequences flowing from 
dispossession are likely to be negative for the occupant irrespective of the form of 
tenure. If any argument was to be made as to the detrimental effects of 
dispossession upon an individual there is scope to make the case that renters who 
place an emphasis on the family and neighbours around them are likely to suffer 
more distress than an owner attached to their chattels which are easily transferable 
to a new home. Therefore, the criticisms of Radin’s property and personhood theory 
being conservative,206 favouring the nuclear family,207 and concerned with the 
aspirational idea of the suburban family home208 seem to misunderstand Radin’s 
approach which does not require ownership of property.209 This is supported by the 
empirical research referred to above. Particular support is drawn from Sixsmith’s 
work. The fact that Sixsmith’s students exhibited much the same feeling towards 
their home as their more typical rented sector counterparts strengthens this 
argument. The criticisms levied at property and personhood are understandable as 
Radin at times makes the claim that ownership is central to her theory210 which 
conjures up ideas of owning property rather making clear that ownership of a legal 
interest, such as under a lease or a licence, is equally able to contribute to 
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personhood.211 Furthermore, Radin does not acknowledge the potential for a person, 
for example children and other vulnerable people, to be bound up in their home in 
lieu of a proprietary interest.212 The contention made here due to the empirical 
evidence identified above is that the personhood approach is equally applicable in 
instances where there is no legal interest as such. In those occasions where art.8(1) 
ought to be engaged it is suggested that there should be a ‘robust justification’213 for 
the removal of someone from their home. In light of the interpretative powers 
created by the HRA 1998 the same robust justification ought to be required for 
limiting the ramifications of art.8 to public sector tenants as was done in Pinnock 
and McDonald. 
3.2.3 The X Factors of the Home 
The above discussion of Radin’s property and personhood theory has alluded to the 
connections which arise in relation to a person’s home. These intangible qualities 
have been explored in a more overt legal context by Fox who has termed these 
qualities the ‘x factors’ which transform the home from bricks and mortar into 
something which is bound up with the occupier, in other words ‘home = house + 
x’.214 The framework provided by Fox allows for the interests a person may feel to be 
conceptualised in an overt sense beyond simply accepting that a person is bounding 
up in their home. This is particularly beneficial when a person’s connection to their 
home is to be assessed by a court. Fox identifies five potential categories for these x 
factors: 
1. home as a financial investment; 
2. home as a physical structure; 
3. home as a territory; 
4. home as a centre for self identity; and 
5. home as social and cultural unit.215 
3.2.3.1 Financial Investment 
The first of these x factors accounts for those instances in which the home is owned 
by the occupier. Legal discourse concerning the home is adept at identifying the 
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financial investment an owner-occupier makes in their home.216 However, this 
adeptness has led to the non-monetary interests which arise from a person’s 
relationship with their home being underappreciated.217 Where owner-occupation is 
seen as the primary form of tenure the rented sector will be ‘viewed as a second-
class housing tenure’.218 This perpetuation of the financial elements of one’s home 
threatens to further marginalise those who rent their home. In this sense Fox 
accepts that overly focussing upon a financial investment skews matters in favour of 
owner-occupiers. This view also fails to appreciate that most owner-occupiers must 
buy their home with the help of a mortgage and so whilst an owner-occupier may 
have an exclusive right to possession this is subject to significant contractual 
obligations to the mortgagee.219 This thesis is concerned with the effect of art.8 upon 
landlord and tenant relationships, in which a tenant will not typically have a 
financial investment in their home. In light of the foregoing analysis as to the 
diversionary nature of the financial investment x factor and the research objectives 
of this work, focus will instead be placed upon the other x factors of the home as 
identified by Fox. These factors are not only more relevant to this study but exist 
independent of any ownership one may or may not have in their home. 
3.2.3.2 Physical Space 
The abstract advantages of the home must flow from some physical space which is 
more than simply a shelter or territory.220 The physicality of the home provides the 
locus for a ‘place of safety, privacy, continuity, and permanence.’221 These benefits 
are succinctly expressed by Porteus who notes that the benefits of a physical space to 
call one’s home are essential for psychological health.222 Due to the law’s 
comfortableness in dealing with physical spaces it is unsurprising to see that art.8 is 
seen to protect ‘the notion of a private space into which no-one is entitled to 
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enter’.223 The absence of a physical space which is ‘basic to the sustenance of life 
itself’224 is not simply detrimental to a person’s physical health but their very future 
as it is the home where ‘opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually, 
and spiritually’225 which will hopefully prepare an individual to enter society.226 The 
importance of the home in this regard is evident in the romantic manifestations of 
the home in literature and poetry.227 
There is also an alternative view put forward by Waldron arising out of the lack of a 
physical space to call home, that is that any liberal society which values an 
individual’s freedom requires a place to exercise that freedom: 
Everything that is done has to be done somewhere. No one is free to 
perform an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform it. 
Since we are embodied beings, we [must] always have a location.228 
In this sense one’s home is a precondition to the realisation of the other rights 
contained within the HRA 1998. This is an important point when considered 
alongside the work of Barak. For Barak where such facilitative rights are at issue 
there exists a duty upon the courts to consider and give effect to the idea of an 
implicit right to ‘human dignity’.229 The content of this right protects a person’s 
humanity; that is their self-respect, self-worth, and the freedom to direct one’s life 
as they choose.230 This overlaps with Waldron’s view and is supported by Miller’s 
work on the transition a physical space goes through from structure to household 
via the expression of one’s own tastes and modifications to their home.231 For Miller, 
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the wilful construction of a household identity is crucial in the formation of the 
home.232 
This same view is reflected in Fox’s approach to the home as a physical space, in that 
the structure of the home acts as an undoubtedly important aspect of the home yet it 
is not fully representative of the range of feelings which are attributed to the 
home.233 Rather, for Fox, the structure of the home is the starting point for the x 
factors which create the phenomenon of the home, as a place of privacy, safety and 
continuity.234 This idea of safety and continuity demonstrates the territorial 
character of the home where a person or group will exhibit control over the area 
which in itself allows for self expression, security and family life.235 These 
observations overlap with the insights above in relation to the negative feelings 
tenant’s have towards their home where they are prevented from making 
customisations to the property. The advantages of the home as a physical space or a 
territory might be encapsulated in the following, ‘[the physical space of the home] 
represents a complex cluster of values … ’ for the occupier such as family, privacy, 
security, control, belonging, rootedness, personal orientation, and continuity.236 
These same attributes contribute to the occupier’s feelings of identity and self-
determination.237 However, the physical features of the home ‘account for only a 
small portion of the definition of home’238 and so act as a jumping off point for the 
other x factors. 
Before moving on to the additional x factors of the home detailed by Fox it is 
worthwhile exploring the concept of spatial identity which may act as a bridge 
between the advantages of a physical space and identity. The importance of a spatial 
identity is best put by Fried, ‘a sense of spatial identity is fundamental to human 
functioning.’239 The idea of a spatial identity is based upon the memories, images, 
and ideals that are triggered and developed by a physical space, whether this is the 
home itself or the local area.240 Whilst Fried is concerned with this phenomenon in 
relation to the forced relocation of whole communities (specifically the West End of 
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Boston during the 20th century) the same observations made in relation to spatial 
identity in those instances are equally applicable in the case of individuals, families, 
or friends facing a possession order. It is arguable that the negative feelings which 
would arise in the case of an individual being dispossessed would be more 
pronounced as they are being removed from the community in which they may have 
developed their spatial identity.241 This contention is all the more pertinent in 
relation to those who are less affluent and who tend to be ‘integrally tied to a specific 
place’242 (emphasis in original). It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that those in low 
security tenancies are often those in disadvantaged socio-economic circumstances, 
in such cases ‘effective relationships with others are dependent upon a continuing 
sense of common group identity, the experience of loss and disruption of these 
affiliations is intense and frequently irrevocable.’243 These identity connections 
exemplify the connections that a person may have to the physical space and 
surrounding area in which they make their home. These ideas of identity are further 
explored in the following section. 
3.2.3.3 Identity 
The importance of identity is often presented as an outcome flowing from private 
ownership,244 perhaps the most extreme form of this is Locke’s labour theory which 
allows for a person’s identity to essentially be stamped upon the land through 
mixing one’s labour with the land.245 However, if the emergence of identity is 
analysed further it becomes clear that identity flows not from ownership of private 
property but rather from one’s presence in their home or a specific place.246 This 
idea is perhaps most visible in the development of children and young adults as ‘ … 
it is inevitable that any place a child lives will shape him in some way in terms of his 
memories, his identity, his self-worth, and his self-esteem.’247 A child is unlikely to 
own the home in which they live, at most they may have an equitable interest 
through the operation of a trust, and yet it is in the home that a child’s identity is 
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formed. Therefore, it is the home and its intangible nature that gives rise to the 
development of the self and one’s identity rather than ownership.248  
The home as an aspect of a person’s identity may be subdivided into two categories: 
1) ‘the home as a symbol of one’s self’ or the pscyho-analytical perspective which 
sees the home as ‘the most powerful extension of the phyche’249 and 2) the socio-
psychological aspect which sees the home as an integral aspect of a person’s social 
identity.250  
3.2.3.3.1 The Home as a Symbol of One’s Self251 
The home acts as an ‘identity shell’ which provides the physical and metaphorical 
space for autonomy allowing for incubation of the self.252 Therefore, the home is 
symbiotic with the occupier who is allowed to express themselves fully within their 
home and the home concurrently becoming the canvas for that expression.253 Again, 
this supports the view that it is not ownership which gives rise to the complex 
feelings a person has towards their home but rather the freedom to express 
themselves as noted in the empirical studies above. For the purposes of art.8, in any 
balancing exercise involving the home it should be expected that the damage to a 
person’s self-identity be considered before making a possession order. This is 
especially the case given that the loss of the home ‘may often trigger an identity 
crisis’.254 
The connection between the home and one’s self might be better expressed in the 
non-legalese language that there is a ‘deep connection’ between the home and the 
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human spirit.255 In balancing competing interests the evocative reference to the 
human spirit made by Dovey and referenced by Fox is indicative of the aspirational 
strength of the rights sought to be respected under art.8 of the Convention. This 
view also has some empirical support from psychoanalytical psychology which has 
identified a ‘fusion between “self” and “home” as symbolic of the home “as a centre, 
a place in which possessions and display represent identity; home and the self 
become merged”’.256 It is the merging of home and self that leads to memories being 
intimately linked to a physical space.257 In addition to memories being linked to a 
physical space there are also memories linked to objects contained in the home, for 
example furniture and photographs, which are often treasured.258 Upon realisation 
of this intimate connection between home and memory it is seems only reasonable 
that the law ought to act when the home comes under threat:259 
If there is some validity to the notion of the house-as-self, it goes part 
of the way to explain why for most people their house is so sacred and 
why they so strongly resist a change in the basic form which they ... 
[live] ... For most people the self is a fragile and vulnerable entity; we 
wish therefore to envelop ourselves in a symbol-for-self which is 
familiar, solid, inviolate, [and] unchanging ... 260 
3.2.3.3.2 The Home as an Integral Aspect of a Person’s Social Identity261 
The second plank of the identity x factor comes from socio-psychological theory 
which supposes that a person’s home is integral to their outward social identity.262 
Under this lens, it is the social stigma or the social esteem created by a person’s 
home and their tenure within that home which suggests that the home is ‘a 
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statement and a mirror’.263 This is evident in the case studies referenced by Cooper 
and the styles that people pursue in decorating their homes.264 The concurrent 
inward and outward nature of the home continues the idea that the home acts as an 
‘identity shell’265 or garment: 
Beings surround themselves with the places where they find 
themselves, the way one wraps oneself up in a garment that is at one 
and the same time a disguise and a characterisation. Without places, 
beings would be only abstractions.266 
When a person loses their home they are ‘de-robed’ thereby losing their ability to 
project onto the outside world.267 On that basis the home could be said to be 
essential to a person’s individual inward and outward self-identity allowing for 
individuals to fully interact with the world outside of their home.268 This identity is 
the product of human beings being ‘thinking, remembering, experiencing’ 
creatures.269 Whilst a person’s identity might be seen as two sides of the same coin 
being developed in the home and then honed and fashioned in the outside world, 
the geographical location of the home is dual layered in the sense that our identities 
will be formed by our association with that place but also by others’ conception (be 
they positive or negative in the eyes of the beholder) of that place.270 Where such 
strong connections are engendered by the home, which have a continuing formative 
effect on the self, it would appear logical to afford the home strong legal protection. 
It is not only these internal elements of the home but also the social connections 
which attach to this space. Those who are dispossessed of their home often lose 
contact with friends and family not simply because of their relocation but because of 
the social stigma attached to the loss of the home, particularly among children.271 In 
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cases of such personal trauma it would appear logical to utilise art.8 to assist those 
whose home interest has been overlooked by the relevant statutory or common law 
rule.272 
3.2.3.4 Privacy 
It has been said that the kernel of art.8 is protection from arbitrary interference on 
the part of the State and therefore a substantial body of art.8 case law has focused 
upon the privacy perspective of art.8.273 However, the home and privacy are not 
mutually exclusive legal domains. The home in itself contributes towards the value 
of privacy in allowing a person to go about their life away from the prying eyes of 
others in the community.274 This aspect of property has been explored by Radin.275 
Admittedly, Radin approaches privacy from the perspective of its advantages to the 
individual without specifically referencing the home. However, it is clear that the 
advantages which attribute to Radin’s property and personhood theory arise equally 
from a person’s home.  
Radin relies upon the US Supreme Court case of Stanley v Georgia276 to 
demonstrate the link between privacy and the home. Stanley concerned the 
possession of so-called obscene material, specifically three reels of pornography, 
which were discovered by police at the home of the appellant. Notwithstanding the 
alleged obscenity of the material, the US Supreme Court found that the possession 
of pornography in the home was part of the appellant’s freedom of expression under 
the First Amendment to the US Constitution and therefore any laws which forbade 
this were invalid. Although this work is concerned with English law it is nevertheless 
significant to see the US Supreme Court acknowledging that the home is linked with 
a person’s privacy. Such interference with the sanctuary of the home is itself an 
invasion into ‘one’s history and future [and] one’s life and growth’.277 
Given the common lineage of the English common law and the US common law, and 
the prevailing influence of Entick v Carrington,278 it is unsurprising to see such 
reverence paid to the privacy of the home. However, there is more to privacy in the 
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home than that detailed by Radin. It is this view that demonstrates the non-physical 
advantages of the home and how these tie in with the physical characteristics of 
property.279 The ‘headquarters of private life’280 therefore serves to protect the 
individual from arbitrary interference and allows for the development of the self, 
which goes to the heart of what human rights protect.281 It is this latter aspect of 
development within the home which might be accorded with ‘identity’282 and 
demonstrates the overlap across all of the categories discussed above and the 
holistic nature of an individual’s feelings towards our homes. It is easy to 
compartmentalise the interests protected by art.8, the home, privacy, and 
correspondence, into discrete areas. However, this betrays the interrelated nature of 
these interests, the observance of one protects the other. This further puts in doubt 
the disparate approach to the courts have taken towards art.8 with respect to 
possession proceedings and privacy cases.283 
3.2.3.5 A Social and Cultural Phenomenon 
The above observations of the x factors of the home might be grouped under the 
heading of ‘psychological or sociological’284 conditions. However, there are 
significant threads of literature which identify the social and cultural character of 
the home as equally prevalent in a person’s feelings towards their homes.285 It is in 
this sense that the x factors of the home might be identified as contemporary 
culturally specific conceptions rather than uniform ideas that travel across 
borders.286 Given the regular recital of an Englishman’s home being his castle it is 
unsurprising to find Anglophone perceptions of the home are very much informed 
by the social context in which we interpret institutions. Therefore, the home as a 
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refuge remains the core of the Anglo-American understanding of the home.287 
Whilst it is implied by Fox that the increased level of owner-occupation has 
bolstered the feeling of the home being the core of a person or family’s for their 
exclusive use, taking advantage of the x factors detailed above, there is no reason to 
suggest that these feelings are not equally present in those who choose to, or who 
have no choice but to, rent their home. Those who rent their home benefit equally 
from the physical space of the home, privacy, identity and security and so any 
distinctions between these two forms of tenure in this area is undue. Moreover, it 
may be that there is a stronger case for those who rent their home to receive such 
protection as they are not the beneficiaries of the policy objectives of the late 20th 
century which have sought to increase home ownership rather it may be said they 
are the victims.288  
3.3 Conclusions 
A focus on home meanings enables us to examine questions which 
are not always deemed to be ‘relevant’ to legal proceedings, for 
example, the human, social and personal costs of displacement and 
dispossession ... The concept of home provides the vocabulary ... for 
articulating the human claims of vulnerable people.289  
The above analysis of philosophical and legal theory in relation to property at 3.1 
and sociological understandings of the home at 3.2 demonstrates the failings of the 
courts and the law generally to account for the importance of the home. This 
importance must be accounted for in art.8 in spite of the heavy judicial preference 
for the certainty of an owner’s legal interest. Therefore, it is encouraging that within 
property theory there are gaps which allow for hard-edged understandings of 
property to be curtailed in certain instances thereby allowing for a middle ground in 
which the courts are afforded the opportunity to assess the weight of conflicting 
rights in a given case. In the context of possession proceedings (be they public or 
private) such conflicts are visible in the art.8 rights held by a tenant and the 
property rights held by a landlord. To give effect to these disparate interests there 
must be an acceptance on the part of the courts that these home interests are in the 
abstract at least as importance as the well-defined property interests held by a 
landlord. The literature concerning the non-legal nature of the home explored above 
highlights the urgency with which the courts ought to act where a person’s home is 
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at risk. However, this is not to say that there are not instances in which an owner’s 
proprietary rights ought to take precedence over another’s home interests. Therefore 
what is required is an understanding which allows for the court to appreciate that 
neither of these interests have a priori importance. 
It is in assessing such an understanding that Aquinas’s and Rawls’s work is 
particularly instructive in that it recognises an initial position which accounts for 
instances where property interests may be recalibrated due to common ownership. 
This approach is supported to some extent by Rousseau’s theory of property 
allowing for property interests to be curtailed where it is in the interests of the 
community. There are therefore theoretical justifications for protecting the home 
beyond what has so far been allowed for by the Supreme Court in relation to art.8. 
These home interests are ‘a complex and multi-dimensional amalgam of financial, 
practical, social, psychological, cultural, politico-economic and emotional interests 
to its occupiers’.290 The difficulty of giving weight to the home is exacerbated by its 
experiential nature which will differ from one case to the next.291 This might explain 
the limp advice of the Supreme Court in largely leaving the effect of art.8 on 
possession proceedings to the ‘good sense and experience’ of county court judges.292 
However, this approach starves the lower courts of any constructive dialogue with 
the Supreme Court as to developing a conception of the home. After all, before 
asking what art.8 offers tenants in particular proceedings it must firstly be 
determined what art.8 might protect generally. Fox argues that such considerations 
ought to be made at the policy level.293 It is agreed that a more sophisticated 
understanding at the policy level would be welcome, especially considering the 
international obligations placed upon the UK by the UDHR and negative 
commentary from the UN with respect to the UK’s housing policy.294 However, upon 
accepting that art.8 is in the least triggered by possession proceedings the courts are 
now well placed to adjudicate those instances where a person’s home is at risk. 
Moreover, it is the courts that are best able to consider the contextualised nature of 
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art.8 rights in a given case. For example, the negative effects a tenant may face upon 
dispossession vary widely and can only be fully accounted for by a court. Such an 
exercise would have to bear in mind the links an individual has to their home 
including an understanding of the home as an identity forming physical space which 
allows for an individual (or group) to live their life as they wish. Of course this will 
not be the experience of every person such as vulnerable people who face violence or 
abuse within the home. However, it seems unlikely that these people would be 
arguing against a possession order based upon the protections of art.8. 
The understanding of the home analysed above may be anchored to legal arguments 
regarding the home ‘within a framework that recognises the authenticity and 
importance of home meanings for occupiers.’295 This therefore allows one’s feelings 
towards the home in an individual case to be unpacked and fully considered by the 
court. These feelings are not restricted to public or private sector tenants and are 
pervasive across all forms of tenure. Therefore, this Chapter undermines any 
argument in favour of maintaining the restriction on art.8’s application to public 
sector proceedings. In the following Chapter the doctrinal difficulties created by the 
HRA 1998 and the current case law around art.8 are assessed in relation to private 
landlords and tenants. The outcomes of this may then be factored into a principled 
form of proportionality which takes account of the complex features of the home as 
identified above but which allows for a reasonable balance to be struck between 
competing interests. The courts adjudicative nature and tradition of balancing 
interests across all adversarial litigation suggests that they are capable of giving 
weight to the importance of the home to the individual and wider society. 
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4 The Argument for Horizontal Effect of Article 8 
4.1 Introduction 
Human rights were originally conceived as rights and freedoms owed 
by the State and other public authorities. Their very fundamental 
purpose was to protect the individual against the omnipotent State 
with its vast powers ... The major function of human rights thus was 
to mitigate the imbalance between two unequal parties ... 1 
The potential for human rights to reach beyond the traditional position described 
above is of fundamental importance to this thesis which is concerned with the 
theoretical and legal basis for arbitrarily limiting art.8’s application to local 
authority tenants. The scope for human rights to apply between private individuals, 
rather than between private individuals and the State, has been termed horizontal 
effect in opposition to vertical effect as between the State and individuals.2 The 
question of horizontal effect pervades the incorporation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (the Convention) via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998). 
The Convention itself appears to be drafted in terms seeking to limit the actions of 
States. However, it is equally the case that the Convention’s plain wording does not 
preclude a horizontal reading of the Convention rights. 
In housing law, the courts have recognised the ability of a tenant to draw upon art.8 
to resist a possession order notwithstanding any statutory requirements for a 
mandatory possession order. However, the Supreme Court in Pinnock made clear 
that their judgment was to have no bearing on proceedings involving a private 
landlord.3 The outstanding question of horizontal effect was considered by the Court 
of Appeal in Malik v Fassenfelt4 and the Supreme Court in McDonald v McDonald5 
with the finding that art.8 has no bearing in private sector possession proceedings. 
Malik and McDonald were analysed in detail at 2.2. This aversion to art.8’s 
horizontal effect is in spite of the dissenting opinion of Sir Alan Ward who held that: 
the court must approach the claim made by a private landowner 
against a trespasser [or tenant] in a similar way to that adopted to 
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claims of various sorts made by a local authority ... Thus the test is 
whether the eviction is a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim.6 
Sir Alan proceeded on the same basis as the trial judge in finding simply that the 
courts, as a public authority,7 are bound to apply art.8 in all cases. This suggestion 
cuts to the core of this Chapter and suggests that human rights protection ought to 
extend beyond vertical relationships. However, despite a ‘good steer’8 from Sir Alan, 
the horizontal effect of art.8 has been rejected by the Supreme Court. These findings 
are all the more concerning given that ‘the private rented sector is [now] larger than 
the local authority and social rented sectors combined.’9 Therefore, the potential 
beneficiaries of a horizontal reading of art.8 are legion. Barring private sector 
tenants from the protection of art.8 in effect provides ‘a shield for the bearers of 
private power who [ought to be] the targets of social regulation.’10 
Even near two decades after the HRA 1998 was enacted, whilst it is largely accepted 
that there is at least some form of horizontal effect in areas other than housing law,11 
there continues to be considerable debate as to its precise model and scope.12 
However, acknowledging that there will likely be some form of horizontal effect is 
not sufficient,13 instead it must be asked precisely what is meant by horizontal effect 
and, for the purposes of this work, what this means for possession proceedings, an 
area made up of various common law rules and statutory interventions. Considering 
the competing theories of horizontal effect generally will highlight the means by 
which the courts might reassess housing law in light of the HRA 1998. In addition, 
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this will inform the discussions emerging later in this thesis in relation to the 
public/private divide and proportionality. 
4.2 Defining Horizontal Effect 
Before assessing the possible scope of horizontal effect it is worthwhile reiterating 
what is meant by the term itself. Simply put, horizontal effect occurs where ‘an 
individual is subject to an obligation to respect the human rights of another’,14 as 
opposed to the more traditional view that human rights exist to ‘safeguard the 
individual against the excessive power of the state’15 (vertical effect). Whilst this 
provides a good starting point to further explore horizontal effect, its precise form is 
far from definitive.16 Therefore, the following will analyse the literature around 
horizontal effect with the viability of various models questioned and evaluated 
alongside instances in which a person’s home is at risk and therefore art.8 is in play. 
4.3 Forms of Horizontal Effect 
4.3.1 Direct Horizontal Effect 
Proponents of direct horizontal effect effectively argue that the Convention rights, 
and therefore their HRA 1998 counterparts, are a freestanding cause of action which 
may be relied upon by one individual against another.17 The force of direct 
horizontal effect is dependent on the text of the Convention rights themselves and 
whether these rights are applicable to private parties.18 This is particularly the case 
in relation to art.8 and housing law given the potency of s.3 of the HRA 1998. For 
instance, in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza19 the House of Lords held that s.3 allowed 
for a departure from previous precedent thereby allowing a same sex couple to 
benefit from the succession provisions of the Rent Act 1977. 
The first question in considering horizontal effect therefore must be whether the 
plain wording of art.8 is in itself ‘applicable’ to private individuals. The most 
enduring and sophisticated consideration of horizontal applicability comes from 
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Beyleveld and Pattinson.20 Beyleveld and Pattinson argue that the Convention rights 
themselves have ‘unqualified’ horizontal effect and, therefore, unless limited to 
vertical effect by Parliament, must be given full horizontal effect.21 In analysing the 
submissions of Beyleveld and Pattinson below it is demonstrated that the content of 
art.8 is triggered by proceedings involving individuals are independent of the State, 
notwithstanding the adjudicative function of the court dealt with by s.6 of the HRA 
1998. 
4.3.2 Horizontal Applicability 
Before any Convention right may have horizontal effect it must first be horizontally 
applicable.22 This submission rests upon the language of Convention rights rather 
than the legal machinery of those rights’ incorporation into the domestic legal 
framework. Article 8(2) is illustrative of the horizontal applicability of Convention 
rights. Article 8(2) reads: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
(emphasis added) 
Beyleveld and Pattinson contend that the inclusion of the italicised passage in 
art.8(2) presupposes that art.8, along with the other Convention rights, is prima 
facie horizontally applicable.23 Beyleveld and Pattinson’s reading of the Convention 
might overly focus on the catch-all aspects of the qualified rights like art.8 rather 
than the apparently absolute Convention rights such as art.3 or 5 which are aimed at 
limiting the powers of the State rather than private individuals.24 However, these 
rights are in any event secured against private individuals by operation of the 
domestic law.25  
                                                        
20 D Beyleveld and S D Pattinson, 'Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal Effect' (2002) 
LQR 623. 
21 Support for Beyleveld and Pattinson’s approach comes from N Bamforth, 'The Application 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and Private Bodies' (1999) Cambridge 
Law Journal 159, 166-169. 
22 A L Young, 'Mapping Horiztonal Effect' in Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the UK Human 
Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 29. 
23 D Beyleveld and S D Pattinson, 'Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal Effect' (2002) 
LQR 623, 627. 
24 N Bamforth, 'The Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and 
Private Bodies' (1999) Cambridge Law Journal 159, 159. 
25 See for example the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the torts of trespass to the 
person, Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, ex 
p Hague [1992] 1 AC 58. 
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Support for the horizontal applicability proposition is drawn from the work of 
Christoffersen.26 Christoffersen considers horizontal effect alongside the positive 
obligations of the Convention and makes the argument that the text of the 
Convention is in itself horizontally applicable, although Christoffersen does not 
employ the distinction between applicability and effect described by Beyleveld and 
Pattinson.27 Christoffersen’s argument proceeds on two fronts. The first is the 
lineage of the Convention rights which were drawn from the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights which looks to protect rights from contravention by any source.28 
The second, more forceful, argument made by Christoffersen regards the self-
fulfilling nature of the arguments made against horizontal effect. For Christoffersen 
arguing against horizontal effect presupposes horizontal effect. It is the State’s 
obligation under the Convention to protect the human rights of all its citizens. The 
effect of this is in a sense a positive obligation to ensure that the exercise of one 
individual’s rights does not infringe the rights of another. This therefore in itself 
creates horizontal effect.29 
On such a reading the Convention rights and therefore the HRA 1998 rights are 
inherently horizontally applicable. In light of this the question becomes how those 
same rights might have horizontal effect through the legal machinery of the HRA 
1998. 
4.3.3 Beyleveld and Pattinson’s Substantive Argument for Full 
Horizontal Effect 
Following their argument that the Convention rights are in themselves horizontally 
applicable, Beyleveld and Pattinson are left with identifying the legal framework 
which allows for full horizontal effect. Beyleveld and Pattinson rest their argument 
upon s.3(1) of the HRA 1998 which ‘requires all legislation ... to be interpreted as 
compatible with the Convention rights if it is possible to do so’.30 On this basis 
Beyleveld and Pattinson argue that s.3(1) taken together with: 
1. s.1 of the HRA 1998, which incorporates the Convention rights, but for arts.1 
and 13, and requires those rights to have effect for the purposes of the HRA 
1998; and 
                                                        
26 J Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2009). 
27 Ibid 98-99. 
28 Ibid 98. 
29 Ibid 99. 
30 D Beyleveld and S D Pattinson, 'Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal Effect' (2002) 
LQR 623, 633. 
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2. the long title of the Act, ‘an Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights’, require the 
courts to give effect to those rights that are horizontally applicable. 
For Beyleveld and Pattinson this duty to apply Convention rights horizontally will be 
required in all cases with the exception of those in which primary legislation makes 
it impossible to give a Convention compliant interpretation.31 
4.3.4 Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 
The interpretative powers created by s.3(1) are significant, however, s.6(2) of the 
HRA 1998 appears to limit the power of s.3(1) to those instances in which legislation 
is not mandatory to a particular course of action. For example if a local authority is 
required to perform some act that is non-compliant with the HRA 1998 then s.6(2) 
will protect that local authority from any liability. In Pinnock, s.143D(2) of the 
Housing Act 1996 required the court to make an order for possession in favour of 
the landlord. However, the court found that art.8 required that the proportionality 
of a possession order must be considered by the court. At the same time art.8 
required the court to consider the proportionality of the measure before making a 
possession order.32 Upon this basis, applying the reasoning of Beyleveld and 
Pattinson with regard to s.6(2), it might be thought that the Supreme Court would 
be unable to give a Convention compliant reading to s.143D(2) given its clear terms 
which appear to exclude any consideration of proportionality. The Supreme Court’s 
brief discussion of s.6(2) gives the impression that engagement of s.6(2) will depend 
upon the interpretative powers granted by s.3 of the HRA 1998 in a given case.33 
Where a provision can be read in a Convention compliant fashion then the defence 
provided by s.6(2) will not arise.34 This therefore casts doubt on the extent to which 
the court will utilise s.6(2) of the HRA 1998 and suggests that s.3 will be the primary 
judicial remedy. In the context of possession proceedings a landlord will rarely be 
under a statutory duty to seek possession and so the ability of a public sector 
landlord to rely upon s.6(2) to avoid liability under s.6(1) seems limited when 
considered against the obligations of s.6(1). 
                                                        
31 Human Rights Act 1998 s.6(2). 
32 Paulic v Croatia App no 3572/06 (European Court of Human Rights, 22 October 2009); 
McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 40; Connors v United Kingdom (2005) 40 
EHRR 9. 
33 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104 [93]-[104]. 
34 Ibid. 
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Further support for the limited role of s.6(2) is provided by Poplar Housing & 
Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue.35 Poplar dealt with a 
possession order made under s.21 of the Housing Act 1988, which requires that the 
court make a possession order where the procedural elements of s.21 are met. 
Speaking obiter dicta in Poplar Lord Woolf stated that ‘[i]t is difficult to 
overestimate the importance of section 3 ... [which applies] ... to legislation passed 
both before and after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force.’36 In giving effect 
to s.3 Lord Woolf held that ‘legislation which predates the Human Rights Act 1998 
and conflicts with the Convention has to be treated as being subsequently amended 
to incorporate the language of s.3.’37 The wide ambit of s.3 may therefore go further 
and extend ‘deep in[to] the private sphere … [regardless of] ... whether [the Act is] 
regulating the acts of public authorities or private individuals ... ’.38 Clearly, s.3 of 
the HRA 1998 imposes a heavy burden upon the courts to interpret all legislation in 
keeping with the HRA 1998 rights. 
Whilst the preceding comments from Lord Woolf support the view that s.3 will have 
a wide-ranging effect upon legislation, the Court of Appeal in Poplar came to the 
conclusion that s.3 did not allow for an interpretative reassessment of the Housing 
Act 1988. The defendant in Poplar contended that the consequence of the claimant 
being a public authority was to make mandatory possession incompatible with art.8. 
Therefore counsel on behalf of the defendant argued that the words ‘if it is 
reasonable to do so’ be read into s.21(4) of the Housing Act 1988.39 Despite the force 
of s.3 recognised by Lord Woolf, his Lordship found that reinterpreting s.21(4) in 
such a way would ‘defeat Parliament's original objective of providing certainty ... 
[and this] ... would involve [the judiciary] legislating.’40 Notwithstanding these 
comments, the Supreme Court in Pinnock came to precisely the opposite conclusion, 
finding that s.3(1) of the HRA 1998 taken together with art.8 required that the court 
be able to consider the proportionality of a possession order sought by a local 
authority.  
The above analysis of s.3 suggests that the court’s interpretative obligations under 
the HRA 1998 will not be limited due to s.6(2) as suggested by Beyleveld and 
                                                        
35 Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] EWCA 
Civ 595, [2002] QB 48. 
36 Ibid, 72. 
37 Ibid, 72. 
38 F Klug and K Starmer, 'Standing Back from the Human Rights Act: How Effective is it Five 
Years On?' (2005) PL 716, 725. 
39 Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2001] EWCA 
Civ 595, [2002] QB 48, 73. 
40 Ibid. 
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Pattinson. In other words, the duty to interpret legislation in a rights-compliant 
manner imposed by s.3 is stronger than the defence created by s.6(2). Some support 
for the strength of s.3 comes from the relatively small number of occasions in which 
the courts have made declarations of incompatibility, as at 4 March 2015 the UK 
courts had made only 29 declarations of incompatibility since the HRA 1998 came 
into force.41 The usage of s.3 as opposed to s.4 of the HRA 1998 is perhaps to be 
expected given that the obligation created by s.3 is ‘the prime remedial remedy’42 in 
cases dealing with HRA rights. 
The arguments of Beyleveld and Pattinson in relation to s.3(1) of the HRA 1998 and 
the resultant judgments of the courts in light of the HRA 1998 show that the effect of 
s.3(1), despite the robust approach of Beyleveld and Pattinson, may have been 
underestimated. Beyleveld and Pattinson suggest that s.6(2) of the HRA 1998 would 
act as a bar to the judiciary utilising an adventurous interpretation of legislation in 
pursuit of s.3 of the HRA 1998. However, upon assessing the case law around ss.4 
and 6(2) it appears that the courts have instead opted to rely upon s.3 in the first 
instance and attempted to reach a Convention compliant reading of legislation 
which is not possible on a literal reading of legislation. In the field of housing law 
this has resulted in the, albeit limited, introduction of proportionality in the case of 
public sector tenancies. However, the courts have resisted utilising the same 
arguments in cases concerning private sector tenancies despite the doctrinal 
viability of the same approach demonstrated above in relation to the use of s.3 and 
the interpretative obligations contained therein. 
4.3.5 Full Horizontal Effect 
In addition to the argument for direct horizontal effect ‘full horizontal effect’ has 
been advocated by Raphael.43 Full horizontal effect rests upon similar theoretical 
foundations as direct horizontal effect. However, it differs in the position the courts 
should take in approaching existing precedents. In discussing full horizontal effect 
Raphael does not appear to contend that the HRA 1998 will have at least some effect 
upon the application of legislation but he focuses upon the Act’s role in developing 
and applying the common law.44 Despite legislative intervention from Parliament 
there are areas of housing law which are governed by the common law, such as the 
                                                        
41 Joint Committe on Human Rights, Human Rights Judgments: Seventh Report of Session 
2014-2015 (HC 1088, 2015) 17. 
42 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557 [50]. 
43 T Raphael, 'The Problem of Horizontal Effect' (2000) EHRLR 493. 
44 Ibid, 493. 
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rule from Hammersmith v Monk.45 Therefore, consideration of full horizontal effect 
is equally as important as those models which deal with the law generally. 
Raphael differs from Wade, Beyleveld, and Pattinson in claiming that the restriction 
of the HRA 1998 to public authorities prevents any direct horizontal effect via s.6, 
notwithstanding the requirements of ss.2 and 3. However, Raphael does foresee a 
developmental obligation arising from s.6 for two reasons. Firstly, there is no 
mechanism for issuing a declaration of incompatibility for shortcomings in the 
common law. Secondly, if the courts are obliged to construe legislation in light of the 
Convention then in ‘an area where case law and statute are interwoven [such as 
housing], [this] could create highly odd practical results.’46 To quell this uncertainty 
Raphael proposes: 
full horizontal effect … [meaning] that judicial decisions which do not 
give effect to rights are incompatible wherever there are no statutory 
restrictions on jurisdiction. [In such cases the] ... court would be 
obliged to develop the common law in the face of contrary precedent 
and common law rules of jurisdiction.47 
Raphael argues that there are limitations placed upon the court in their duty to 
interpret legislation from other statutes and within the HRA 1998 itself at s.6(2).48 
In response to this Raphael suggests that judicial decisions which do not give effect 
to Convention rights will be incompatible where there is no statutory justification 
for those decisions, echoing the sentiments of s.6(2) of the HRA 1998. Therefore s.6 
exists to place an obligation upon the courts to develop the common law in line with 
the Convention. This duty arises out of primary legislation and so the courts ought 
to attach primacy to the will of Parliament in developing the common law in a 
Convention compliant manner rather than exercise a preference for the settled 
common law. However, Raphael stops short of fully endorsing this view for fears of 
an unconstrained judicial ability to develop the common law beyond what has 
hitherto been accepted by English law.49 Rather the courts should adopt a 
constrained approach to developing the common law by respecting the existing 
jurisdictional limits of the respective court and any negative precedent.50 The 
problem with this approach continues to be the nature of s.6 of the HRA 1998 in 
that it requires the courts to act compatibly with the Convention rights irrespective 
                                                        
45 Hammersmith v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478. 
46 T Raphael, 'The Problem of Horizontal Effect' (2000) EHRLR 493, 497. 
47 Ibid, 501. 
48 Ibid, 501-502. 
49 Ibid, 503-506. See also Baroness Hale, 'Common Law and Convention Law: The Limits to 
Interpretation' (2011) EHRLR 534; G Phillipson and A Williams, 'Horizontal Effect and the 
Constitutional Constraint' (2011) 74 MLR 878. 
50 T Raphael, 'The Problem of Horizontal Effect' (2000) EHRLR 493, 505-506. 
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of existing common law precedent. It is not a matter of established common law 
being determined as ‘irrelevant or obsolete’51 by the courts, but rather giving effect 
to the HRA 1998 which requires the courts to respect the Convention rights. 
Raphael’s theory is closer to direct horizontal effect than it appears on its face. 
Raphael accepts that legislation is to be interpreted in accordance with the 
Convention due to ss.2 and 3 of the HRA 1998. Furthermore, Raphael accepts that 
the Convention will have an effect upon the common law. The main differentiator 
between direct horizontal effect and full horizontal effect is the nature of the 
obligation placed upon the courts to develop the common law and new causes of 
action. In Beyleveld and Pattinson’s view the ability of the courts to develop the 
common law exists apart from the HRA 1998,52 moreover, the obligation to give 
effect to the Convention rights, including the creation of new causes of action, is 
absolute and negative precedents have no bearing upon this.53 This is opposed to 
Raphael’s argument that there ought to be limitations upon the development of the 
common law so as to respect the ‘existing boundaries’ of judicial development.54 
There is some support for Raphael’s view in the realm of housing law. In Pinnock 
the Supreme Court found that the interpretative power created by s.3 of the HRA 
1998 allowed the court to read proportionality into s.143D of the Housing Act 1996. 
This was the case despite contrary precedent.55 Comparing this approach to that of 
the court in Hammersmith v Monk56 it is clear that the court have been less 
confident in developing the common law. The approach of Monk has been affirmed 
in spite of art.8 with Mummery LJ stating in Sims v Dacorum BC that there ‘is 
nothing in the legal rule [in Monk] per se or in its exercise by [a tenant] that was an 
interference ... with respect for the home.’57 In considering art.8 and the rule from 
Monk the Supreme Court adopted a remarkably concise style with the court handing 
down a joint judgment with the conclusion that whilst a tenant was entitled to raise 
art.8 ‘that point gets [him] nowhere.’58 Rather than assessing the continued 
application of the rule from Monk the court instead found the terms of the lease to 
                                                        
51 Ibid, 506. 
52 There is support for this view in the development of the law around construct trusts in 
equity, see Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 AC 432.  
53 D Beyleveld and S D Pattinson, 'Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal Effect' (2002) 
LQR 623, 642-643. 
54 T Raphael, 'The Problem of Horizontal Effect' (2000) EHRLR 493, 505-506. 
55 Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43, [2004] 1 AC 983; Kay v 
Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465; Doherty v Birmingham City Council 
[2008] UKHL 57, [2009] 1 AC 367. 
56 Hammersmith v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478. 
57 Sims v Dacorum BC [2013] EWCA Civ 12, [2013] CP Rep 19 [35]. 
58 Sims v Dacorum BC [2014] UKSC 63, [2014] 3 WLR 1600 [21]. 
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be determinative of the legality of the notice to quit,59 in spite of the acceptance that 
such provisions on their face engage art.8.60 However, the Supreme Court never 
directly engaged with the question of whether Monk is itself compliant with art.8. 
Therefore, it would appear following Sims that despite a tenant being able to argue a 
proportionality defence, the rule from Monk remains good law. The situation is 
complicated by the court’s reliance upon the terms of the lease making the judgment 
highly contextual with the rule from Monk being undercut by the facts of the case 
but yet still being binding precedent. The only advantage to this approach appears to 
be that the door remains ‘open to allow a litigant in the future to argue that the 
position would be different where the tenancy agreement was silent on the point 
[and the common law stepped in].’61 These conflicting approaches to statute and 
common law demonstrate the ‘highly odd practical results’62 which Raphael warned 
of in the event that the common law was not reassessed alongside statute. The 
current situation is odd indeed with local authority possession proceedings being 
subject to art.8 whilst the private sector goes on unchanged. 
Both Raphael’s and Beyleveld and Pattinson’s theories of horizontal effect provide a 
solution to the problem created by Monk. The differences are found in the force and 
confidence with which the courts should act in developing the common law. There is 
no reason why such developments must be in keeping with the ‘existing limits of 
judicial power’63 which the courts have exercised prior to the HRA 1998. For the 
purposes of this study the question becomes why the courts have not trodden the 
same course in reassessing Monk to ensure compatibility with art.8. This is 
especially the case given the viability of Raphael, Beyleveld, and Pattinson’s 
arguments. The uncertainty within the courts as to the method by which the HRA 
1998 may have a more robust application is exacerbated by the further models of 
horizontality explored below. 
4.3.6 Remedial Horizontality 
Another conception of horizontal effect is remedial horizontality which is s.6(1) 
when read alongside s.6(3)(a) of the HRA 1998 together with the ‘discretionary 
powers of the court to issue court orders and remedies in private law actions.’64 
Admittedly, the traditional discretionary common law powers of the court are 
                                                        
59 Ibid [17]. 
60 Ibid [20]-[21]. 
61 P Williams, 'Monks Working to Rule' (2015) 19 Landlord & Tenant Review 7, 11. 
62 T Raphael, 'The Problem of Horizontal Effect' (2000) EHRLR 493, 497. 
63 Ibid, 502. 
64 A L Young, 'Mapping Horiztonal Effect' in Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the UK Human 
Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 19.  
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limited in housing law with the majority of tenants falling under one of the statutory 
regimes.65 However, there are those tenants who are excepted from substantive 
statutory protection,66 and are therefore common law tenants with minimal 
statutory protection.67 Most notable of these exceptions are tenancies with a high 
rateable value,68 tenancies at a low rent,69 and tenancies with a resident landlord.70 
It is these common law tenancies which may feel the reach of the HRA 1998 based 
upon remedial horizontality. 
The discretionary powers of the court have arisen most often in relation to art.8 and 
privacy in which areas of the common law have been fused with the principles 
underpinning the Convention.71 The classic position in English law with regard to 
privacy was that there existed no freestanding tort amounting to a right to privacy.72 
However, following the HRA 1998 the position is now more nuanced as 
demonstrated by Murray v Express Newspapers.73 The case concerned pictures 
taken of JK Rowling’s son, David, in public but without the permission of his 
parents. In considering the legal background to privacy Sir Anthony Clarke took 
time to point out that the rights contained in art.8 of the Convention, relating to, 
among other things, privacy, and art.10 of the Convention, relating to freedom of 
expression, now lie at the heart of liberty in a modern state.74 The reverence Sir 
Anthony speaks with lends further weight to the proposition that the HRA 1998, and 
by proxy the Convention, now sits in a unique position in the constitutional 
framework of English law.75  
The development of the common law in this area has taken a marked lead from the 
principles of the Convention. Moreover, the courts have shown no hesitation in 
applying this new tort to horizontal relationships (often between individuals and 
press organisations) notwithstanding the principles of the modern tort arising from 
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66 Housing Act 1988 sch 1. 
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the Convention and the HRA 1998.76 The remedy often sought in cases involving 
privacy is an injunction preventing publication of the relevant images or 
information. Injunctions are a discretionary remedy flowing from the courts’ 
equitable jurisdiction.77 Therefore, if the courts are willing to employ remedial 
horizontal effect in these circumstances, the follow up question must be why the 
same motion cannot be applied to housing situations governed by the common law, 
where the court are afforded more discretion than in cases involving housing 
legislation. A response to this may be that it is the high value attached to a landlord’s 
property which may dissuade the court from interfering. However, in privacy cases 
the courts have been willing to block the publication of sensitive images 
notwithstanding the financial advantage that would no doubt flow from this for the 
newspaper or magazine in question. Moreover, looking at privacy cases and 
possession cases as discrete areas of law each concerning different aspects of art.8 
seems counter-productive and arbitrary given the conflation of these areas in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.78 These areas of law may 
deal with disparate interests but these interests are equally important in the scheme 
of the Convention and HRA 1998.79  
4.3.7 Indirect Horizontal Effect 
In addition to the above arguments in favour of horizontal effect there are also those 
who have called for ‘indirect horizontal effect’.80 Indirect effect rests on the 
proposition that the HRA 1998 may require the law to be developed in light of 
Convention principles thereby the Convention will organically seep through into 
apparently unrelated areas of law.81 In such a case the law itself is subject to human 
rights arguments with subsequent compliant interpretations being applicable to 
private persons.82 Therefore, indirect horizontal effect will only arise where an 
individual pleads an independent legal provision which is then in turn interpreted 
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under s.3 of the HRA 1998 to reflect HRA rights.83 However, the literature around 
indirect horizontal effect gives rise to the following models which ought to be 
considered: 
1. strong indirect horizontal effect; 
2. strong/weak indirect horizontal effect; and 
3. weak indirect horizontal effect. 
4.3.7.1 Strong Indirect Horizontal Effect 
In Hunt’s view the strong indirect position lies somewhere between vertical and 
direct horizontal effect and is based upon ss.3(1) and 6(1) of the HRA 1998, which, 
he suggests, make the law itself subject to the Convention and place a duty upon the 
courts to achieve HRA 1998 compatibility.84 For the purposes of housing law this 
conception of horizontal effect would be applicable to housing legislation and also 
those tenants who fall outside of statutory protection and are subject to the common 
law. Therefore, it is an attractive vehicle for a more robust reflection of human 
rights,85 and supports the argument that the HRA 1998 ought to be applicable to all 
tenants regardless of the institutional character of their landlord, the legislative 
scheme, or the common law rules in play. For example, if assured shorthold 
tenancies are viewed alongside Hunt’s arguments relating to s.3 of the HRA 1998 
this would allow for the court to read proportionality into provisions requiring a 
mandatory possession order. Equally in the case of those tenancies governed by the 
common law s.6 of the HRA 1998 imposes a duty upon the courts to uphold the 
HRA 1998 rights and so this would encompass the common law. 
Buxton is however critical of Hunt’s contentions.86 Buxton critiques Hunt’s view of 
s.6 on the basis that whilst there is now an obligation on the courts to act compatibly 
with the HRA 1998 when developing the common law it is equally the case that the 
courts are bound by their traditional duty to apply English law. Buxton goes on to 
question the view that Convention rights themselves require horizontal effect due to:  
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1. the wording of the Convention rights being directed towards the limitation of 
State interference rather than individuals;87 and 
2. the European Court’s resistance to imposing requirements on signatories to 
the Convention and domestic courts.88  
However, looking more closely at these points the strength of Buxton’s argument 
falls away. On Buxton’s first point and as detailed at 4.3.2, Beyleveld and Pattinson’s 
work has demonstrated that the issues of horizontal applicability and horizontal 
effect must be separated from one another and following this exercise it is clear that 
the Convention rights may be read so as to apply to individuals.89 On Buxton’s 
second point, whilst the European Court may have resisted imposing requirements 
upon the domestic courts, notwithstanding the positive obligations arising from the 
Convention,90 Buxton confuses the distinction between the HRA 1998 and the 
Convention. Prior to the HRA 1998, the Convention had no standing within the 
domestic legal order and, although some of the principles of the Convention 
permeated the common law, there was no obligation on the English courts to utilise 
the Convention rights or the jurisprudence of the European Court. Following the 
enactment of HRA 1998, there is an obligation placed upon the courts to take 
account of the jurisprudence of the European Court,91 thereby encouraging a 
dialogue between the domestic and the European Court, providing a direct route for 
the domestic courts to give effect to European Court’s jurisprudence. This obligation 
reflects the will of Parliament and is now one and the same as the duty to give effect 
to domestic law. However, there is a barrier presented by the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights in relation to horizontal effect and the ability of 
the court to offer guidance on the same. The European Court is limited to hearing 
applications concerning a Member State.92 These limitations of jurisprudence 
explicitly supporting horizontal effect are reflected in the approach of the domestic 
courts towards Buckland v United Kingdom in which De Gaetano J held in a 
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separate opinion that art.8’s application was limited to public landlords.93 Therefore 
relying upon the European Court to provide a steer as to horizontal effect seems 
unwise.  
There are also deeper concerns with strong indirect horizontal effect where it is 
conceptualised as an independent form of horizontal effect. This problem is best put 
by Wade stating: 
[I]s there any significance in distinguishing between direct and 
indirect effect, or in speaking of new private causes of action? A 
claimant pleads the facts of his case, and he may claim any relief to 
which the facts, if proved, entitle him … Whether this is called direct 
or indirect effect or a new cause of action seems to be a matter of 
words and to make no intelligible difference.94 
Hunt’s goal of a model for horizontal effect which would apply to statute and 
common law equally is commendable. However, his theory suffers from a reliance 
upon the jurisprudence of the European Court regardless of the domestic standing 
of the HRA rights and terminological difficulties noted by Wade. These 
shortcomings make it difficult to wholeheartedly recommend strong indirect 
horizontal effect on its own. 
4.3.7.2 Strong/Weak Indirect Horizontal Effect 
Noting the potential shortcomings of the strong indirect horizontal effect model, 
Young suggests that there is a weaker form of strong indirect horizontal effect in 
which the court are under an obligation to develop the common law but must stop 
short of creating new causes of action.95 This is something of a hybrid between the 
strong indirect horizontal effect analysed above at 4.3.7.1 and the weak indirect 
horizontal effect assessed below at 4.3.7.3. Support for this particular view is 
provided by Baroness Hale stating: 
The [HRA 1998] does not create any new cause of action between 
private persons. But if there is a relevant cause of action applicable, 
the court as a public authority must act compatibly with both parties’ 
Convention rights.96 
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This view has the advantage of allowing the courts to develop and apply Convention 
rights in a fairly robust fashion via what may be called ‘developmental influence’.97 
The limitations placed upon new causes of action are perhaps not all that 
problematic in the field of possession proceedings as the pleading of art.8 would not 
amount to a cause of action. However, development or reinterpretation of statute is 
not included within strong/weak indirect horizontal effect thereby creating a gap as 
to the potential for art.8 to protect tenants who are subject to statute. In addition 
the problems with strong/weak indirect horizontal effect continue into the 
theoretical basis of the position. 
Phillipson and Williams term Young’s theory of strong/weak indirect horizontal 
effect the ‘radical distortion model’,98 saying that it is equally too limiting and too 
unconstrained.99 Phillipson and Williams’s claims rest on the fact that there is 
nothing within the HRA 1998 which would prevent the development of new causes 
of actions as such, rather the only limitation placed upon the courts in this sense is 
to develop the common law in keeping with its evolutionary tradition. It is accepted 
that the HRA 1998 does not on its face prevent the creation of new causes of action. 
However, it is unfair to say that in developing, for example, the tort of misuse of 
private information via arts.8 and 10 that the original tort has been ‘over-written’100 
with the original tort discarded and arts.8 and 10 standing in its place. Instead, the 
tort has incrementally progressed in precisely the fashion afforded by the HRA 
1998.101 Moreover, it is submitted that the courts have sought to develop arts.8 and 
10 using the vehicle of breach of confidence because the spirit of the common law 
and the Convention were sufficiently analogous to make it unnecessary for the 
creation of a new tort.102 Therefore, whilst it is accepted that the strong/weak 
indirect horizontal effect model might impose unjustified limits upon the flexibility 
of the court, it would seem that the courts’ approach to existing torts has been in 
keeping with the spirit of the common law which calls into doubt the soundness of 
this form of strong/weak indirect horizontal effect. If the courts opted for the 
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creation of a new cause of action separate from breach of confidence it seems 
unlikely that the judiciary and counsel would have jettisoned case law concerning 
breach of confidence. In which case the permeating influence of the common law 
would still have been felt. This further weakens the arguments made by those in 
favour of strong/weak indirect horizontal effect. 
In conclusion, the foremost shortcoming of strong/weak indirect horizontal is the 
focus placed upon development of the common law and resultant lack of 
development of statute. Housing law has been moulded by successive statutory 
interventions in addition to development of the common law. Therefore, 
strong/weak indirect horizontal effect seems to address only part of the law at issue. 
Strong/weak indirect horizontal effect alone does not provide any guidance for 
courts which are faced with interpreting legislation in light of the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights or the precise nature and strength of the 
obligation created by s.3 of the HRA 1998. 
4.3.7.3 Weak Indirect Horizontal Effect 
Foremost of the proponents for weak indirect horizontal effect is Phillipson who 
suggests that claimants ‘seeking to invoke Convention rights in private common law 
cases will not be able to rely solely on the right in question, but will have to anchor 
their claim in an existing common law cause of action.’103 Phillipson rests his 
proposition on the idea that there is no duty upon the courts to interpret the 
common law in tandem with the jurisprudence of the European Court.104 However, 
Phillipson does concede that the courts may unilaterally develop the common law 
beyond that required by the Convention and s.3 of the HRA 1998.105 
Phillipson points specifically to the potential development of the common law 
protection of privacy in support of the idea of weak indirect horizontal effect. 
However, as discussed above it appears that in the realm of privacy the court have 
incorporated arts.8 and 10 under the guise of breach of confidence and more 
recently misuse of private information. These articles are ‘now not merely of 
persuasive or parallel effect but ... are the very content of the domestic tort that the 
English court has to enforce’.106 On this basis, it seems that the courts have taken the 
obligations placed upon them by the HRA 1998 beyond simply a power to develop 
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the common law and instead have seen it as a duty to develop the common law. 
Moreover, Phillipson has himself reneged from the weak indirect horizontal effect 
model in his more recent work.107 Therefore, in light of this and the above it would 
appear that whilst the indirect horizontal effect model may have been a viable theory 
early in the life of the HRA 1998 it is not the course which has been followed.  
There are also further difficulties with Phillipson’s initial conception of weak 
indirect horizontal effect as noted by Klug and Starmer.108 Weak indirect horizontal 
effect allows for gaps in the protection offered by the common law if the courts are 
unable to deal with incompatible legislation through s.3 of the HRA 1998 and 
instead read s.6 as preventing the creation of freestanding torts.109 It would appear 
that adopting such a reading of the HRA 1998 would not be in the spirit of the Act to 
‘bring rights home’110 and instead would offer protection weaker than that provided 
in the European Court,111 which would in turn fall below the minimum protection 
the courts have found the HRA 1998 requires.112 
4.4 Missing the Point? 
It is clear from the above that there is significant disagreement around the 
application of the HRA 1998. However, it appears that commentators concerned 
with common law jurisdictions have, perhaps due to the volume of literature on the 
subject, been unable to see that it is not a matter of developing a single theory or 
single explanation of horizontal effect; rather it may be that each theory is an aspect 
of an all-encompassing phenomenon which is sensitive to the ‘complicated legal 
relations typical in horizontal effect cases’.113 
The legal theory of Alexy offers a solution to this problem. Alexy’s work is concerned 
with the German legal system. The differences between the German human rights 
regime and the HRA 1998 are many.114 However, Alexy’s observations regarding 
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horizontal effect are equally applicable to the HRA 1998.115 This is particularly the 
case for art.8 which is inherently horizontally applicable and protects individuals 
from private parties as well as the State.116 In this sense the interpretation of statute 
and common law are consequences of horizontal applicability and the positive 
imposition placed upon the State to observe human rights.117 In such a case there is 
no basis for the distinction between direct (or full) horizontal and indirect 
horizontal effect as the only limitations placed on the court are those relating to 
statutory interpretation or development of the common law.118 Therefore, for Alexy 
there is only horizontal effect.119 The above consideration of horizontal effect in 
relation to the HRA 1998 has demonstrated that the effects of the HRA rights 
between individuals are more nuanced than any single model can account for. 
Rather these theories are part of an overarching approach to horizontal effect. These 
instances of horizontal effect are better understood within the context of three levels 
of relations: 
1. the level of state duties; 
2. the level of rights against the state; and 
3.  the level of legal relations between private individuals.120 
Within each of these levels is an appreciation of the literature explored above but 
with an understanding that these approaches coexist in HRA 1998 jurisprudence.  
4.4.1 The Level of State Duties 
The first head of Alexy’s conception of horizontal effect rests in the traditional 
vertical relationship between State and individual. It is in this relationship that the 
State is obliged to ensure that legislation and private law adjudication is compatible 
with constitutional rights.121 In terms of the HRA 1998 these obligations are already 
visible. For example in the case of legislation presented before Parliament the 
relevant Minister must make a declaration that the bill is either compatible or 
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incompatible with the Convention rights.122 In either case the bill will continue 
through Parliament, however, if there is a statement that the bill is incompatible the 
Minister must give reasons for the incompatibility.123 Equally in the case of 
adjudication involving public authorities, even when dealing with private law, 
regard must be had to the HRA 1998.124 This level of state duties is similar in that 
sense to public liability horizontality which recognises the force of s.6 in giving effect 
to the HRA 1998 in proceedings involving a public authority. As noted above the 
shortcoming of public liability horizontality is the necessity for a public authority or 
a private body performing a public act to be involved in the proceedings. This is 
problematic for the large body of private sector tenants who, under the present law, 
are barred from the protections of art.8. However, the level of State duties explains 
those instances such as Pinnock and Lawal v Circle 33 Housing Trust125 in which 
the courts have found art.8 to be applicable with regard to local authorities and 
housing associations respectively. 
4.4.2 The Level of Rights Against the State 
The second head of Alexy’s model refers to the relationship between the individual 
and the State.126 For example, Alexy uses the example of a judge, acting on behalf of 
the State, who contravenes rights which a litigant is entitled to.127 This example 
again finds support in the HRA 1998 from s.6(3)(a) which defines the courts as 
public authorities who are therefore bound to respect the Convention rights of those 
seeking the assistance of the court. After all, a right can ‘only be infringed by those 
against whom it is held.’128 Equally this is evidenced by the courts willingness to 
develop the common law in line with the Convention, especially in the area of 
misuse of private information.129 This approach therefore similar in scope to 
intermediate horizontality discussed above.  
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There are two advantages to this aspect of Alexy’s approach. Firstly, all parties have 
the benefit of their individual rights in litigation ‘to [an] appropriate extent’.130 
Secondly, as this is based at the adjudication level the court is able to take account of 
the defensive and protective nature of rights,131 for example in the realm of housing 
law this would allow for consideration of arts.8(1) and 8(2) and art.1 of the First 
Protocol to the Convention when assessing the proportionality of a possession order.  
4.4.3 The Level of Legal Relations Between Private Individuals 
Finally in Alexy’s tripartite reconceptualisation of horizontal effect, Alexy contends 
that the concept of direct horizontal effect should not be thought of in the sense that 
rights themselves are equally applicable to private parties but instead that rights 
create ‘certain rights and no-rights, liberties and no-liberties, powers and disabilities 
in the relations between citizens on the basis of constitutional reasons’ which would 
not exist but for the rights themselves.132 In the context of art.8 within domestic 
jurisprudence this would manifest itself in the right of a tenant to plead art.8 to the 
court and to have the proportionality of any possession order considered and the no-
right of a landlord to reattain possession of the property without the court first 
considering proportionality and determining that it would be proportionate to make 
a possession order. Each of these levels of horizontal effect are in play in domestic 
law, however, the shortcoming in the literature to date has been to see each model of 
horizontal effect as exclusive rather than a position within a wider framework 
through which human rights may take effect;133 through State duties, through rights 
against the State, and through the legal relations between private individuals. The 
shortcomings of one model of horizontal effect might be filled by another. This 
would place the offending law itself under the scrutiny of the HRA 1998. On this 
basis it seems that there is no reason for the courts to remain passive when asked by 
a private sector tenant to consider art.8. Alexy’s tripartite approach dispatches the 
terminological difficulties created by the plethora of suggestions for the scope of 
horizontal effect. The question becomes not whether something is direct/indirect or 
strong/weak it is matter of the level at which the litigation takes place, which allows 
for courts to take account of the facts as pleaded by the claimant. This argument is 
bolstered from the additional pressure placed upon the courts by the non-
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discrimination provisions of the Convention and the HRA 1998 which are critically 
analysed below. 
4.5 Further Support for Horizontal Effect 
Article 14 of the Convention reads: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status. 
On its face art.14 seems of little relevance to housing proceedings and the horizontal 
effect of art.8. However, when art.14 is read in conjunction with the preamble to the 
Convention, which seeks to secure the realisation of the Convention rights, it must 
be asked whether art.14 might raise questions over the disparate application of art.8 
the domestic courts have thus far favoured.134 This is particularly so in light of the 
level of state duties discussed above as the State (including the courts) is bound to 
have regard for art.14 in adjudication. The engagement of art.14 in relation to 
housing proceedings is not novel with the House of Lords in Kay v Lambeth LBC 
being of the opinion that any art.8 defence must be predicated on art.14.135 However, 
art.14 arguments have not been common. The closest analogous argument advanced 
in relation to the differential application of art.8 following Pinnock comes from 
Southward Housing Co-Operative Limited v Walker,136 detailed below at 4.6. This 
discussion suggests that the current approach of the courts towards the exclusive 
application of art.8 in possession proceedings is flawed, not least for the reasons 
expounded above in relation to the lack of appreciation for the theoretical nature of 
horizontal effect, but also due to the requirements placed upon the courts by art.14. 
A correct reading and application of art.14 requires the same procedural safeguards 
afforded to public sector tenants by art.8, this argument finds additional weight 
from the framework of the HRA 1998 itself. This section therefore adopts a legalistic 
argument against the current differential application of art.8. This will be 
demonstrated: 
1. through an assessment of art.14 jurisprudence; 
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2. by establishing the ‘ambit’ of art.8 which includes possession proceedings 
which in turn will trigger art.14; and 
3. by establishing that the status of private sector tenants falls under the 
protection of art.14 via the ‘other status’ provision. 
4.6 Article 14 Jurisprudence 
The prevailing guidance on the effects of art.14 from the European Court of Human 
Rights remains the Belgian Linguistic Case.137 The case concerned the language 
used in schools in certain areas of Belgium which had been termed unilingual. In 
assessing whether these measures discriminated against the French speaking 
minority in these regions, in that they were not able to study in their preferred 
language, the European Court determined that there will be a breach of art.14 where 
a ‘distinction has no objective and reasonable justification’.138 In assessing whether 
such a justification is reasonable and objective the court will pay attention to the aim 
and effects of the measure and assess these through the lens of proportionality.139 
This approach has since been adopted in Larkos v Cyprus140 with the European 
Court of Human Rights accepting that the differential treatment of public and 
private sector tenants amounted to a breach of art.14 as there was ‘no objective and 
reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised’.141 Given this rather straightforward guidance from the European Court it 
might be wondered why the domestic courts have not, due to their duties under s.3 
of the HRA 1998, enquired into whether the current judicial approach which allows 
for the differential treatment of public and private tenants is objective, reasonable, 
and proportionate. However, the English courts have instead sought to distinguish 
domestic proceedings from their European counterparts. 
Southward Housing Co-Operative Ltd v Walker142 serves as the most recent 
example of the domestic courts’ failure to grapple with the substantive requirements 
of art.14. Walker is not directly analogous to situations in which a private sector 
tenant is seeking to resist the possession order of a tenant, however, in the absence 
of direct judicial commentary on the issue Walker serves as a good example of the 
lacklustre approach of the domestic courts. Walker concerned a tenancy granted by 
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a housing association which the association claimed was excluded from the security 
of tenure provisions of the Housing Acts. A range of arguments contrary to this 
submission were raised by the tenants including reliance upon arts.8 and 14. In 
addressing these submissions Hildyard J held that the argument of the defendants 
stretched what was possible under arts.8 and 14. On the art.8 argument Hildyard J 
reiterated that consideration of proportionality will only be required where the 
order is sought at the behest of a public authority. The tenant’s art.14 argument was 
based upon the residual protection afforded to those in housing association 
accommodation143 versus private sector and local authority tenants.144 This 
argument failed as, for Hildyard J, a tenant is not a form of ‘other status’ due to the 
lack of ‘innate and immutable’145 characteristics required before an individual’s 
attributes will amount to a status for the purposes of art.14. A further problem 
identified by Hildyard J was the institutional character of the housing association. 
Therefore, taking Walker as the most recent and applicable authority on the effects 
of art.14 in possession proceedings would appear to suggest that: 
1. art.14 is only relevant in cases where the landlord is a public authority (the 
ambit);146 
2. differentiation of tenants on the basis of their landlord (and therefore the 
statutory framework which applies to them) does not amount to a ‘status’ for 
the purposes of art.14 (the status);147 and 
3. even if art.14 was engaged the difference in treatment would be justified 
given the margin of appreciation which has been left to Member States (the 
justification).148  
This conception of art.14’s role in possession proceedings is flawed as it propagates 
discrimination between tenants. This disparate application of art.8 is the very 
outcome which art.14 looks to avert. It is demonstrated below that each of these 
three heads has been misconstrued by Hildyard J. 
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4.6.1 The Ambit of Article 14 
The finding of the High Court in Walker suggests that art.14 will only be relevant in 
possession proceedings where an order is sought by a public authority. This 
misunderstands the ambit of arts.8 and 14. At 4.3.2 it was demonstrated that art.8 is 
applicable to all possession proceedings upon its plain reading. The same 
observations are true of art.14 due to its horizontal applicability and the positive 
duties it creates on the part of the State. However, the arguments as to horizontal 
effect will not be repeated here. The focus will instead be the uniquely ‘parasitic’149 
or ‘symbiotic’150 nature of art.14 when pleaded alongside art.8 of the Convention. 
With regard to art.8 it should be recalled that: 
 … the loss of one’s home is the most extreme form of interference 
with the right to respect for the home. Any person at risk of an 
interference of this magnitude should in principle be able to have the 
proportionality of the measure determined by an independent 
tribunal in light of the relevant principles under art.8 of the 
Convention … 151 
Clearly on this reading art.8 is engaged where a person’s home is at risk 
independent of art.14. This might be called the ambit of art.8 for the purposes of this 
thesis. It is this ambit which is being limited to public sector tenants. 
The difficulty the courts have faced in identifying the purpose and effects of art.14 of 
the Convention is perhaps surprising given that there is a tradition within the 
common law to identify and prevent discrimination where possible.152 Nevertheless 
the courts have struggled to provide a principled approach that avoids arbitrary 
distinctions among different groups of people due to legalistic wrangling with s.6 of 
the HRA 1998 and concerns over whether a litigant is a public authority.153 It is 
suggested that limiting attention to s.6 of the HRA 1998 has caused the courts to 
overlook the purpose of art.14 which is simply the equal enjoyment of Convention 
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rights.154 Article 8 is, inter alia, concerned with the right to respect for a person’s 
home this has manifested in the requirement that any order ought to be subject to 
proportionality. Therefore art.14 is prima facie triggered in the case of private sector 
possession proceedings where this protection being denied. In such cases it is for the 
State to demonstrate that discrimination is not disproportionate.155 The typical 
position in which this might occur may be in relation to discriminatory legislation or 
government measures. However, in the case of possession proceedings it is the 
judicially developed approach to art.8 which has led to the discriminatory 
application of Convention rights,156 despite the allowance within the statutory 
framework to give effect to the requirements of arts.8 and 14.157 Therefore, it falls 
upon the courts to adjust their course in relation to arts.8 and 14. Following this line 
of argument, the relevance of art.14 will turn on whether a tenant fulfils the status 
requirements of art.14 due to not falling into the non-exhaustive list of other 
potential grounds of discrimination.158 
4.6.2 The Statuses of Article 14 
Article 14 of the Convention explicitly prohibits discrimination based upon a range 
of factors including birth, sex, or race. However, the words ‘other status’ indicate 
that this is a non-exhaustive list.159 Moreover, the nature of the ‘other status’ 
included within art.14 provision is not limited to those characteristics which are 
inherently or innately personal as suggested in Walker.160 It is arguable on that basis 
that private sector tenants have recourse to art.14 due to their exclusion from art.8 
protection.161 However, whilst the European Court has been open to an 
encompassing approach confusion has arisen due to two diverging schools of 
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thought as to the scope of art.14.162 The first approach is exemplified by the cases of 
Engel v Netherlands163 and Rasmussen v Denmark;164 in the former differential 
treatment based upon military rank was found to be a breach of art.14 as the holders 
of said ranks were caught by the other status provision of art.14, in the latter the 
European Court found that there was a difference in treatment between husband 
and wife with the Court simply stating there was ‘no call to determine on what 
ground this difference was based, the list of grounds appearing in Article 14 not 
being exhaustive.’165 The second approach may be seen in Grande Oriente d’Italia di 
Palazzo Giustiniani v Italy166 in which the European Court appeared to focus upon 
the arbitrary nature of the distinction rather than the reason for the distinction 
occurring on the basis of any status. For the purposes of this study it would appear 
that regardless of which approach the European Court chooses to adopt the current 
situation for private sector tenants falls foul of art.14 if it may be demonstrated that 
the current situation is either: (1) discriminatory on the basis of the tenant’s 
personal status; or (2) the distinction is arbitrary. The most suitable approach to 
art.14’s application is dependent upon what one sees as the purpose of art.14. On 
this front, it was established above that the essential rationale of art.14 is to ensure 
the equal enjoyment of the Convention rights. However, as the work of Gerards 
demonstrates, this may manifest in two ways: (1) non-discrimination or (2) equal 
treatment.167 
4.6.2.1 Non-Discrimination 
The non-discrimination perspective is based on the idea that art.14 prohibits 
discrimination rather than guarantees equality.168 In view of this an individual’s 
personal status (race, sex, or religion) is informative as to whether there has been 
discrimination. These characteristics often evoke moral discomfort given the 
historical discrimination such groups have faced.169 These characteristics are also 
often seen to be the product of a person’s innate being such as race (non-choice 
grounds) or within the realm of their personal autonomy such as religion (choice 
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grounds).170 The difficulty with this approach for the purposes of this study is that 
this may exclude the argument that the discriminatory application of art.8 on the 
basis of a landlord’s institutional character does not involve a sufficiently innate 
characteristic. It is likely that the court would approach this in the same manner as 
place of residence cases which have been of mixed success.171 It is perhaps for this 
reason that Gerards foresees this view as the one which would be most agreeable 
between the European Court and the domestic courts, not least because this 
approach is analogous to existing legislation,172 as this sets a low bar which the 
Member States are free to build upon should they chose.173 
The difficulty here is that the location a person makes their home and the status of 
that person’s landlord may be prima facie seen as a choice ground of discrimination. 
However, upon an assessment of the rented sector this suggestion loses weight. The 
number of tenants in the private rented sector is growing for a number of reasons.174 
Among these reasons is the reduced local authority housing stock resulting from 
right to buy schemes,175 which are about to be reinvigorated and introduced for 
housing associations.176 Therefore there is a housing market in which a tenant’s 
ability to rely upon a human rights defence is narrow not because of their choice as 
such but due to the lack of opportunity for them to find a local authority tenancy. 
This is not a choice but rather a fact of the housing market. To exclude private sector 
tenants from the protection of art.8 on the basis of it not being part of their status is 
misconceived. The status of tenant is legal in nature rather than personal as the 
form of a person’s tenancy is dictated by statute. In such cases, the UK government 
                                                        
170 R Wintemute, '"Within the Ambit": How Big is the "Gap" in Article 14 European 
Convention on Human Rights? Part 1' (2004) 4 EHRLR 366; R Wintemute, 'Filling the 
Article 14 "Gap": Government Ratification and Judicial Control of Protocol No. 12 ECHR: 
Part 2' (2004) 5 EHRLR 484. 
171 Magee v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 35; Clift v United Kingdom App no 7205/07 
(European Court of Human Rights, 13 July 2010); Carson v United Kingdom (2010) 51 
EHRR 13. 
172 Equality Act 2010. 
173 J Gerards, 'The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights' (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 99, 116-117; J Lewis, 'The European 
Ceiling on Human Rights' (2007) PL 720. 
174 Department for Communities and Local Government, English Housing Survey (Headline 
Report 2013-14, 2015); R Mason, 'Council Tenants Lost Lifetime Right to Live in Property' 
(The Guardian, 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/dec/09/council-
tenants-lose-lifetime-right-to-live-in-property> accessed 10 December 2015. 
175 D Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2011) 86-87. 
176 Cabinet Office and Her Majesty The Queen, 'Queen's Speech 2015' 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015> accessed 14 October 
2015; F Perraudin, 'Housing Bill to Include Right-to-Buy Extension in Queen's Speech' The 
Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/26/housing-bill-right-to-buy-
queens-speech-housing-association-tenants-conservatives> accessed 14 October 2015. 
112 
 
has argued that art.14 is not applicable. However, in Bah v United Kingdom177 the 
European Court found that legal statuses may amount to an ‘other status’ for the 
purposes of art.14. Therefore, a tenant’s legal status ought to be able to form the 
basis of an art.14 claim.  
4.6.2.2 Equal Treatment 
Taking an alternative view to the rationale for art.14 of the Convention, Gerards 
discusses the equal treatment rationale. The equal treatment rationale seeks to 
empty art.14 of moral considerations and rather imposes a strict legal rule 
applicable where ‘one group or person is allowed to exercise a certain right or 
receive a certain benefit, whilst this is not permitted for another person or group’.178 
The primary advantage of this approach is that it would allow for flexibility on the 
part of the European Court to develop art.14 to a fuller extent by scrutinising ‘all 
differences in treatment with an open eye to underlying systematic problems of 
societal or economic discrimination.’179 The Court’s commentary on social and 
economic issues is controversial due to its supra-national status.180 In the domestic 
sphere the same conservative approach is found due to deference from the courts to 
Parliament and local authorities.181 Nevertheless, if a court chose to adopt this 
course and ask whether the Convention rights had been applied equally in the case 
of art.8 and possession proceedings the answer would clearly be no. This would then 
allow the court to assess the justification for the apparent discrimination.  
In assessing the virtues of either the non-discrimination rationale or the equality 
rationale Gerards shows a preference for the equal treatment approach due to its 
robustness in the face of arbitrary discrimination.182 However, it is apparent that the 
use of either model would allow for the European Court and the domestic courts to 
expose discriminatory application of art.8 to justification. For the purposes of this 
work it is recognised that the non-discrimination approach is more likely to succeed 
in the European Court of Human Rights and the domestic courts due to the 
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doctrines of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation respectively.183 On this 
finding the justification for discrimination comes to the fore.184 Focussing on the 
non-discrimination approach should not be taken as a disregard for the equal 
treatment view. Rather it is suggested that the two may coexist,185 but that for the 
purposes of this thesis the non-discrimination perspective should be favoured due to 
its higher likelihood of adoption.  
4.6.3 Justifications for Interference with Article 14 
A finding of prima facie discrimination under art.14 of the Convention is not 
sufficient to amount to a breach. Rather the question is whether the measure is 
justified by it serving a legitimate purpose in a proportionate manner.186 In 
answering this question the domestic courts have adopted a multi-tiered approach 
in which suspect classifications, such as race or gender, will require a weighty 
justification to avoid a breach of art.14 whereas less suspect classifications will not 
be subject to strict scrutiny. This approach is most visible in Carson v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions.187 The case concerned the payment of pension 
contributions to retirees who had left the UK to live in South Africa (among other 
countries). The UK was party to a bilateral international agreement which allowed 
for the uprating of pension payments to account for increases to the cost of living. 
Unfortunately, South Africa was not a signatory to this agreement and so the 
claimant received her pension at the same level as when it was awarded to her 
(excluding increments for inflation). The claimant argued that this breached art.14. 
The House of Lords held that the appellant failed to show a breach of art.14 due to 
the lack of an ‘analogous situation’ to those living in the UK or a country with a 
reciprocal agreement. In assessing the presence of discrimination the House of 
Lords relied upon a lack of Strasbourg jurisprudence on the question of the grounds 
for discrimination being of equal ‘potency’.188 In finding that the appellant’s case to 
be unsuccessful utilised the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court which 
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has recognised the existence of ‘suspect classifications’ that ought to be subjected to 
‘particularly severe scrutiny’ due to historical discrimination.189 It was this view 
which allowed for the House of Lords to find that the appellant was not in an 
analogous situation. It is submitted that this approach is ill-founded. The argument 
against the Carson approach is advanced on two fronts in line with the 
jurisprudence of the European Court: (1) art.14 does not advocate a tiered approach 
to scrutiny on the basis of ‘suspect’ classifications; and (2) the justification for any 
prima facie breach of art.8 should be assessed by gauging whether the measure is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued rather than grasping for a tiered 
approach to scrutiny.190 
4.6.3.1 European Court Approach 
The work of Baker is instructive on the scrutiny to apply to justifications tabled for 
interferences with art.14.191 The first contention of Baker is that the plain wording of 
art.14 does not indicate or require any hierarchy of discrimination which might 
make one form of discrimination more insidious than the other. Article 14 is 
therefore drafted to take account of a wide-ranging number of classifications. The 
motivation of anti-discrimination provisions is the realisation of equal dignity and 
respect.192 In such a case it is not the ground for discrimination which is significant 
but rather it is ‘proportionality itself that tells us whether a classification is 
suspect’.193 In spite of the lack of support for a tiered approach at the European 
Court of Human Rights there are commentators who consider the suspect and non-
suspect grounds to be part of the European Court’s jurisprudence. By way of 
example, Joory states the European Court of Human Rights ‘has gradually cultivated 
different approaches to discrimination involving “suspect grounds” and “non-
suspect grounds”’.194 However, an analysis of the European Court’s jurisprudence 
does not support this, those who have identified the suspect and non-suspect 
grounds have instead highlighted the differing rationales for art.14 assessed above at 
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4.6.2.1-4.6.2.2, non-discrimination versus equality. For instance, Joory relies upon 
Petrovic v Austria195 in support of the suspect/non-suspect distinction. Petrovic 
concerned alleged discrimination which arose out of gender, a historic form of 
discrimination which has been a target of art.14 since the Convention’s inception.196 
Rather than creating a tiered approach to scrutiny the case demonstrates that the 
form of discrimination serves to attune the eventual proportionality analysis which 
any prima facie breach of art.14 must endure.197 This subverts the tiered approach by 
exposing any discriminatory measure to proportionality in the first instance rather 
than asking whether a measure encroached on a prescribed suspect or non-suspect 
ground. This approach is in keeping with a plain reading of art.14 which gives no 
indication that some forms of discrimination are more suspect than others.198 
Following a dispensation of the multi-tiered approach and endorsement of a wide 
reading of art.14 the question becomes whether the justification was ‘objective and 
reasonable’199 not whether it involves suspect or non-suspect grounds.200 In the 
context of possession proceedings, differential application of art.8 would require an 
objective and reasonable justification tested via proportionality which:  
contemplates a situation where the harm of a measure, in terms of 
the extent of invasion of an individual’s rights, or in terms of the 
damage to common interests in equal dignity and social inclusion for 
example, could outweigh the benefits of even a narrowly tailored 
measure aimed at a compelling interest.201 
Therefore on the basis of the above it is suggested that the compelling interest in 
stimulating the private rented sector that lies at the heart of contemporary housing 
legislation,202 taken together with the obligations created by the HRA 1998, ought to 
be scrutinised by the courts during their assessment of whether a person may be 
dispossessed of their home. This is argued due to the requirements of arts.8 and 14 
taken together. Given the importance of the home to the individual recognised 
above at 3.2 and protected via art.8 it is difficult to foresee circumstances in which 
the differential treatment of public sector and private sector tenants might survive. 
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This is appreciated in the discussion below which looks to give effect to the 
European Court’s approach to art.14 in spite of Carson. 
4.6.3.2 Giving Effect to the European Court Approach in Light of 
Carson 
The judgment of the House of Lords in Carson has subsequently been affirmed 
leaving the suspect grounds approach in play in domestic law.203 Notwithstanding 
the questionable turn taken by the House of Lords in Carson the Supreme Court 
should reconsider this issue when afforded the opportunity, especially given the 
omission of suspect grounds jurisprudence in the European Court.204 In doing this 
the Supreme Court should not shy away from their duties under the HRA 1998 and 
should draw upon the constitutional underpinnings of domestic law.205 The 
dissenting judgment of Ward LJ in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association 
Ltd206 is particularly persuasive on this point. Briefly summarised Fitzpatrick 
concerned the interpretation to be given to sch.1 of the Rent Act 1977 which on its 
face discriminated against same sex couples to the effect that the couple’s 
fundamental right to human dignity was ‘severely and palpably affected’.207 This 
same point could be made in relation to the Carson approach which would bar 
private sector tenants from arguing that there has been a breach of art.14. Private 
sector tenants’ human dignity is doubtlessly being ‘severely and palpably affected’ 
where they are barred from the same fundamental rights available to their public 
sector counterparts. 
Ward LJ’s concise and methodical approach highlights the legalistic ease with which 
the Supreme Court could affect a change in position. Ward draws a distinction 
between matters of form and function, on the facts of Fitzpatrick the nature of the 
relationship between members of the same sex is the same as a heterosexual 
relationship in function if not in form.208 Applying this same straightforward 
functionalistic approach to the distinction between public sector and private sector 
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tenants finds that each group have the same goals in mind when taking up a 
residential lease – to make a home. Therefore the formalistic identity of their 
landlord ought to be ignored.209 Such an approach would allow for the Supreme 
Court to adopt a progressive approach in keeping with the ideals of the Convention 
and domestic law.  
4.6.3.3 Comparators 
In assessing the justification for discrimination the European Court and domestic 
courts have often resorted to comparing the situation of the complainant with that 
of another analogous individual. The use of comparators is demonstrated by 
Nicholas v Secretary of State for Defence.210 The appellant in Nicholas was a RAF 
serviceman who occupied his home under a licence granted by the Ministry of 
Defence until the licence was determined upon the breakdown of his marriage. The 
appellant argued that this amounted to discrimination under art.14 taken together 
with art.8 due to the denial of security of tenure that attaches to the majority of 
other tenancies.211 The Court of Appeal identified two potential comparators to the 
appellant in Nicholas the first was a private sector licencee and the second was a 
public sector licencee. On the first comparator the court found that if the appellant 
had been a licencee he would not have benefitted from security of tenure as 
licencees are excluded from protection. This seems a misguided finding in light of 
the lease/licence distinction and the position of the courts following Street v 
Mountford.212 In Street the court found the attempts of a landlord to avoid the 
effects of the Rent Act 1977 by terming the rental agreement a licence to be 
unsuccessful as the characteristics of a lease were present. The use of the second 
comparator is also flawed in that the court seems to flip from a private context in the 
first comparator to a public context in the second. The difficulty with this second 
comparator is that, notwithstanding the effect of sch.1 of the Housing Act 1985 
which excludes employment accommodation from being a secure tenancy, the 
Ministry of Defence is arguably acting in a private law capacity in their employment 
of the appellant. Therefore, both comparators used in Nicholas to find no violation 
of art.14 are flawed. Nicholas demonstrates the possible ‘light touch’ distinction 
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which arises out of a conflation of justification and comparators thereby excluding a 
more intensive enquiry.213 
The European Court and domestic courts do frequently look for analogous 
situations in assessing whether there has been discrimination.214 However, this is 
not a method of determining justification only that there has been a difference in 
treatment. In the case of possession proceedings the relevant comparator would be a 
public sector tenant benefiting from the procedural protections afforded by art.8 as 
opposed to a private sector tenant who does not. In comparing these analogous 
situations it is difficult to see the European Court finding these parties to be 
sufficiently different to allow for the difference in treatment. Therefore, attention 
ought to instead be focused on the justification for the measure in question. For 
example, in Paulik v Slovakia215 the European Court found that despite numerous 
differences between two individuals there may still be a comparable position in 
which any differential treatment must be reasonable and justified.216 This approach 
is best expressed by the European Court stating:  
in any event, the Court does not consider it necessary to determine 
conclusively whether the applicant[s] ... were in an analogous 
situation to either of the comparators suggested ... [due to] ... the 
differential treatment to which the applicant was subjected ... 217 
Therefore for the European Court it appears that although there remains a nominal 
attachment to seeking a comparator against which to compare the complainant the 
determinative factor in assessing art.14 breaches is whether the difference in 
treatment is ‘reasonably and objectively justified’. 
In the domestic courts Baroness Hale has offered comments in support of the above 
view. In the opinion of Baroness Hale, when considering art.14 ‘ ... unless there are 
very obvious relevant differences between the two situations, it is better to 
concentrate on the reasons for the difference in treatment and whether they amount 
to an objective and reasonable justification.’218 Article 14’s ‘non-technical drafting’ 
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thereby simply allows the court to subject discriminatory measures to 
justification.219 Due to the approach of the European Court in relation to art.14 and 
the apparent acceptance of this by the domestic courts, the framework is in place for 
a private sector tenant to argue that the decision in Pinnock is discrimination 
without reasonable or objective justification. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The extent to which the Convention may have an effect in relationships between 
individuals continues to inspire lengthy debates. In view of the contributions of 
Beyleveld and Pattinson220 it is clear that the rights contained in the Convention are, 
on their literal reading, applicable to horizontal litigation. However, there is less 
agreement around the precise model and extent of horizontal effect. There are those 
such as Wade and Raphael who advocate a robust approach to the HRA 1998 and 
horizontal litigation whereas there are those such as Phillipson who argues for a 
weaker form of horizontal effect without any obligation on the courts to develop the 
law in line with the Convention. The situation is made the more difficult given the 
courts aversion to aligning themselves to any one view despite several judgments 
demonstrating the characteristics of mutually exclusive approaches. Therefore, 
rather than seeking to find the one true model the debate may be better framed as 
highlighting a range of possible coexistent applications of the same principle. 
In view of these findings, it is not submitted that any of the headings of Alexy’s work 
at 4.4 become the sole method for determining the horizontal effect of human rights 
but rather that the courts utilise all of the above powers depending upon the 
circumstances and the parties appearing before the court. This approach sidesteps 
the issues which have plagued the courts to date and instead opts for a holistic 
approach which allows individuals to fully plead HRA 1998 rights. Moreover, it 
would allow the courts to develop domestic jurisprudence more freely and in 
keeping with the particular nuances of the common law and the UK Constitution. 
The true question therefore becomes not whether HRA 1998 rights will have 
horizontal effect but rather the ‘balancing of [competing] interests’221 which is 
exemplified in the requirements of art.8(2).222 
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In the sphere of housing law Alexy’s theory allows the courts to approach statute and 
the common law with a view to reaching a Convention compliant interpretation. For 
example if the courts were dealing with s.7(3) of the Housing Act 1988 involving a 
local authority the court may resort to the level of state duties, alternatively if a 
private sector landlord sought to rely upon s.21 of the Housing Act 1988 the court 
may refer to the level of legal relations between private individuals. In either case 
the question will become whether any subsequent order would be proportionate and 
how proportionality may represent the competing interests of a range of parties 
which range from purely public bodies such as local authorities to tenants subject to 
private sector leases. The pressure to adopt this course of action is all the stronger 
due to art.14 which prohibits any unjustified discrimination in the application of 
Convention rights.  
The difficulties of the current human rights approach within housing law necessitate 
a reconceptualization of the application of human rights. In light of the foregoing 
arguments the legal framework is in place for the domestic courts to grasp the 
human rights instruments available to the judiciary to ensure all people’s homes are 
given the respect required and deserved. A concern flowing from this may be the 
curtailment of certainty in possession proceedings which are largely dealt with on a 
summary basis at present. However, it is demonstrated in Chapter 6 that the 
introduction of proportionality does not afford the courts blanket discretion nor in 
such circumstances is a landlord barred from recovering their property in all 
instances. Before dealing with possible conceptions of proportionality the nature of 
the public/private divide must be considered. The public/private divide is the 
theoretical backdrop which has informed s.6 of the HRA 1998’s limitations. 
Therefore, whilst the legal framework critically analysed above might allow for these 
limitations to be softened there remain theoretical questions as to the basis for 
public law creations to reach into the private sphere. 
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5 The Public/Private Divide and its Effects in the 
Application of Article 8 to Housing Law 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapters of this thesis have made the case that the courts’ current 
approach to art.8 is unduly limited in two key ways. The first is assessed in Chapter 
3 where the deep physical and mental connections a person feels towards their 
home were demonstrated. Chapter 3 concluded by arguing that these interests may 
be encompassed within art.8 and afforded weight within an assessment of the 
proportionality of a possession order. The connection which one feels towards their 
home exists regardless of the institutional character of their landlord. This leads to 
the analysis of horizontal effect in Chapter 4 which determined that art.8 is 
inherently horizontally applicable and, in various fashions, may have horizontal 
effect. However, the question which emerges from this practical assessment of 
art.8’s scope and effect is how a creation of public law, which at the time of its 
drafting was understood to be addressed to the State and impliedly not interfere 
with matters outside the State’s purview, might be utilised by private sector tenants. 
This question therefore requires a critical analysis of the public/private divide as 
maintained by the HRA 1998 in s.6 which limits the application of HRA rights to 
those instances involving public authorities, including the courts. This Chapter will 
therefore assess the basis of the public/private divide with a particular focus on the 
divide’s effects in the application of art.8. The key concern of this Chapter is to 
determine the monolithic nature attributed to the divide by many writers and 
judgments. 
The public/private divide and its position within common law jurisdictions has 
engaged commentators since the recognition of a discrete body of public law.1 The 
role, if any, of the public/private divide is all the more noteworthy following the 
passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) which makes the provisions of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) binding upon ‘public 
                                                        
1 See for example J Mitchell, 'The Cause and Effects of the Absence of a System of Public Law 
in the United Kingdom' (1963) PL 95; C Harlow, '"Public" and "Private" Law: Definition 
without Distinction' (1980) 43 MLR 241; D Kennedy, 'The Stages of the Decline of the 
Public/Private Distinction' (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1349; G 
Samuel, 'Public and Private Law: A Private Lawyer's Response' (1983) 46 MLR 558; D 
Oliver, Common Values and the Public/Private Divide (Butterworths 1999); J Allison, 
'Variation of View on English Legal Distinctions Between Public and Private' (2007) 66 
Cambridge Law Journal 698. 
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authorities’.2 The role of divide comes to the fore when arguing that art.8 of the 
Convention and the HRA 1998 ought to have horizontal effect, discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4. If it is accepted that art.8 of the Convention ought have both vertical and 
horizontal effect this doubts the idea that human rights exist to ‘trace a fault-line 
between public and private spheres’3 by imposing human rights duties upon only the 
public actors and not their private counterparts. This is in spite of the fact that 
private actors are often lawfully able to exercise their power against individuals to 
much the same effect as the State.4 In view of these issues this Chapter identifies the 
precise nature of the public/private divide within English law and questions the 
continued appropriateness of this apparent binary legal construct in view of the 
arguments made in Chapter 4 as to the horizontal effect of art.8. 
Understood as a bipolarity the public/private divide acts as a constraint on one of 
the core submissions of this work, that is that human rights considerations ought to 
be applicable in all instances where person’s home is at risk, irrespective of the 
institutional nature of the parties. Human rights are commonly considered to be 
public law creations as they manage the relationship between the State and the 
individual.5 The objectives of public law might be summarised as ensuring public 
bodies act fairly within their powers.6 In the development of public law the courts 
have sought to delineate the occasions and the bodies which will be subject to 
judicial scrutiny thereby drawing a rudimentary divide between those instances 
calling for public law remedies as opposed to private law.7 The lineage of public law 
is visible in the HRA 1998 which on its face applies only to those bodies amenable to 
judicial review.8 In this sense human rights might be thought to exist autonomously 
from private law in an effort to regulate the relationship between State and 
individual.9 Whereas private law is concerned with the legal relationships of 
                                                        
2 Human Rights Act 1998 s.6.  
3 S Nield, 'Article 8 Respect for the Home: a Human Property Right?' (2013) 24 King's Law 
Journal 147, 150.  
4 R L Hale, 'Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion' 
(1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 149. 
5 M Rosenfeld, 'Rethinking the Boundaries Between Public Law and Private Law for the 
Twenty First Century: An Introduction' (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 125, 126. 
6 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, [1984] 3 
WLR 1174. 
7 O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237; R v Panel on Takeover and Mergers ex p Datafin Plc 
[1987] QB 815; R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club ex p Massingberd-Mundy 
[1993] 2 All ER 207. 
8 Human Rights Act 1998 s.6. 
9 C Harlow, '"Public" and "Private" Law: Definition without Distinction' (1980) 43 MLR 241, 
241; G Vedel, Droit Administratif (5th edn, Presses Universitaires de France 1973) 46-47; J 
Bell, 'Public Law in Europe: Caught between the National, the Sub-National and the 
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individuals.10 This view of private law lies at the heart of private property which may 
be reduced to the owner’s ability to exclude others from one’s land with a view to 
protect their autonomy.11 However, even this apparent absolute is not as strong as it 
first appears when the wealth of interferences with private property are noted such 
as planning restrictions and environmental laws.12 The idea of autonomy is 
noteworthy here as it has been understood by the courts as essentially a right to 
quiet enjoyment of one’s property13 rather than autonomy in the sense highlighted 
in Chapter 3. Moreover, if a public/private divide was drawn to include ideas beyond 
law then it would be non-contentious to consider the home private.14 Therefore, to 
argue that human rights should play a role in instances where a person’s home is at 
risk is to argue at the very least that the public/private divide is not to be conceived 
as a monolithic compartmentalisation of two discrete areas of law. This Chapter 
argues that rather than being a hard ‘fault-line’15 the divide ought to be conceived as 
a spectrum which would in turn allow for the courts to factor the characteristics of a 
particular case into any analysis of whether it may be proportionate to dispossess 
someone of their home.  
5.2 Emergence of the Public/Private Divide 
‘What is public, and what is private, and who cares?’16 
5.2.1 Historical Roots 
The roots of the public/private divide are older than the English legal system with 
the distinction between public and private activities being recognised in Greek and 
Roman law.17 Equally, calls for the elimination of the divide have existed for just as 
                                                                                                                                                            
European' in Van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Hart 
2004) 262-264. 
10 E J Weinrib, 'Private Law and Public Right' (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 
191, 191. 
11 E J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 74-75. 
12 Town and Country Planning Act 1990; Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
13 See generally the law around private nuisance, Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum 
[1954] 2 QB 182, 195-203; Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1996] AC 655; Holbeck Hall Hotel 
Ltd v Scarborough Borough Council [2000] QB 836, 851-857. 
14 C M Rose, 'Psychologies of Property (and Why Property is not a Hawk/Dove Game)' in 
Penner and Smith (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford University 
Press 2013) 275. 
15 S Nield, 'Article 8 Respect for the Home: a Human Property Right?' (2013) 24 King's Law 
Journal 147, 150.  
16 C D Stone, 'Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter' 
(1981-1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1441, 1506. 
17 R Kemp and A D Moore, 'Privacy' (2007) 25 Library Hi Tech 58, 59; D Friedmann and D 
Barak-Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart Publishing 2001) 1; N Rose, 'Beyond 
the Public/Private Division: Law, Power, and the Family' (1987) 14 Journal of Law and 
Society 61, 64. 
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long.18 The idea of public and private spheres first received attention from English 
speaking writers with Locke.19 It is upon the acquisition of private property that the 
nuances of Locke’s ideas of the private sphere become clear in that Locke sees 
private property as allowing for the development of the self alongside the enjoyment 
of a person’s land.20 Locke’s approach to the property rights which arose from civil 
society allows ‘ … individuals the moral space to order their lives as they [see] fit ... 
[securing] a domain of private action free from public pressures.’21 Encroaching 
upon this private domain with public power therefore would require ‘weighty 
justification’.22 Admittedly here Locke is concerned with acquisition of private 
property and the liberties attached to this rather than ideas of the home which were 
critically analysed in Chapter 3. However, as was established, the core principles 
remain the same in relation to the home, regardless of the specific form of legal 
tenure (or lack thereof), with the home forming the centre of one’s existence which 
allows for a physical and metaphorical shelter away from the ‘prying eyes’23 of the 
public forum.24 The home therefore exists as a private sphere, an enclave within the 
wider public sphere.25 Even in Locke’s writings which do not address human rights 
concerns, the lines of the public/private divide are visible and serve to enforce the 
principle that private law exists for the protection and proliferation of private 
property.26 Moreover, in modern Western liberal societies public law has been 
blocked from gaining ground in any way which might weaken the ‘most important’ 
right, the right to property,27 creating a ‘republic of property’.28 Private property 
therefore facilitates a private sphere in which an individual is usually free from the 
interference of the State and able to exercise autonomy.29 However, the extent of 
                                                        
18 Plato, The Laws bk V; R Kemp and A D Moore, 'Privacy' (2007) 25 Library Hi Tech 58, 60. 
See Chapter 3 for discussion of Greek virtue. 
19 J Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (Project Gutenberg edn, 1690). 
20 Ibid ch 5. 
21 R Kemp and A D Moore, 'Privacy' (2007) 25 Library Hi Tech 58, 61. 
22 Ibid, 61. 
23 M J Radin, 'Property and Personhood' (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957, 997. 
24 P Korosec-Serfaty, 'The Home from Attic to Cellar' (1984) 4 Journal of Environmental 
Psychology 303, 304; C M Rose, 'Psychologies of Property (and Why Property is not a 
Hawk/Dove Game)' in Penner and Smith (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Property Law 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 275; L Fox O'Mahony, 'Eviction and the Public Interest: The 
Right to Respect for the Home in English Law' in Robin Paul Malloy and Michael Diamond 
(eds), The Public Nature of Private Property (Ashgate 2011). 
25 There is some support for this view from the work of Jürgen Habermas, see in particular J 
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (MIT Press 1962). 
26 See generally M Hardt and A Negri, Commonwealth (Harvard University Press 2009) 9-
15. 
27 Ibid 10. 
28 Ibid 15. 
29 The divide remains clear in the minds of the judiciary who have understood the core of 
art.8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to be concerned primarily with privacy, 
J A Sweeney and L Fox O'Mahony, 'The Displacement and Dispossession of Asylum Seekers: 
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this autonomy is perhaps overwrought when considered in light of contemporary 
limitations placed upon the owner of a property.30 Montesquieu is more overt in his 
assessment of the distinction between public and private law. For Montesquieu, 
public law (or political law) affords liberty whilst private law (or civil law) secures 
private property.31 For Montesquieu these two branches ought not intertwine. 
Montesquieu’s view is based on the belief that the holding of private property is 
inherently virtuous and as such no public good may defeat this.32 Montesquieu’s 
approach does not provide any grounds by which the public/private divide might be 
altered to allow for art.8 to have a role in possession proceedings. 
The recognition of a divide between public and private is also visible in the work of 
Mill in his conceptualisation of public and private spheres:33 
 ... the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection ... The only part of the conduct of any one, 
for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In 
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, 
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.34 
For Mill there is a space around the individual and the individual’s conduct which is 
private in nature and shall not be pierced but for instances in which another 
individual will be harmed.35 In contrast to private conduct Mill refers to public 
power being exercised via public authorities at the behest of the majority of 
society.36 These public and private activities each belong to their own sphere 
independently of one another.37 Solely relying upon On Liberty it would appear that 
the only instance in which a person’s liberty, that is for Mill the freedom to do as one 
wishes, may be infringed by a public authority is where harm will befall another.38 
Extrapolating this idea into landlord and tenant law, a tenant may only be 
                                                                                                                                                            
Recalibrating the Legal Perspective' in James A Sweeney and Lorna Fox O'Mahony (eds), 
The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession (Ashgate Publishing 2013) 125-
126.  
30 Town and Country Planning Act 1990; Environmental Protection Act 1990.  
31 M Cohen, 'Property and Sovereignty' (1927-1928) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8, 8. 
32 Ibid. 
33 J S Mill, On Liberty (Project Gutenberg edn, 1859). 
34 Ibid 17-18. 
35 Ibid 17. 
36 Ibid 7. See also J-J Rousseau, The Social Contract and the Discourses (Project Gutenberg 
2014) ch VI. 
37 J S Mill, On Liberty (Project Gutenberg edn, 1859) 16-21; R Kemp and A D Moore, 
'Privacy' (2007) 25 Library Hi Tech 58, 61. 
38 This view echoes the Lockean belief that an individual has ownership of themselves and 
their labour/property and the reason for entering society is the protection of oneself and 
one’s belongings. For Locke entering society and the protection of one’s property involves a 
cessation of some autonomy, see Chapter 3.  
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dispossessed of their home where there is no harm caused to the tenant. In the same 
example, however, an inability to dispossess might cause harm to a landlord. The 
harm principle is therefore flawed due to it not accounting for law or actions which 
do not fall tidily into either sphere. For the contemporary legal issues of this thesis 
Locke and Mill offer little guidance as they fail to see a middle ground where public 
and private law may intersect with one another. The same is true for socialist 
thinkers such as Marx who ‘recognised the public status of private capital’.39 This in 
turn leads to collective ownership in which the private is made to be public.40 In this 
there is no middle ground between public and private. Marx’s co-writer Engels is 
similarly accepting of a public/private divide, although like Marx Engels saw the 
divide as beneficial only for the bourgeoisie.41 The Marxist solution to this is the 
deletion of the divide by essentially making all which is private public. However, this 
suffers from the same difficulties as classical liberal thinkers such as Locke in failing 
to appreciate the symbiotic nature of each realm. This nuance is clear in art.8 of the 
Convention and art.1 of the First Protocol. These provisions deal with ideas of the 
home and private property which would fall within the so-called private sphere yet 
these provisions are the product of public discourse in the form of human rights and 
so any bright line division is questionable.42 The difficulties continue in the ability of 
public bodies, such as local authorities, that are able to exercise private functions 
such as entering contracts or acquiring property.43 The line between the public and 
private is blurred further by the ‘common rights’ which may be acquired by 
individuals such as those relating to the environment.44 
5.2.2 Early Common Law Application 
The public/private divide in a legal context began to occupy political theorists into 
the 20th century,45 however, this did not readily lead to English law following, 
facilitating, or recognising such a distinction.46 Whilst civil jurisdictions recognised 
a divide between public and private law from their inception those jurisdictions 
                                                        
39 D Slater, 'Public/Private' in Chris Jenks (ed), Core Sociological Dichotomies (Sage 1998) 
142. 
40 Ibid 142. 
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using the common law have looked to develop the divide much later.47 American law 
was the first common law jurisdiction to develop an overt public/private divide in a 
drive to: 
create a legal science that would sharply separate law from politics … 
[an] apolitical system of legal doctrine and legal reasoning free from 
what was thought to be the dangerous and unstable redistributive 
tendencies of democratic politics, legal thinkers hoped to temper the 
problem “tyranny of the majority”.48  
There are hints of historical American scepticism of government and fears of 
majority rule rooted in revolutionary politics in this view.49 Conceptualising law in 
this apolitical form serves to strengthen private rights at the expense of the public 
generally.50 In the context of landlord and tenant law this might be seen as evident 
in the exceptional circumstances required by the courts before a landlord’s right to 
recover their property will be defeated by human rights considerations, thereby 
giving preference to ascertainable property rights.51 However, any pursuit of a ‘sharp 
line’ between public law and private law or public acts and private acts presents 
inherent impracticalities.52 This is particularly evident in context-sensitive 
approaches adopted by the courts.53 In the United States these issues may be seen in 
the difficulties the courts faced in the regulation of railways54 or the realisation of 
racial equality.55 In this sense it is perhaps unsurprising that the United States 
Supreme Court were required to comment on the legitimacy of a strict 
public/private divide in Shelley v Kraemer.56 The case concerned the inclusion of a 
                                                        
47 See the following for discussion of the public/private divide in civil law systems, J H 
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Historical and Comparative Perspective on English Public Law (Clarendon Press 1996). 
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restrictive covenant which sought to preclude the purchase of property by people of 
the ‘Negro or Mongolian Race’.57 The legality of the covenant turned on the 
interpretation given to the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution which 
might be summarised as prohibiting the denial of constitutional rights to US 
citizens. This same argument is one aspect of the overall submission of Chapter 4 of 
this thesis, that HRA rights are inherently applicable and effective in all cases 
regardless of the character of the parties before the court.58 
In determining the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment upon a covenant which had 
been agreed between individuals the court drew attention to the fact that the 
enforcement of such covenants was dependent upon State action through a court 
order.59 The cases in which the courts have enforced these agreements are not cases 
where the courts have ‘merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free 
to impose such discriminations as they see fit.’60 In light of this view the court 
adjudged the restrictive covenant to be unconstitutional and therefore 
unenforceable notwithstanding the private law underpinnings to the enforcement of 
restrictive covenants.61 Herein the court appears to have recognised that where the 
State is called upon to enforce a promise or right effectively all law becomes public 
and subject to considerations over the constitutionality of the requested action.62 
There are echoes of this approach in the development of various areas of English law 
following the view that the court, as a public authority, is required to give effect to 
the HRA rights where possible.63 Given the apparent ease with which the US 
Supreme Court reached its decision in Shelley it may be asked why the nature of the 
public/private divide has continued to enliven legal debate.64 In the context of the 
US the continued referral to the public/private divide is attributed to the changing 
political attitudes which emerged in the latter half of the 20th century following 
World War 2. Prior to the War progressives in the US saw the State as the promoter 
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of the public interest. However, upon witnessing the emergence of totalitarian 
governments of Europe the function of the State was ‘redefined as simply a 
reflection of a sum of the vectors of private conflict. Private self-interest … once 
again became the only legitimate political reality … ’. 65 The same political attitudes 
were not contemporaneous within the UK, particularly after the War and the 
nationalisation that followed, nevertheless a discrete body of public did emerge.66 
On that basis it would appear that the divide is reactionary to historical and societal 
conditions rather than inherent in common law jurisdictions leaving open the 
potential for flexibility within any conception of the divide.67  
5.2.3 Coming to England 
Given the theoretical difficulties which arise from the public/private divide and the 
historic peculiarities of the common law it is unsurprising that English law took 
some time to recognise the existence of public law.68 The most famous proclamation 
of the historical absence of public law in England comes from Dicey.69 Calls from 
within the judiciary for the development of a discrete body of law to govern the 
action of the State increased in the 1960s and 1970s.70 Prior to this period it was felt 
that administrative law was not necessary in England.71 However, the development 
of public law came to be seen as necessary in curtailing ‘the enormous post-war state 
apparatus’.72 Prior to this an individual’s ability to hold the State to account was 
limited to ancient historical instruments, such as Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 
1689, and habeas corpus, but these instruments could not be described as part of a 
discrete system of public law. The procedural aspects of the public/private divide 
took shape with the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) and later the Supreme Court 
Act 1981 (now the Senior Courts Act 1981)73 which, unlike the RSC, ‘can affect both 
procedure and substance alike’.74 Therefore, with the enactment of s.31 of the Senior 
Courts Act 1981 the courts were afforded the power, in the form of judicial review, to 
make orders in favour of an individual where they were ‘challenging the conduct of a 
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public authority or a public body, or of anyone acting in the exercise of a public 
duty.’75 On this definition the purpose of public law clearly overlaps with the 
intentions of human rights instruments which regulate the relationship between the 
individual and the State.76 For example art.1 of the Convention makes plain that the 
signatories to the Convention are to secure the rights and freedoms of the 
Convention to all those in their jurisdiction. Moreover, the HRA 1998 itself seeks to 
secure these same rights and freedoms for individuals as against public authorities.77 
The public/private divide might therefore be seen as core to the constitutional angle 
of public law which aims to regulate relations between the State and individuals78 
this is as opposed to the relations between individuals which, if they are not part of 
public law, may be deduced to be part of private law.79  
Whilst the burgeoning public law of the 20th century saw the relationship between 
State and individual as its primary concern, the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms did not feature within this newly developed framework as such. The 
idea that human rights ought to be protected through public law did not 
immediately receive credence as the common law was seen to already recognise and 
protect a number of such rights.80 It is in this approach that we see the sanctity of an 
individual’s property achieving a higher status through the operation of common 
law rights.81 Specifically the principles of the common law recognised in Entick v 
Carrington82 and Semayne’s Case83 are significant.84 Notwithstanding this lineage 
the protection of fundamental rights is now often adjudged through the lens of 
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judicial review.85 For the purposes of housing law and possession proceedings in 
particular this is evident in Kay v Lambeth.86 It is in instances such as this that 
rights-based public law is visible. There are elements of this within other areas of 
law such as family law87 and employment law.88 The passage of the HRA 1998 
crystalizes this and reaches beyond the comparatively limited scope of judicial 
review with the Supreme Court now more than willing to tackle public law issues 
(particularly human rights applications).89 However, the paradox within this is that 
the HRA 1998 explicitly retains a distinction between public law and private law 
with only public authorities being bound by the HRA rights.90 
This distinction is visible in ss.6(1) and 6(3)(b) of the HRA 1998 which require any 
body performing a public function to act compatibly with HRA rights.91 Despite this 
apparent retention of the public/private divide in s.6 there have been some 
instances of private actors being bound by rights contained in the HRA 1998. This is 
visible in public liability horizontality. The most illuminating examples of public 
liability horizontality are Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community 
Association v Donoghue,92 R (Heather) v The Leonard Cheshire Foundation93 and 
Aston Cantlow v Wallbank94 Each of these cases involved art.8 of the Convention 
and so are particularly instructive as to the potential role of art.8 within housing 
law.  
Poplar is an early consideration of s.6.95 In assessing the correct approach to s.6 
Lord Woolf found that in applying the HRA 1998 the courts should adopt a generous 
interpretation of s.6,96 which would presumably extend beyond the traditional 
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definition of a public authority as understood in judicial review and the requirement 
for there to be some public function.97 However, his Lordship stopped short of 
finding that any private organisation carrying out functions on behalf of a public 
authority would be bound by the HRA 1998 instead noting the existence of hybrid 
bodies which may carry out both public and private functions. Nevertheless, where a 
seemingly private body performs public acts that body may be bound by the HRA 
1998. This approach exacerbates the situation created by the courts following 
Pinnock with public sector tenants able to rely upon art.8 whilst private sector 
tenants are not. This differential approach ‘is hard to justify in principle’98 and 
highlights the importance of the second research question set out in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis as to the theoretical and legal basis for arbitrarily limiting art.8’s 
application to local authority tenants. 
The rights contained in the Convention are intended be ‘practical and effective’ 
rather than ‘theoretical or illusory’.99 On this basis it is difficult to envisage how the 
courts can continue to justify such an arbitrary distinction where dealing with a 
private landlord and tenant relationship. Arbitrary distinctions between public and 
private bodies are all the more concerning following R (Heather) v Leonard 
Cheshire100 and Aston Cantlow v Wallbank.101 Leonard Cheshire concerned a care 
home run by a charity. Those cared for by the charity were placed there by the local 
authority fulfilling a statutory duty to provide care. The residents were later moved 
to another residence following redevelopment of the original care home. The 
residents argued that the charity was a public authority for the purposes of s.6 and 
that the dispossession amounted to a breach of art.8. 
In giving judgment in Leonard Cheshire, Lord Woolf phrased the question simply as 
being whether, by providing accommodation, the charity was: ‘performing a public 
function?’102 Surprisingly, given the generous interpretation which was detailed in 
Poplar, the court found that the charity was not a public authority as the local 
authority’s statutory obligations were met by the authority arranging for and 
providing funding for the residents’ care. However, the local authority’s obligations 
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under the HRA 1998 were neither extinguished nor transferred to the charity upon 
entering a contract to provide care. The court held that the charity was not a public 
authority on the basis that there was no material difference in the treatment given to 
residents who were privately funded and those who were funded by the authority. 
The practical effects of art.8 were therefore limited.103 This ‘questionable’104 
approach does not prevent there being some public liability horizontal effect, but the 
scope for this form of horizontal effect appears limited on a reading of Leonard 
Cheshire. 
Following the Court of Appeal’s views in Poplar and Leonard Cheshire, the House of 
Lords again considered the concept of a public authority in Aston Cantlow. Aston 
Cantlow concerned a church council that chose to enforce their powers under the 
Chancel Repairs Act 1932 thereby requiring local residents to pay for repairs to the 
parish church. Bearing in mind Poplar and Leonard Cheshire Lord Nicholls found a 
distinction between public authorities and the Church of England, which is a purely 
religious organisation.105 Therefore, the parish council was not bound by the HRA 
1998. Furthermore, if the church council was a hybrid public authority, a private 
body able to commit public acts,106 it would not be bound by the HRA 1998 in this 
case as the powers it was seeking to use were private in nature and were permitted 
by primary legislation thereby protecting the church council from liability.107 
The remainder of the court came to similar conclusions as Lord Nicholls in 
determining that the church council was not a core public authority but via different 
avenues. Lord Hope focused particularly on the consequences of the Church of 
England being recognised as the established church, drawing attention to the fact 
that whilst the Church has no legal personality and although recognised by the State, 
it acted independently of government.108 Lord Hobhouse took the view that the 
church council was neither a core or hybrid public authority and so the council was 
not bound to uphold HRA 1998 rights.109 Lord Scott followed the same line as the 
other Law Lords concluding that the church council was not a core public 
authority.110 However, Lord Scott found that the acts of the church council, at least 
in this case, were public acts but did not amount to a breach of the Convention 
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rights.111 Delivering the final speech Lord Rodger found that the church council was 
not a core public authority112 and was not carrying out a public act.113 The House of 
Lord’s reluctance to adopt a comprehensive unified approach as to what will amount 
to a public authority further muddies the waters as to the effect the HRA 1998 and 
the public/private divide. This differential opinion moves judicial consideration 
away from the content and import of the rights at issue towards a procedural and 
institutional query. 
Public liability horizontal effect may be attractive in principle but for the courts’ 
narrow approach to public authorities thereby limiting the scope for horizontal 
effect. However, the core shortcoming of public liability horizontality remains. Only 
those instances involving some form of public authority will engage horizontal effect 
thereby undermining the public/private divide. This is a matter outside the control 
of the claimant. This approach is particularly problematic for housing law. Under a 
public liability horizontality model a great number of private tenants would not 
benefit from the protection of the HRA 1998 whilst their public sector counterparts 
would. Chapter 3 demonstrated that these tenants have much the same feelings 
towards their home as public sector tenants and so are no less deserving of 
protection. Public liability horizontality is at best only part of a broader framework 
which would allow for art.8 to have a role in private possession proceedings. 
Based upon the above analysis, the retention and demarcation of public law and 
private law inherent in the HRA 1998 is problematic for the following reasons: 
1. the judicial tools at hand to measure interferences with human rights may be 
mired in the limitations of judicial review which have influenced the 
recognition and role of proportionality in possession proceedings;114 
2. the divide serves as an arbitrary limitation upon the HRA 1998 and its 
potential effect in horizontal proceedings;115 and 
3. if the courts are able to apply human rights principles between individuals, 
how can the divide between public law and private law continue to exist as a 
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hard ‘fault-line’.116 Thinking of the divide in this fashion suggests that there is 
no scope for the law to permeate and crossover where it is necessary thereby 
blocking the aspirational nature of human rights.117 
5.3 What is Private Law and What is it For? 
Private law operates between parties who exist in the same plane, and 
are thus equal. Rights are in issue. In public law properly conceived 
there is an inequality; private right is in conflict with public interest 
in a quite different way.118 
The primary concerns of this Chapter have been outlined above alongside the 
emergence of the public/private divide and recognition of a discrete body of public 
law within England and Wales. The topic of private law has only been alluded to in 
passing and so some attention will be paid to the idea of private law, as distinct from 
public law, before asking why it is seen as advantageous to have an area of law which 
is independent of public law concerns. It might be deduced private law is that which 
is not public. However, this seems to oversimplify the public/private distinction as it 
exists in the law today. 
As established above public law has developed to regulate the relationship of the 
State and the individual. Therefore relationships between individuals fall outside of 
public law, in such relationships private law: ‘ … exists to provide frameworks within 
which individuals can act voluntarily, and to provide remedies when they exceed the 
bounds of the acceptable use of private power.’119 In some sense the aim therefore 
appears to be the ‘just distribution of power’.120 The question which arises following 
such a finding is what role the State, specifically the courts, ought to play in this 
space. Jansen and Michaels are instructive on this stating that the role of the State 
in private law ‘ … could be regarded as a neutral authority to balance conflicting 
interests of two parties to find solutions for conflicts that are regarded as purely 
private.’121 The aim of this pursuit would appear to cut to the core of Locke’s reasons 
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for entering civil society, that is to avoid a state of conflict which is within the 
interests of any sovereign to avoid and, moreover, supports the view that an 
individual’s benefit of joining society is the protection of their private property.122 
Having established that private law aims to provide frameworks for areas regarded 
as purely private any follow up enquiry should ask what areas of law can be called 
purely private. A natural answer to this question may be that those bodies of law 
which seek to protect private property. This is problematic for it underestimates the 
multifarious aims law may have. For example, criminal damage is clearly concerned 
with the protection of property,123 property being anything of ‘a tangible nature, 
whether real or personal, including money’.124 However, to argue that criminal 
damage is a form of private law would make the most earnest defender of private 
law recoil.125 This is equally apparent in the case of housing legislation which seeks 
to recalibrate the common law relationship between landlord and tenant. 
Nevertheless, following the recognition of art.8’s place within possession 
proceedings it is increasingly difficult to exclusively term the relationship between 
landlord and tenant private. Asking whether the law in question is solely concerned 
with the protection of private property therefore seems to be a difficult endeavour. 
An alternative conception of private law suggests that common law (that is the 
common law that has been developed by the courts not that which describes the 
nature of English law in opposition to civil law) and private law are essentially 
synonymous.126 However, this is equally problematic due to the development of 
fundamental rights in the common law which, prior to the emergence of public law 
in England and Wales, were seen as the primary protection available for the 
individual against the State.127 Samuel determines that private law is dependent 
upon a range of factors including: the status and the nature of the relationship 
between the parties, the damage suffered, and the remedy which should be 
awarded.128 Within these factors it is the status of the defendant which is of ‘central 
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importance’ to deciding the level of duty to impose upon a party.129 In other words 
the State ought to be under a more onerous obligation than an individual.130 On this 
view the relationship between a landlord and tenant becomes particularly 
interesting. Public landlords (including local authorities and, in some cases, housing 
associations) are under statutory duties to provide housing to those who are deemed 
to be in need due to prescribed vulnerabilities or homelessness.131 Whilst private 
landlords are under no such duty to house those in need.132 These disparate duties 
(or lack thereof) are echoed in anti-social behaviour legislation which allows for 
local authorities to apply to the court directly for an injunction against anti-social 
behaviour133 or seek a reduction in the security of tenure afforded to tenants.134 
Private landlords on the other hand must rely upon the assent of the police before 
any actions may be taken under anti-social behaviour legislation.135 Moreover, 
private landlords are not be under a duty to alleviate nuisances caused by their other 
tenants but for those instances in which there has been a breach of covenant.136 
There is a clear difference in the expectations placed upon public and private 
landlords. For Samuel these differential duties might suggest a more onerous 
obligation resting on a local authority over a private landlord. However, this would 
contradict the horizontal applicability of art.8 as established in Chapter 4. Samuel’s 
suggestion that private law is linked with the status and relationship of the parties 
seems something which ought to be considered by the court under art.8(2) rather 
than as a boundary for the application of fundamental rights. It would be at this 
same stage that a private landlord’s own rights under art.1 of the First Protocol 
would be considered.  
Samuel’s relational angle to private law is also key to Weinrib’s study of private law. 
For Weinrib identifying the character of private law through its supposed aims is 
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counterintuitive. Private law may only be understood from an internal perspective 
with an acceptance of the interrelated nature of a parties’ relationship at the 
exclusion of any question of the effect a court’s judgment may have upon those not 
party to the litigation.137 This understanding of private law separates adjudication 
from legislation putting the arguments of the litigants centre stage making the 
internal coherence of the law equally as important as the outcome in a given case. 
The outcome of this for Weinrib is a repository of ‘collective wisdom’138 that is self-
correcting and able to ‘work itself pure’.139 Weinrib’s views carry an air of 
romanticism reminiscent of the old judicial view of the common law as a self 
defining phenomenon which has since lost support.140 
Beyond the romanticism of Weinrib’s views his approach is its inherently insular 
making the common law averse to considering the wider ramifications that it may 
have. Although the private relationship at hand might seem narrow the precedent 
set in the common law doubtlessly has a wider effect upon the public.141 Related to 
this criticism is the role of corrective justice in Weinrib’s theory, corrective justice 
being ‘the idea that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person on 
another’.142 For Weinrib corrective justice is ‘the unifying structure that renders 
private law relationships immanently intelligible.’143 This conception of justice is 
broadly contrary to distributive justice which ‘deals with the distribution of 
whatever is divisible … among the participants in a political community … [dividing] 
a benefit or burden in accordance with some criterion that compares the relative 
merits of the participants’.144 Conceiving private law within the terms of corrective 
justice is problematic for the following reasons; it makes the assumption that the 
parties are equal (either in their bargaining position or their holdings) prior to 
whatever circumstances have led to the matter reaching the courts and it does not 
accord with the approach the common law has taken in relation to those relations in 
which there is an imbalance of power. Such imbalances of power exist in landlord 
and tenant relationships. This is the case for both public and private sector 
relationships in which it is straightforward to conceive a landlord being in a stronger 
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bargaining position to their tenants. A further shortcoming in Weinrib’s approach 
stems from a focus upon damages as a pervasive remedy in private law. Clearly such 
a focus does not accord with instances in which a person’s home is at risk, in such 
cases a court may grant an order for possession or not. Moreover, Weinrib’s 
approach does not accord with the approach of the court in the development of the 
foundations of landlord and tenant law which seek to ensure that tenants, who are 
typically the weaker party in tenancy agreements, enjoy protection from the law.145 
The shortcomings of Weinrib’s theory of private law become more pronounced upon 
a further analysis of the landlord and tenant relationship. A landlord and tenant 
each have broadly overlapping interests in the property that links them together. For 
a landlord most often this will take the form of rent received from the tenant.146 For 
a tenant their interest is occupation which will be secured through the payment of 
rent and keeping the property in a tenant-like manner so that they may remain in 
occupation. However, this is an over-simplification of the current housing landscape 
with tenants renting from a local authority, a registered social landlord, or another 
individual. It is here that Samuel and Weinrib’s relationship based approach to the 
public/private divide becomes strained, this is in spite of the fact that the rules 
around the creation of a lease are largely based in the common law and so following 
Samuel and Weinrib within private law.147 A rigid application of the public/private 
divide based upon the relationship of the parties has given rise to an absurd 
application of art.8 of the Convention with tenants of local authorities able to rely 
upon the protections afforded by art.8 whilst non-local authority tenants are 
excluded. This seems to be an affront to the aspirations of the Convention and the 
further realisation of human rights to everyone within the signatories’ 
jurisdiction.148 From another more practical view, as discussed in Chapter 1, this 
approach is difficult to justify in the sense that tenants are often not in a position to 
choose their landlord as such rather they will choose their home based upon means, 
location, and social connections.149 In such situations it will be these factors that 
dictate the ability for someone to retain their home in the face of a landlord who 
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wishes to recover possession. It seems ill-judged to leave the application of human 
rights to chance and as a result the above private law theories in support of a hard 
divide must be rejected as they would allow for the contravention of an individual’s 
art.8 rights whilst their neighbour may be protected by the same.150 
The public/private divide is tenuously present in the Convention at art.34 which 
states that only States may be the respondents in applications made by those who 
allege human rights infringements.151 Article 34 impliedly requires the European 
Court to adjudge the distinction between a State and an individual.152 However, the 
question as to the distinction between public and private law for the European Court 
is less nuanced than that experienced in English courts. If it is determined that an 
application is validly made against a State then the matter will be heard, if not then 
the Convention will have no bearing on the case (in the eyes of the European Court). 
Therefore, there has not been an opportunity for the European Court to consider the 
nature of the public/private divide due to private actors not being within the remit 
of the court due to its institutional limitations discussed at 2.2.2 above. The closest 
the court has come to recognising the role of private actors in breaching the human 
rights of other individuals is within the scope of positive obligations.153 The 
consequence of this for this study is a dearth of overt guidance from the European 
Court of Human Rights on the nature of the public/private divide. In elucidating the 
public/private divide the domestic courts are more vocal and provide grounds for 
arguing that there may be a reconceptualisation of what we understand to be public 
or private. 
5.4 Finding an Alternative Divide 
 ... [S]ome may wish to press the search for some general essence of 
public/private. But I doubt that the prospective rewards would 
warrant the effort. For what we need is not merely a line (if we could 
produce it) that clearly and intelligibly satisfies our intuitive notions 
about public and private in general. We need definitions that suit 
specific legal purposes, yielding whatever division is appropriate to 
the legal consequences that currently are, or should be, attached.154 
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Rather than grappling with the difficulties presented by the divide it may instead be 
the case that ‘the “public/private” classification is today irrelevant and devoid of 
intrinsic merit’.155 The difficulties with the current approach for the individual are 
set out by Cornu: 
A traffic accident, in public as in private law, possesses the same 
characteristics. What does it matter whether the state or a private 
individual owns the vehicle? It is the victim who is in each case the 
focal point and his interests are the same throughout. At this level, 
the frontiers between public and private law necessarily disappear.156 
Cornu writes from a civil law perspective. However, in the brief scenario outlined 
above there is nothing unique to take away from the fact that, in either a civil law or 
common law jurisdiction, the victim’s interests are the same regardless of the 
character of her oppressor. Applying this same view to a lease, leases with either a 
local authority or a private individual feature largely the same characteristics. In 
each case the interest of the tenant in staying in their home permeates throughout 
proceedings. Therefore, on this view the distinction between public and private 
ought to disappear, allowing any tenant to rely upon art.8 of the Convention in 
protecting their home.  
Arguments in favour of differential treatment of tenants are threefold. The first rests 
on the legal machinations of the HRA 1998 which seeks to provide guidance on 
those bodies which will be bound by the Act. This first argument has much in 
common with the debate around horizontal effect. Those arguments are not 
repeated here but for reiteration that there is scope within the framework of the 
HRA 1998 for the rights contained therein to have a robust application in all 
proceedings where a person’s home is at risk. The second rests on the aims of the 
legislation which governs private sector tenancies. For example the Housing Act 
1988 sought to reduce the security enjoyed by those that make their home in the 
private rented sector.157 The Housing Act 1988 aimed to ‘put new life into the 
independent rented sector’158 by striking a balance between the interests of landlord 
and tenant, allowing a ‘reasonable return’ on a landlord’s investment and 
‘reasonable’ security of tenure respectively.159 On the face of these aims there seems 
to be little conflict with art.8 and art.1 of the First Protocol and the inherent fair 
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balance the Convention aims to strike.160 This pursuit for balance would fairly 
protect the landlord’s economic interests in their property.161 However, the case law 
has demonstrated that, due to the mandatory nature of certain grounds for 
possession,162 there is a stark preference for the interests of the landlord. This 
preference for the landlord is in spite of the non-legal interests that attach to a 
person’s home which have largely been underplayed by the courts in their 
assessment of art.8. Related to these shortcomings is a lack of appreciation from the 
courts that consideration of art.8 in private possession proceedings would concern 
art.1 of the First Protocol thereby calibrating any proportionality analysis to the facts 
at hand. 
Thirdly, if the law is sensitive to the institutional nature of the parties there are 
extra-legal characteristics of those in each sector which necessitate those in the 
public sector having increased protection. The lion’s share (58%) of those in the 
private rented sector are aged 25-44163 whereas those in the public sector tend ‘to be 
more evenly spread across the age groups.’164 In addition to this 85% of private 
renters are in employment or full-time education.165 Based upon this it could be 
argued that those within the private rented sector are more resilient, and therefore 
more able to find a new home, than their public counterparts. However, this 
overlooks the economic pressures placed upon those making their home in the 
private sector who must pay comparatively higher rents.166 Therefore, the economic 
flexibility of those in private sector is perhaps overestimated.167 Moreover, there are 
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increasing numbers of dependent children in the private sector whilst the number of 
children in other tenures (owner-occupied properties and public sector tenancies) 
remains steady.168 The feelings children may have towards their home were explored 
in Chapter 3, it was particularly noted that children often experience the home as a 
place of identity formation and sanctuary. These feelings are likely to be particularly 
prevalent in the private sector in which the majority of dependent children are 
under 5 years old.169 In denying art.8’s protection for private sector tenants the 
home interests held by dependent children go unheard. This is particularly 
concerning as those with dependents are often most at risk of losing their home due 
to difficulties with paying rent.170 
Those in the private sector are typically more economically active than those in the 
public sector. This is evident in the common desire to move into owner-occupation 
among affluent tenants in the private sector in spite of the circumstantial 
unlikelihood of owning a home.171 However, it must be remembered that there is a 
rump of tenants in the private rented sector who expect to make their long term 
home in a sector which offers little statutory protection.172 Of those tenants who do 
not expect to be able to move to owner-occupation, 55% plan to stay in the private 
rented sector long term.173 Those in such circumstances have subsequently been 
barred from the protection offered by art.8. Exacerbating this problem is the limited 
availability of public sector housing,174 leaving private renters to make the best of 
their trying circumstances. The product of these problems taken together is the 
dominance of the private rented sector over both owner-occupation public sector 
housing, with a generation of people ‘permanent renters’175 unable to save for 
owner-occupation due to high rents.176 These high rents are not only locking people 
into the private rented sector but they are also depriving renters of other basic 
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necessities due to the money spent on housing. Despite housing charities, Shelter 
and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, advising that individuals should spend no 
more than a third of their income on housing the price of renting in many places in 
England exceeds this benchmark.177 
Fortunately for the growing number of people in the private rented sector, Harlow’s 
work recognises the difficulties which have arisen in applying a rigid division 
between public and private authorities under the HRA 1998.178 As referenced above, 
s.6(1) of the HRA 1998 makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in 
contravention of the Convention rights. It is s.6 of the HRA 1998 which has led the 
Supreme Court to find that art.8 allows a public sector tenant to have the 
proportionality of any possession order considered and, if it would be 
disproportionate to make an order, the landlord cannot recover possession.179 The 
courts have also concluded that registered social landlords ought to pay attention to 
the HRA 1998 which presents further theoretical difficulties.180 This is notable in the 
recognition of ‘hybrid public authorities’.181 
The recognition of such bodies draws question marks over the rigid approach of 
Samuel explained above and strengthens the view that the divide appears to be fact 
specific182 and a judicial tool to make or rather mask value judgments.183 This is 
increasingly the case in modern life where public and private institutions, such as 
local authorities, registered social landlords, and private landlords, ‘carry on 
identical functions which are allocated in a haphazard fashion.’184 On that basis 
there seems little sense in maintaining a strict divide given its poor structural 
integrity. This sharing or parity of functions in the modern legal landscape doubts 
the probity of any strict divide between so-called public and private actors. If the 
basis for a discrete body of public law is to account for power held by the State in 
opposition to the individual this reasoning falls away where private actors possess 
                                                        
177 P Sherlock, D Wainwright and P Bradshaw, ''Sky-High' Rental Hotspots Across England 
Revealed' (BBC, 5 August 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-36794222> 
accessed 5 August 2016. 
178 C Harlow, '"Public" and "Private" Law: Definition without Distinction' (1980) 43 MLR 
241, 256. 
179 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104; Hounslow LBC v 
Powell [2011] UKSC 8, [2011] 2 AC 186. 
180 R (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 587, [2010] 1 WLR 
363. 
181 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 AC 95 [30]; R (Weaver) v 
London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 587, [2010] 1 WLR 363 [27]. 
182 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 AC 95. 
183 M Weaver, 'Herbert, Hercules and the Plural Society' (1978) 41 MLR 660; C Harlow, 
'"Public" and "Private" Law: Definition without Distinction' (1980) 43 MLR 241, 265. 
184 C Harlow, '"Public" and "Private" Law: Definition without Distinction' (1980) 43 MLR 
241, 257. 
145 
 
the same ability to negatively affect another’s life, after all 'not all wrecked lives are 
caused by governments.’185 However, given that the divide seems trenchant in the 
minds of the judiciary dissolution of the divide is unrealistic at this time and 
sacrifices the jurisprudence which has developed to date.186 
Complete destruction of the public/private divide might seem attractive on the basis 
of the above difficulties, but abolition fails to account for the differing competencies 
of the actors which may have to consider human rights.187 The difficulties presented 
by a deletion of the public/private are explored by Chinkin188 and Schoenhard.189 
Chinkin accepts that drawing lines between public and private spheres in legal and 
non-legal disciplines is fraught with difficulty.190 Despite this the divide is pervasive 
in ‘Western liberal thought’ making any attempts to separate the legal 
understanding of the divide from the philosophical conception fruitless.191 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in drawing a bright-line between public and private 
there is no doubt utility in retaining these archetypal understandings in a ‘nuanced 
and contextual’192 approach. This approach is succinctly put by Schoenhard: 
the public/private distinction remains … necessary to adjudication of 
fundamental constitutional issues as well as issues in, among other 
areas, corporations and securities law. Unfortunately, the traditional, 
two-dimensional approaches to public and private result in 
inconsistencies …193  
With this in mind it would appear that a context sensitive approach to the 
public/private divide would take account of the criticisms towards the current 
framework but account for the differing competencies of those who might defend 
                                                        
185 Peter Archer MP, HC Deb 2 April 1971, vol 814, cols 1861-1862. 
186 A Grear, 'Theorising the Rainbow? The Puzzle of the Public/Private Divide' (2003) 9 Res 
Publica 169, 170-171. 
187 D Oliver, 'The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law' in Michael Taggart (ed), 
Administrative Law (Hart 1997); D Oliver, Common Values and the Public/Private Divide 
(Butterworths 1999); C Harlow, '"Public" and "Private" Law: Definition without Distinction' 
(1980) 43 MLR 241. 
188 C Chinkin, 'A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension' (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 387. 
189 P M Schoenhard, 'A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction' 
(2008) Utah Law Review 635. 
190 The difficulties drawing a hard line between public and private spheres, and the 
responsibilities which flow from each, are visible in non-legal areas such as the feelings a 
person may have to the most visible part of the home, the garden, N Blomley, 'The Borrowed 
View: Privacy, Propriety, and the Entanglements of Property' (2005) 30 Law and Social 
Inquiry 617. 
191 C Chinkin, 'A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension' (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 387, 389. 
192 Ibid, 395. See also P M Schoenhard, 'A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private 
Distinction' (2008) Utah Law Review 635, 635-636. 
193 P M Schoenhard, 'A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction' 
(2008) Utah Law Review 635, 663. 
146 
 
human rights claims. Whatever conception of the public/private divide replaces the 
status quo must account for the spectrum of circumstances which come before the 
county court in possession lists. This is particularly pressing in possession 
proceedings with local authorities, registered social landlords, and private landlords 
all vying for supremacy against the interests of tenants suggesting that the courts 
ought to have some latitude to account for the context of a given case. This is evident 
in the statutory duties owed by local authorities and housing associations to house 
those who are homeless or deemed vulnerable.194 Conversely private landlords are 
not subject to these duties and instead reasonably look to rent their stock to produce 
profits. Therefore, in dispossessing a tenant a local authority will often be looking to 
achieve vacant possession so that their statutory duties may be more effectively 
fulfilled such as where property is under-occupied.195 A landlord’s objective in such 
cases is in the least ‘arguably sufficiently important to justify’196 limiting art.8. In the 
case of a private landlord the method by which dispossession is achieved will be 
based in statute197 or common law198 however the objective of dispossession is 
encapsulated by art.1 of the First Protocol to the Convention – the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions. These objectives are discrete and so to have an 
alternative public/private divide which does not take account of these disparate 
institutional objectives would be ill-suited to the wide range of possession claims 
which come before the courts. The key for any new model is therefore context 
sensitivity. 
5.5 Diluting the Divide 
[A strict separation of the public/private divide] … proceeds from the 
shared assumption that the flow of values through public and private 
law is essentially uni-directional. That is, either public law or private 
law is the critical locus of value but not both … In fact the relationship 
between public and private law is better understood as deeply 
integrated and mutually constitutive.199 
The foregoing discussion above has demonstrated two opposing views as to the 
future of the public/private divide with Samuel advocating the retention of the 
divide due to it allowing the courts to hold the State to a higher standard than 
individuals whilst Harlow doubts the utility of the divide due to its theoretical 
instability and its apparent arbitrary nature. Each approach has its strengths and 
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weaknesses for the following reasons. Samuel’s approach would allow the courts to 
hold State bodies to account and ensure they act within their powers in a robust 
fashion. However, this would be at the expense of human rights principles playing a 
role in private proceedings where they are often most needed. For example in the 
realm of housing law private tenants typically enjoy low security of tenure yet are 
the demographic excluded from art.8 protection. Harlow’s approach to the divide 
would allow for the blanket application of human rights to all cases. The trouble 
with this approach is that the courts would be unable to implement a nuanced 
approach dependent upon the circumstances of the case. Each approach is clearly 
problematic. Instead a third way should be sought which appreciates the ‘profound 
connection’200 between public and private, is sensitive to the difficulty in separating 
public and private,201 and advocates the fusion of the divide allowing courts to utilise 
the remedies of either branch where necessary. In other words, the court must ask 
what the context of the case requires. An assessment of proportionality, discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6, goes some way in achieving this, however, before one can 
consider proportionality the theoretical justification for proportionality playing any 
role in private sector possession proceedings must be made out. This is particularly 
so given that the courts’ aversion to allowing for proportionality to play a part in 
possession proceedings to date has been based upon a strict understanding of the 
public/private divide in which those actors which are purely private are free from 
any art.8 considerations.202 
Diluting the public/private divide begins with recognising that there are ‘underlying 
common values’ throughout the law.203 These common values are not legal in 
character but rather have an aspirational tone akin to the underlying values of the 
Convention and the HRA 1998.204 Oliver cites the values of ‘dignity, autonomy, 
respect, status, and security’ which in turn link into three paramount values: 
‘democracy, citizenship, and participation’.205 Each of these five common values are 
present in cases where the courts are asked to dispossess someone of their home. 
Firstly, there is the dignity which flows from a person having a home to call their 
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own. Secondly, there is the autonomy a person achieves by having a home. That is 
the autonomy to exclude others and develop a conception of oneself,206 this 
autonomy in itself is a key part of the concept of human dignity conceptualised by 
Barak.207 Thirdly, respect is given to a person’s home and the homes of others 
through operation of the law.208 Fourthly, a person’s status together with that of 
their family may be tied up in the home.209 Lastly, security is at play where a 
person’s home is at risk in two senses. There is the financial investment that people 
make in their home which may be lost and also a wider sense of security in that a 
person’s home is a shelter from the outside world which may be lost.210 This 
approach to common values turns the focus from the decision itself and to ‘the 
significance of the action or decision for the individuals affected by it’.211 The 
significance of any action can then be fed into the court’s proportionality 
assessment. 
In possession proceedings a person now has the opportunity to argue that it would 
be disproportionate for a local authority to remove them from their home in light of 
art.8. Herein the common values of domestic judicial review and the application of 
proportionality in human rights are visible. However, the problem of crossing the 
divide at this stage remains clear with both judicial review and human rights acting 
in areas preoccupied with the exercise of so-called public power.212 Oliver’s common 
values are nonetheless heartening in that they recognise the conflicting values which 
are to be balanced with competing interests.213 This is particularly pertinent where 
there is an imbalance of power between the parties in which one party may infringe 
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upon the dignity, autonomy, respect, security, or status of the weaker party.214 The 
trouble with these findings is that they remain restricted in the public realm of the 
public/private divide. However, there are instances in the private realm which 
reflect Oliver’s common values which are particularly pertinent to the housing 
space. 
The common values cited by Oliver and identified above in relation to public law are 
present in private law. These are evident in common law rules which seek to address 
the imbalance of power between individuals.215 For example this is the case in 
housing law which has for the majority of the 20th century seen statutory 
intervention in an effort to provide some security of tenure to tenants who are often 
in an imbalanced relationship with their landlord. Within this approach is the 
weighing up of the positive and negative implications for the parties involved216 
which shows a parallel backdrop to common values which has been present in public 
law following the emergence of contemporary judicial review.217 Given the statutory 
basis for the mandatory termination of tenancies in the majority of cases,218 there is 
also an argument to be made that the power exercised by landlords in these cases is 
in itself public in nature and therefore should be subject to public law oversight.219 
This links back to the idea that statutes act as an expression of the will of Parliament 
in its position as a legislature whose mandate flows from the majority of the public 
and is given effect by the courts.220 These ideas are not limited to overt housing 
legislation or case law. The tort of trespass has been stretched to allow for the 
protection of a person’s home notwithstanding the absence of property ownership in 
limited circumstances.221 The protection of a vulnerable person from the stronger 
position of another individual or group is also present in the development of the tort 
of misuse of private information.222 Clearly these common values on each side of the 
public/private divide seek to protect all aspects of an individual’s life from arbitrary 
                                                        
214 Ibid 233. 
215 P Craig, 'Public Law and Control Over Private Power' in Taggart (ed), The Province of 
Administrative Law (Hart 1997) 197. 
216 Vandermolen v Toma (1983) 9 HLR 91. 
217 D Oliver, 'The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law' in Taggart (ed), 
Administrative Law (Hart 1997) 237. 
218 Housing Act 1996 s.101; Housing Act 1988 s.21; Housing Act 1985 ss.84-84A. 
219 P Craig, 'Public Law and Control Over Private Power' in Taggart (ed), The Province of 
Administrative Law (Hart 1997) 198.  
220 See above at 3.1.3.1. See also M Amos, 'The Second Division in Human Rights 
Adjudication: Social Rights Claims under the Human Rights Act 1998' (2015) 15 Human 
Rights Law Review 549. 
221 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1996] AC 655, 675.  
222 For an account of this development see T Aplin, 'The Development of the Action for 
Breach of Confidence in a Post-HRA Era' (2007) Intellectual Property Quarterly 19; T Aplin, 
'The Relationship Between Breach of Confidence and the "Tort of Misuse of Private 
Information"' (2007) 18 King's Law Journal 329. 
150 
 
interference including their livelihood, their privacy, and their freedom of 
association.223 The above examples do not concern the same conflicting interests of a 
tenant pleading art.8 and a landlord relying upon their property rights. 
Nevertheless, the commonality of the values within public and private law overlaps 
with the idea of ‘the common’ argued by Hardt and Negri.224 For Hardt and Negri 
there exists a third perspective for considering what would otherwise be termed 
public or private. This in turn links with the discussion in Chapter 3 around 
Aquinas’s view that ‘everything is in common’225 with property serving both ‘private 
and public ends.’226 This recognition of property as serving both public and private 
ends appreciates the dialectic at work whenever one talks of property. Property is 
commonly spoken of as being strictly private, ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle’,227 
and free from interference from other individuals and the State. Yet restrictions and 
interferences with one’s property are commonplace thereby taking account of the 
mixture of public and private interests which coalesce around property.228 This 
realisation underlines the impracticality of making private property immune to 
human rights considerations due to the mirage of a strict public/private divide. 
The permeability of public/private divide is explored by Moran.229 In recognising 
that values cross the divide Moran’s work concerns the mutually beneficial nature of 
public and private law over the idea of public law serving as hierarchically superior 
to private law.230 In this sense Moran’s view overlaps with Oliver’s in finding that 
each area of law offers lessons for the other. With this idea in mind it is clear to see 
the importance of private law in the relationship between landlord and tenant. This 
is demonstrated in the development of the legal characteristics of this relationship 
which have been developed by the courts opting to ensure protection for the 
typically weaker party, the tenant.231 Therefore, what is required from the law is an 
analytical method by which the permeability of the divide is appreciated allowing 
principles to flow back and forth dependent upon the context of the proceedings at 
hand.  
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5.6 Dilution but by How Much? 
The extent to which the public/private divide should be diluted to allow for 
principles to flow back and forth remains a live question. It is Grear’s work that is 
most helpful in accounting for the context sensitivity needed for the application of 
human rights principles to public and private actors.232 Grear opposes the full fusion 
proposed by Oliver and instead suggests a public/private spectrum based upon the 
idea of polycontextuality.233 Grear argues that the difficulties in operating the 
public/private divide ‘strongly suggest the inadequacy of any rigid division between 
public and private law, [however, these difficulties] do not support the 
abandonment of a distinction between them at a conceptual level ... ’.234 Instead the 
law should turn its attention to the ‘complexity of relationships and 
interpenetrations’.235 It is this appreciation which makes the theory attractive for 
possession proceedings which encompass a variety of relationships and allows for 
human rights to apply to both public and private proceedings.236 In most 
relationships which come to be considered by the courts ‘ ... public and private 
interests appear on both sides, [therefore] there is little sense in seeing the balance 
in terms of individual versus governmental [or community] interests.’237 These cases 
fall on the spectrum which Grear details as existing between public law and private 
law which is imagined as a gradient rather than a binary distinction.238 Interests 
traditionally understood as existing within the public or private find themselves ‘on 
the same plane’.239 The sensitivity of Grear’s work is particularly advantageous when 
dealing with property as it recognises the co-operative and facilitative nature of law, 
alongside the control of power, that is inherent in land law and law more 
generally.240 
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The idea of a spectrum within the public/private divide is not unique to Grear with 
support coming from Wolfe.241 Wolfe contends that what is needed is ‘a way of 
recognising the importance of both the public and the private without absolutising 
either.’242 This may be achieved by accepting a range of distinct publics which might 
include families, communities, and collectives with shared norms. In these groups 
there are public characteristics in their shared norms and yet the groups themselves 
are partially private in that they exist apart from the wider public. Therefore, there 
are multiple publics (and privates) in operation at any one time. These diverse states 
allow for the development of personal identities which in turn are then exercised in 
the wider public forum.243 These advantages are reminiscent of the characteristics 
associated with the home in Chapter 3. There is an argument to be made on this 
basis that the home is a unique institution which is simultaneously public and 
private. Public to tenants who share collective norms which tie households together, 
private in the sense that the home is expected to be protected from outside 
interference. This recognition does not give priority to either conception but rather 
serves to appropriately calibrate the approach to be taken in instances where a 
person’s home is at risk. 
When Grear and Wolfe’s work is applied to the home the advantages of any 
dissolution of the public/private divide become questionable. For Oliver the 
commonality across public and private law is based upon the law existing to control 
the use of power. In controlling the use of power the law has a facilitative 
character.244 In the realm of housing law this is exemplified in the relationship 
between landlord and tenant with the law seeking to find a balance between the 
interests of the landlord and the interests of the tenant. This facilitation occurs 
against the backdrop of attempts to regulate both the public and private rented 
sector.  
When controlling the use of human rights, principles ought to apply to ‘all bodies, 
public or private, that wield significant power to affect important public, individual, 
or social interests.’245 In developing a spectrum for the operation of public law and 
private law it is necessary to paint what will be the ‘archetype’ of private law and 
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public law.246 Grear’s archetypal relationships look to the power at the core of each 
type of relationship. For public law this would rest on the control of power thereby 
avoiding the imposition of unfair restrictions or obligations on the weaker party, 
whereas, private law emphasises the autonomy of individuals and their ability to 
enter agreements with others.247 
Sensitivity to these issues allows for an ‘organic and dynamic’ interplay between the 
common values identified above.248 It is in considering these archetypes that the 
argument in favour of human rights playing a role in all possession proceedings 
gains strength. As noted above in Chapter 1, tenants in the public and private rented 
sector do not benefit from institutional parity with their landlords and so this 
relationship cannot be described as one of bilateral liberty and choice.249 The law’s 
response to this must be to allow for human rights to have horizontal effect. This is 
only possible through a reconceptualisation of the public/private divide which takes 
account of this. It is here that a polycontextural approach is recommended. 
Polycontextuality foregoes blanket definitions by accepting a contextually sensitive 
approach to public law and private law. This goes beyond the de facto idea of private 
law protecting a de facto economic autonomy and recognises the benefits a range of 
autonomies related to the range of social circumstances in which the individual 
exists.250 Within these autonomies is the importance of the home to the individual 
which goes beyond economic constraints and has wider societal significance. This in 
turn allows for the penetration of private law by public law principles where the 
autonomy afforded to private law leads to a skewing of interests. For example, in 
cases of unregulated markets a market centric approach may lead to a marketplace 
in which the individual is disadvantaged in bargains which ought to be equal.251 
Teubner cites industries such as health, telecoms, and social services as being 
examples of this phenomenon. However, this skewing of interests is equally 
applicable to the housing market in view of the disadvantaged position of tenants in 
public and private accommodation.252 It is clear that the current makeup of the 
housing space which has seen a reduction in State intervention and security for the 
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tenant in favour of a reallocation of power towards the landlord is akin to the 
problems noted by Teubner above. Therefore, there is ample opportunity for 
Teubner’s polycontextuality to play a role in determining the extent to which human 
rights considerations ought to penetrate all possession proceedings. A simple 
dualism between public law and private law, however defined or erased, cannot take 
account of the plurality of factual situations which come before the courts in 
possession proceedings.253 
If polycontextuality was utilised in possession proceedings the ideas of the home 
expressed in Chapter 3; shelter, security, and self-development, come to the fore. 
Tenants are not simply seen as independent consumers able to autonomously 
choose where they make their home thereby immune from the externalities of 
property.254 Instead context is given to the situation by its own unique 
circumstances.255 For Teubner these contexts might include ‘intimate life, health 
care, education, research, religion, art, [and] the media’.256 Taking this view, there is 
no bar preventing home interests being considered. However, unlike Teubner who 
advocates for self-regulation it is suggested that given the importance that the home 
has for the individual and the lack of consideration that has been given to these non-
legal interests it is for the courts to utilise the powers granted to them by the HRA 
1998.257 There are instances in which the expediencies of the facts at hand frustrate 
a hard divide between public and private and require paramountcy to be given to 
recognised rights in ‘a special legal space … carved out for the existence of a fertile 
interpenetration between a set of real, multi-faceted human social orderings … ’258 
This approach lets ‘those aspects of being human which are not reducible to politics 
or economics’ but which are central to the human experience to be considered.259 A 
person’s connection to their home is of exactly the same nature, it is irreducible to 
politics or economics. The great advantage of the polycontextuality approach is that 
it is conciliatory rather than destructive and allows the space between uncontentious 
public or private bodies to continue while allowing latitude for more difficult 
decisions. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
The key aim of this Chapter has been to question the continuing relevance of the 
public/private divide which seeks to compartmentalise law based upon the standing 
of the parties rather than the interests at stake. This question is particularly 
pertinent within the scope of this thesis as an acceptance of the public/private divide 
as traditionally conceived restricts consideration of art.8 to possession proceedings 
involving a public authority. This is unsatisfactory for the reasons argued in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the importance of the home to the individual and the possibility 
for art.8 to be given horizontal effect. Judicial review in public law has developed 
into a useful device for ensuring public bodies act fairly and within their powers. It 
is within the confines of judicial review that ideas as to what bodies are public and 
therefore subject to public law have been developed. The HRA 1998 appears to 
support this compartmentalisation by limiting HRA rights to those instances 
concerning a pure public authority or private bodies which perform public acts. This 
has in turn restricted art.8 arguments to those proceedings involving public 
authorities. This has led to arbitrary distinctions with public sector tenants having 
more protection than others due to mere chance. 
The public/private divide has been deconstructed above to allow for art.8 to be 
further considered in all proceedings where a person’s home is at risk. Whilst 
judicial review has proven to be receptive to proportionality such focus upon 
procedure and whether a body is public blocks consideration of the rights protected 
within art.8. Reconfiguring the public/private divide allows for art.8 to be 
considered in private possession proceedings. Utilising polycontextuality recognises 
the flexibility within the public/private divide which is demonstrably not inherent to 
legal systems. The emergence of the public/private divide in English law has 
occurred in response to the changing nature of the State and so is responsive to 
other changes in society such as the need for a robust application of art.8 
established in Chapters 1 and 2. Polycontextuality assists in this by allowing for the 
courts to recognise that whilst there may be archetypal actors which typify a hard 
line between public and private there are also instances where private actions may 
be just as traumatic as any action taken by the State. This is no more evident than in 
the relationship between landlord and tenant. In possession proceedings there are 
doubtless public and private interests in play and therefore disavowing one for the 
other is unwise. For example, Parliament, speaking on behalf of the community, 
enacted art.8 in domestic law the observance of which creates a public interest in 
ensuring a person’s right to respect for their home is satisfied. Equally there is a 
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public and private interest in ensuring that a person’s property interests are 
respected. This is evident in art.1 of the First Protocol and in the general acceptance 
of private property established in Chapter 3 above. Yet if one was to identify the 
nature of the power at the core of landlord and tenant relationships such as is 
recommended by Grear then it is clear to see that the relationship is not one of equal 
power or autonomy as one might be expected from private law. Rather what is found 
is the imposition of unfair obligations on the weaker party, the tenant. This is 
archetypal of public law and yet it would be unfair to define a landlord and tenant 
relationship as either strictly public or private. 
What becomes clear upon these realisations is that context is key to possession 
proceedings. Such sensitivity to context allows for the considerations explored in 
Chapter 2 to filter through into possession proceedings alongside ideas of the home 
under art.8. To deny this to some proceedings because they are termed private 
misunderstands the complexity of the landlord and tenant relationship and the law 
which governs it. Accepting the permeability of the public/private divide and the 
advantages of such an approach for possession proceedings gives rise to the 
question as to how resultant conflicts of rights might be reconciled. Any solution to 
this problem must be able to account for interests that may be sourced from either 
public or private law and yet gives no a priori weight to one or the other but instead 
allows for the facts of the cases to determine how conflicting rights might be 
assessed. Chapter 6 identifies proportionality as the best answer to this question as 
proportionality allows for the simultaneous identification and balancing of 
competing interests within the confines of a neutral adjudicative structure explored 
in detail below.  
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6 Developing a Principled and Replicable Model of 
Proportionality for Possession Proceedings 
6.1 Introduction 
Questions around proportionality and the balancing of conflicting interests have 
been alluded to throughout this work and therefore the nature and application of 
proportionality deserve the full attention of this Chapter. Thus far it has been 
established that there has been an underappreciation of the importance of art.8 
interests has resulted in the discriminatory treatment of private sector tenants. 
Chapter 3 argued that the interests which attach to a person’s home have been 
underplayed in the landlord and tenant relationship and are such that they ought at 
the very least to be given equal weight to monetary legal interests which have arisen 
out of the law’s understanding of ownership. The non-legal interests which attach to 
the home have thus been omitted from any proportionality analysis concerning art.8 
and possession proceedings. Chapter 4 highlighted the legal opening created by the 
HRA 1998 allowing for art.8 to play a robust role in all possession proceedings, 
regardless of the institutional nature of a tenant’s landlord. This Chapter builds 
upon the analysis undertaken in Chapter 5 regarding polycontextuality. In accepting 
a polycontextual approach to balancing rights the courts may consider the vying 
interests of those parties involved in possession proceedings regardless of the 
institutional character of the parties. The advantages of a polycontextual approach 
are evident at 6.4 below where a replicable proportionality model is tested against 
case law to demonstrate the advantages of art.8 for tenants alongside the force of an 
owner’s right to possession.  
The proportionality model explored here goes beyond that utilised by the courts in 
possession proceedings to date. Prior to and following the HRA 1998 it is Parliament 
that is deemed to be best placed to strike a fair balance between the competing 
rights of landlords and tenants.1 However, this deferential approach does not sit 
comfortably with the idea that the courts are the protectors of fundamental rights.2 
The ‘most difficult and important’ issue facing English courts is therefore the 
development of ‘a coherent and defensible’ doctrine of proportionality which is 
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clear, principled, and respectful of fundamental rights.3 This is no more evident than 
in possession proceedings. It has been demonstrated above that art.8 may have 
horizontal effect between private individuals due to the fundamental nature of the 
rights protected by art.8. This is of course in addition to vertical effect which was 
recognised in Pinnock. However, in each instance the courts have struggled to 
annunciate the precise exercise that should be followed when assessing the 
proportionality of a possession order. This Chapter provides guidance on a 
proportionality model which accounts for the plethora of circumstances which may 
arise where a landlord looks to dispossess a tenant. These rights are given no 
hierarchical value by the Convention or the HRA 1998 and so the conflict facing the 
courts is in effect right versus right. 4 This realisation defeats much of the criticism 
laid upon proportionality and makes the case stronger for structured 
proportionality. This is particularly so in areas where there is a ‘clash of rights’5 such 
as would be the case in private possession proceedings concerning art.8 and art.1 of 
the First Protocol. This Chapter paints the framework through which the courts may 
consider the fundamental rights of landlords and tenants.  
Part 1 of this Chapter examines the nature of proportionality in English law and 
critiques the disparate approaches to proportionality which are present in the 
courts. These disparate approaches have given rise to a number of doctrinal 
problems including the judicial creation of a hierarchy of rights which in turn 
dictates the intensity with which rights infringements will be tested. To address 
these concerns Part 1 introduces a principled proportionality model, known as full 
proportionality analysis, and argues that the burden of proof for proving 
(dis)proportionality must be split between the parties holding conflicting rights. 
This approach insulates the court from overstepping its institutional role and 
overcomes concerns around judicial deference which have occupied commentators 
in debates around proportionality. 
Part 2 details the nature of full proportionality analysis and its specific contours. 
Following a discussion of full proportionality analysis it becomes clear that the 
doctrine is already at work in the European Court of Human Rights and the 
domestic courts. The theoretical work of Alexy is called upon to give structure to full 
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proportionality analysis and demonstrate how the courts may balance competing 
interests in an open and principled framework. 
Part 3 applies full proportionality analysis as detailed in Parts 1 and 2 to three cases 
which have concerned art.8 in possession proceedings, Manchester City Council v 
Pinnock,6 Lawal v Circle 33,7 and McDonald v McDonald.8 These cases represent a 
cross section of the institutional nature (public, hybrid, or private bodies) of 
landlords involved in possession proceedings. Notwithstanding the institutional 
differences between these parties and their disparate objectives, the principled and 
context-sensitive nature of full proportionality analysis is straightforwardly 
applicable to all cases where a person’s home is at risk and as a result of the 
polycontextual approach advocated in Chapter 5. 
6.2 Proportionality in English Law 
We are at a crossroads, and there is a choice: proportionality can 
either become the fig leaf for unstructured judicial decision-making 
or it can become a powerful normative and predictive tool … 9 
The roots of the ‘indeterminate concept’10 of proportionality run to antiquity and 
cross ‘time, space, and subject matter’.11 Proportionality took hold in modern legal 
systems in the Prussian12 and later German legal order and spread to kindred civil 
legal systems in Continental Europe, the common law traditions of the 
Commonwealth, and into the international orders of the European Union,13 the 
European Court of Human Rights and the World Trade Organisation.14 
Proportionality is therefore now seen as ‘a central feature of rights adjudication in 
liberal democracies worldwide.’15 In the case of the European Court of Human 
Rights this is in spite of the Convention itself making no mention of the doctrine of 
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proportionality.16 Nevertheless, it is now accepted that proportionality sits at the 
core of the Convention in the eyes of the European Court of Human Rights17 and is 
the best tool for analysing ‘the intricate collision ... [of] ... competing principles’.18 In 
addition to proportionality is the idea of ‘fair balance’ between the rights of the 
individual and the community at large, which is said to guide the application of the 
Convention in the European Court.19 This idea of fair balance is relevant here due to 
the overt reference to such principles in art.8(2) which allows for interference with 
the rights protected in art.8(1) where the interests of the community outweigh those 
of the individual. However, fair balance should not be considered separately from 
proportionality but rather as the overall goal of proportionality.20 Fair balance 
implicitly requires a ‘purposive interpretation’ of the Convention rights as a whole in 
which the overall structure of the Convention will influence its application.21 It is for 
the courts to pay attention to the structure of the Convention and the HRA 1998 and 
draw out both the express and implied holistic meanings of the instrument’s 
preamble, articles, and paragraphs.22  
Following the enactment of the HRA 1998 proportionality now has a role to play in 
determining whether human rights have been infringed. This is particularly the case 
for a tenant who is to be dispossessed of their home where art.8 is to be considered. 
However, in assessing this the courts have failed to articulate precisely what task the 
court ought to carry out when assessing the proportionality of a given measure.23 
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The only successful pleading of proportionality in possession proceedings is 
Southend-on-Sea v Armour,24 discussed in Chapter 1 above.  
In English law generally, the closest ‘that domestic courts have come to establishing 
a structured approach to proportionality is … de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of 
Ministry for Agriculture’.25 The case concerned the Constitution of Antigua and 
Barbuda, an independent state within the Commonwealth, and the right to freedom 
of speech that was constitutionally protected. In deciding the case the Privy Council 
developed, based upon Canadian jurisprudence,26 the following test to identify 
whether interference with the claimant’s freedom of speech had been proportionate: 
the legislative objective [must be] sufficiently important to justify 
limiting a fundamental right; the measures designed to meet the 
legislative objective [must be] rationally connected to it; and the 
means used to impair the right or freedom [must be] no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective.27 
This test has subsequently coalesced into a four-prong approach with the courts 
recognising that in matters concerning breaches of Convention rights the following 
analysis ought to be conducted: 
1. the legislative objective must be sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; 
2. the measures designed to meet the legislative objective must be rationally 
connected to it; 
3. the means used to impair the right or freedom must be no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective; and 
4. the measure must strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual 
and the interests of the community.28 
This conception of proportionality will be termed ‘full proportionality analysis’29 for 
the remainder of this work. Full proportionality analysis has found some support 
                                                                                                                                                            
Executive in the Picture: A Reply to Professor Leigh' (2003) PL 41; C Knight, 
'Proportionality, the Decision-Maker, and the House of Lords' (2007) 12 Judicial Review 
221.  
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from the courts30 but where a person’s home is at risk the courts continue to show a 
heavy preference for a landlord’s ‘unencumbered property rights’.31 This has 
organically led to their being multiple approaches to proportionality in English 
courts.32 
6.2.1 Multiple Approaches to Proportionality 
It has been noted above that the domestic courts have developed numerous 
approaches to proportionality.33 These include; 1) flexible unstructured 
proportionality,34 2) structured proportionality in cases concerning EU law,35 and 3) 
structured proportionality where HRA 1998 rights are at issue and flexible 
unstructured proportionality where EU rights are at issue.36 The aim of this Chapter 
is to demonstrate the suitability of full proportionality analysis in those instances 
where a person’s home is at risk. However, in making this argument it is first 
necessary to highlight the problems which arise from multiple approaches to 
proportionality. The argument against multiple conceptions of proportionality is 
threefold, first, disparate applications of proportionality give rise to a hierarchy of 
rights that is not present in the Convention or the HRA 1998. Second, and related to 
a hierarchy of rights, multiple approaches to proportionality create situations in 
which the intensity of review applied by the courts is determined by the source of 
rights rather than the severity by which they have been infringed.37 Third, and 
perhaps most pressing for public sector tenants, differential proportionality tests 
may prejudicially calibrate proceedings in the State’s favour.38 
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6.2.2 Hierarchies and Intensity of Review 
Hierarchies of rights and intensity of review are inherently linked. This is astutely 
demonstrated by Craig who argues that a hierarchy of rights and variable intensity 
of review are built into the HRA 1998. For Craig the level of scrutiny to be attributed 
to a particular right will depend upon the views of the decision-maker, the a priori 
importance of the right, and the institutional nature of the defendant.39 However, 
this is counter to the jurisprudence of the European Court where it has been made 
clear that there is no hierarchy of rights which allows for certain rights to trump 
others.40 This is particularly the case for qualified rights such as art.8 which 
recognise that rights ought to be balanced against one another indicating that these 
rights carry equal weight. This idea of a hierarchy is counter to the fair balance that 
is said to run through the Convention41 which ought to be viewed as a whole 
indivisible ‘single package’.42 The idea is also doubtful in light of the case law 
surrounding the balance to be struck between apparently conflicting rights and goals 
indicating that there is no one Convention right which is a silver bullet.43 It is 
suggested here that the domestic courts ought to appropriate the principles of the 
common law and administrative law and reiterate that there is no a priori weighting 
of rights,44 rather the balancing and weight to be attributed to rights in a given 
instance are a matter for the bench in that case.45 Another issue flowing from the 
current confusion around the precise contours of proportionality is the intensity of 
review placed upon a measure becomes dependent upon the right’s legislative 
character. The potential for variable intensity on the basis of a right’s source has 
been dismissed by the European Court of Human Rights.46  
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(Application No 28957/95, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 July 2002) [72]. 
42 A Tahvanainen, 'Hierarchy of Norms in International and Human Rights Law' (2006) 24 
Nordic Journal of Human Rights 191, 204-205. 
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(2008-09) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 88. 
46 ‘As has already been adverted, there can be no double standards of human rights 
protection on grounds of the “origin” of the interference. It is immaterial for a fundamental 
human right, and for that reason for the court, whether an interference with that right 
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It is in cases such as Pinnock that proportionality is calibrated in the State’s favour 
by merging ‘all four stages of the [proportionality] enquiry into one general question 
of … whether the measure is reasonable or permissible.’47 In so doing the courts are 
failing in their duty to ‘guard against slippage “into unstructured balancing tests” in 
all contexts.’48 Following this it is incredibly difficult for a tenant to demonstrate a 
possession order would be disproportionate due to the heavy presumption placed 
upon a landlord’s ‘unencumbered property rights’.49 The question flowing from this 
conception is what does proportionality offer over traditional Wednesbury 
unreasonableness and why is proportionality not utilised as a penetrating analysis of 
the allegedly infringing conduct.50 These questions will be considered below in the 
context of variable intensity of review and judicial deference. 
The emergence of a variable intensity of review can be traced to the development of 
judicial review following Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corp,51 which focused upon the pure administrative aspect of decision to the 
complete exclusion of value judgments,52 and stated that a court may only interfere 
with the decision of a public authority where it is so unreasonable that no public 
authority could have come to it. Following the emergence of Wednesbury review, 
Wednesbury remained rather static and acted predominantly as a ‘safety net’ for a 
domestic judiciary alongside other heads of judicial review, those being ‘error of law, 
fairness, and legitimate expectation’.53 These avenues of judicial review crystalised 
in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service.54 In which Lord 
Diplock found that the nature of judicial review which had developed following 
Wednesbury may be assembled under the following heads: illegality, irrationality 
(Wednesbury unreasonableness), and procedural impropriety (taking account of 
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West [2012] EWCA Civ 1435, [2013] HLR 5 [25]; Southend-on-Sea BC v Armour [2012] 
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50 Connors v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 9. 
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natural justice).55 In taking these ideas forward the judiciary paid a particular 
reverence towards what may be termed fundamental rights56 or constitutional 
rights.57 This has been termed the ‘righting’ of administrative law,58 which has in 
turn led to the development of variable intensity of review.59 The question therefore 
becomes whether variable intensity of review has any bearing on a proportionality 
enquiry where a person’s home is at risk.  
On its face variable intensity of review is appealing given the lack of judicial 
consideration for the non-legal interests which attach to a person’s home as it would 
allow for the range of interests in play to be considered within the framework of 
polycontextuality. However, a heightened standard of judicial review still remains 
judicial review at its heart which is rather different to proportionality. Therefore, the 
development of traditional judicial review allowing for variable intensity of review 
would be better described as a hangover from the judicial awakening of the 20th 
century.60 This hangover and the shortcomings of the same can be seen in the House 
of Lords’ early approach to art.8 in possession proceedings.61 It is clear that 
traditional judicial review (of any intensity) falls woefully short of the more piercing 
review required by the Convention in the eyes of the European Court of Human 
Rights.62 Moreover, for the purposes of this study traditional judicial review is mired 
in procedural difficulties which exclude actions against individuals.63 Therefore, 
judicial review at any intensity does not provide a suitable method for the balancing 
of competing interests, such as art.8 and art.1 of the First Protocol, as its application 
is denied to a large swathe of potential beneficiaries. 
                                                        
55 Ibid, 410-411. 
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The difficulties of a variable intensity of review within the mould of judicial review 
are visible in proportionality and echo the concerns above in relation to hierarchies 
of rights. Variable intensity of review within proportionality exists independently of 
judicial review and in a housing context would serve to calibrate the level of scrutiny 
inflicted upon the justification for interference with art.8. As noted above, the 
current level of scrutiny features a heavy preference for the interests of the 
landlord.64 This presents a clear misunderstanding of the proportionality analysis 
which the courts ought to carry out. Baker has written extensively on the nature of 
art.14 of the Convention.65 Baker notes that there is nothing in the text of art.14 
which makes some infringements more serious than others.66 This same argument is 
applied to art.8 here, in cases where there has been a prima facie breach of art.8 
then it is proportionality which determines the severity of the breach.67 This 
demonstrates the mistaken approach taken by the courts thus far by affording a 
priori weight to certain rights as has been done in possession proceedings involving 
public sector landlords. It is within this approach that the margin of appreciation 
and the idea of judicial deference regularly appears to cloud the process by which 
the court balances interests. Below the margin of appreciation and deference are 
considered in detail. 
6.2.3 Margin of Appreciation and Deference 
The margin of appreciation exists to recognise the sovereignty of States within the 
Council of Europe.68 It is the ‘lubricant between international and national 
authorities’.69 The margin of appreciation is seen to be the ‘other side’ of 
proportionality in the European Court.70 Despite the margin of appreciation’s 
                                                        
64 Such shortcomings are inherent in horizontal conceptions of proportionality which call for 
an intuitive assessment of proportionality in lieu of structure, E Brems and L Lavrysen, 
''Don't Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut': Less Restrictive Means in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights' (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 139, 146. 
65 A Baker, 'Comparison Tainted by Justification: Against a "Compendious Question" in 
Art.14 Discrimination' (2006) PL 476; A Baker, 'Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a 
US Suspect Classificiations Model under Article 14 ECHR in the UK' (2008) 56 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 847; A Baker, 'The Judicial Approach to "Exceptional 
Circumstances" in Bankruptcy: the Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998' (2010) 5 Conv 
352. 
66 See above at 4.6.3 for discussion of Baker. 
67 A Baker, 'Proportional, Not Strict, Scrutiny: Against a US Suspect Classificiations Model 
under Article 14 ECHR in the UK' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 847, 
884. 
68 Y Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2002) 17. 
69 D Feldman, 'Proportionality and the Human Rights Act 1998' in Evelyn Ellis (ed), The 
Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart 1999) 126. 
70 Y Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2002) 14; G Letsas, 'Two Concepts of the 
Margin of Appreciation' (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705, 711; F Matscher, 
167 
 
origins in the European Court of Human Rights the doctrine’s role within English 
law repeatedly arises in domestic courts. In the case of politically sensitive areas 
such as housing this is particularly prevalent with the European Court of Human 
Rights holding that it will respect the wishes of the legislature in sensitive areas 
‘unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation’.71 
It is easy to see echoes of the margin of appreciation at the European Court in 
judicial deference in domestic courts in domestic courts.72 Therefore, an 
understanding of one will inform conceptions of the other together with 
understandings of proportionality.73 The most pressing question for the purposes of 
this work is whether it is correct for the domestic courts to give any consideration to 
the margin of appreciation in English law given its origins in a supranational court. 
If so, to what extent should the margin of appreciation exist independent of judicial 
deference. It is surprising to note that prior to the enactment of the HRA 1998 the 
English judiciary paid mind to the margin of appreciation.74 In R v Ministry of 
Defence ex p Smith75 the Court of Appeal held the margin of appreciation to be akin 
to ‘constitutional bounds’ and ‘constitutional balance’ suggesting that there is some 
institutional deference created or, in the least, altered by the margin of appreciation. 
Going further Simon Brown LJ observed that if the Convention were to be 
incorporated into domestic law then, subject to the margin of appreciation, it would 
be for the courts to ask whether a human rights infringing action was 
proportionate.76 From Smith it is clear that in 1995 the Court of Appeal were of the 
opinion that the margin of appreciation ought to have a role in domestic 
adjudication in the event the Convention was incorporated. In which case the 
margin of appreciation would be synonymous with judicial deference. This approach 
raises questions as to the discreteness of these two areas.  
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Following the incorporation of the HRA 1998 the warmth shown towards the 
margin of appreciation has waned with the acceptance that the English courts are 
not as such bound by the doctrine.77 It is now clear that the European Court and the 
domestic courts may reach different verdicts due to the subsidiary nature of the 
former78 and the ‘meaningless’ of the margin of appreciation in domestic courts.79 It 
is nevertheless unquestionable that domestic deference has retained a role in 
proceedings where the courts have recognised an area of judgment where deference 
will be shown to the ‘considered opinion of [an] elected body’.80 
Taking this view forward the question becomes in what circumstances will it be 
appropriate for the courts to defer to another body given the importance placed 
upon the right to respect for one’s home by the European Court with regard to the 
margin of appreciation.81 The dissenting judgment of Laws LJ in International 
Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department82 is helpful in 
providing principles which may assist in the approach to be taken in cases calling for 
deference. Laws’s discussion of deference touches on some of the issues that have 
arisen from the recognition of the role of proportionality within housing law, 
including:  
1. the tension between parliamentary supremacy and fundamental 
constitutional rights;83 
2. the deference (or latitude) to be afforded to the elected institutions of the 
State;84 and 
3. the balance to be accorded between the rights of the individual and the wider 
community.85  
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Laws goes on to detail his principles in the following terms, firstly there should be 
greater deference accorded to an Act of Parliament over other forms of executive or 
public authority actions.86 This principle on its face is similar to the traditional view 
of the supremacy of Parliament but recognises the diminishing reverence to be paid 
to the actions of ministers and other public authorities exercising power conferred 
by Parliament. While this may seem a sensible course of action on its face upon 
further inspection turning this approach to the complicated legal landscape of 
landlord and tenant legislation highlights certain problems. For example, if the root 
of all potentially Convention offending actions within a particular area of law is 
primary legislation87 then Laws’s approach be may sensible as it would allow for the 
fundamental rights of individuals to be consistently and predictably gauged. 
However, housing law is far more complex stemming from numerous Acts of 
Parliament (each with disparate policy aims) and the common law. For a tenant 
facing dispossession the source of whichever law allowing a landlord to recover 
possession is irrelevant, much like in the example provided by Cornu.88 Also, the 
statutes governing housing do not mandate actions but rather set in place the 
specific procedures and outcomes of voluntary actions. For instance, ss.83 and 85A 
of the Housing Act 1985 set out the procedure through which a housing authority 
may recover possession of a secure tenant’s home, however, the decision to initiate 
proceedings rests with the authority. Under Laws’s approach to deference this would 
necessitate a lower standard of deference as the Housing Act 1985 does not mandate 
a local authority initiating possession proceedings. However, this is then 
complicated by his second principle – requiring increased deference where the 
Convention right in question recognises a balancing exercise,89 such as art.8. The 
shortcoming that runs throughout Laws’s theory is the failure to appreciate the two 
conflicting approaches of the courts in this area. The first approach involves the 
court assuming that there has been appreciation of the conflicting interests in play 
by Parliament. The second approach is one of assuming that Parliament has 
legislated to incorporate the balancing of rights through proportionality into 
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domestic law via the HRA 1998.90 This latter approach is particularly concerning in 
respect of housing legislation which has predominantly been enacted prior to the 
HRA 1998 with no evidence of Parliament giving any consideration to art.8.91 
This view undermines the importance of the HRA rights which the HRA 1998 seeks 
to protect. This blanket presumption for antecedent balance therefore runs counter 
to the aspirations of the HRA 1998 and should be doubted as an argument against 
robust proportionality analysis. If the law already balanced the conflicting rights and 
interests protected in the HRA 1998 then what would the point be in bringing rights 
home in the first place. Moreover, an antecedent judgment regarding the balance to 
be struck will always be detrimental to those groups who stand to lose out due to 
their rights being deemed less weighty.92 The argument made here is that this 
assumption is misplaced due to lack of evidence that Parliament has ‘addressed the 
human rights issue ... and subjected it to extensive discussion ... in the context of an 
inclusive debate.93  
Reasons given for deference to Parliament by Laws include ‘constitutional 
competence and institutional competence’,94 that is areas in which the legislature or 
executive are institutionally better placed to make decisions. In uncontroversial 
areas such as national defence, the example used by Laws LJ, it is not contentious to 
suggest that the executive may be better placed than the courts to determine the 
merits of actions conducted in the course of national defence.95 However, this is not 
true of cases which involve the balancing of qualified fundamental rights96 rather it 
is submitted that it is the courts which are best placed to analyse the correct balance 
to be struck due to their inherent experience in adversarial adjudication.97 On that 
basis there is no reason for the court to defer to decisions made by public authorities 
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simply on the basis of their democratic accountability.98 The judiciary ‘must be, and 
must be seen to be’99 independent of the other arms of the State. Disagreement 
among the judiciary, the executive, and Parliament should not be worrisome but 
rather the indication of one branch protecting the individual from the power of the 
other.100 The HRA 1998 provides the judicial tools for such protection. 
The terms ‘constitutional competence’ and ‘institutional competence’ run to the core 
of the issue of judicial deference.101 Jowell approaches deference with a general 
belief that the level of deference afforded is a legal matter to be decided by the courts 
in their role as the arbiters of moral rights enforceable against the State.102 The 
problem with constitutional competence, or deferring to an elected arm of the State, 
in Jowell’s view is the abrogation of the duties created by the HRA 1998. The HRA 
1998 altered the framework through which the judiciary are asked to perform their 
constitutional duties. This thereby creates an assumption that the judiciary will 
prefer rights considerations over other interests such as the wider public interest or 
convenience by virtue of s.3 of the HRA 1998. However, if it is the case that the 
consequences of the HRA 1998 are less drastic and do not require the court to 
presume that rights ought to win out over other concerns the courts remain able to 
delineate and shape the nature of rights while Parliament retains its ultimate 
sovereignty.103 Therefore, there is no reason for the courts to shirk away from their 
HRA 1998 duties for fear of overstepping their judicial competence.104 For this thesis 
this allows for the court to ensure the comprehensive use of proportionality where a 
person’s home is at risk without being overly concerned with deference to 
Parliament as it is Parliament who enacted the HRA 1998. Therefore the court may 
go beyond the base level of protection provided for by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Convention, due to the European Court’s institutional 
limitations.105  
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Clearly the powers allowed for by constitutional competence are substantial, 
therefore, Jowell proposes some curtailment of this power through the recognition 
of ‘institutional capacity’.106 Jowell suggests that the extent to which institutional 
capacity will play a role is dependent ‘upon context and the right and interest 
involved.’107 It is submitted that this ‘context’ looks to the unique characteristics of 
each branch of the State and concedes that there will be occasions where, simply due 
to their makeup and experience, the courts are better placed to decide certain 
matters. The courts are, after all, ‘properly equipped with procedural tools and 
safeguards for a thorough and adversarial examination of complex legal issues’.108 
That is not to say that the opinion of the executive and legislative do not carry 
weight, however, these must be considered alongside the contents of the Convention 
rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.109  
Of course there are those who agree with Jowell,110 however, there are also those 
who disagree with the very concept of deference.111 Allan is the foremost of these 
critics. In Allan’s opinion the very need for deference is unnecessary due to the 
institutional and constitutional sensitivity open to the court through the existing 
judicial tools which allow for the balancing interests, such as proportionality. For 
Allan, the level of deference to be afforded to a decision-maker is a matter for the 
court in its residual discretion which must be determined in the face of the 
complexity of a case’s given facts.112 Allan’s approach is commendable in the sense 
that it aims for doctrinal clarity within the confines of settled law. A shortcoming of 
Allan’s work may be that there is a lack of a defined and replicable model of 
proportionality that would allow for the institutional position of the decision maker 
to be accounted for. As identified above, it is clear that there is confusion within the 
courts as to the precise contours of proportionality, nevertheless, a replicable model 
of proportionality is available in full proportionality analysis. The trouble with a 
discrete deference doctrine, in Allan’s view, is that the court is only able to approach 
rights adjudication on the basis of the stated cases of the parties to the litigation.113 
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In other words these matters are internal to the courts obligation to consider the 
‘genuine moral and legal rights’ which are created by the HRA 1998.114 If the courts 
were able to disregard the HRA rights then there would be a case to be made for the 
development of an independent deference doctrine, however, this is not the case.115 
Therefore, any consideration of deference ought to take place within an analysis of 
proportionality. 
For the purposes of this study, Allan’s approach is certainly attractive in the sense 
that it reduces the number of doctrines in play thereby simplifying litigation for both 
litigants and the courts. This would thereby reduce uncertainty faced by landlords 
and tenants under the current law. In the context of housing law this is particularly 
appealing given that the lion’s share of decisions will be made in the county court as 
part of a busy possession list.116  
Any consideration of Allan’s submissions must be accompanied with the work of 
Kavanagh.117 Kavanagh sketches the scope of judicial deference in the following 
terms: 
[J]udicial deference occurs when judges assign varying degrees of 
weight to the judgments of the elected branches, out of respect for 
their superior expertise, competence or democratic legitimacy ... 
[therefore deference is] variable118 (emphasis in original) 
This conception is similar to the approach advocated by Jowell in that Kavanagh 
alludes to the institutional competence and constitutional competence. Kavanagh’s 
favour for deference stems from the idea that deference is not absolute and, as 
emphasised above, is variable. In this vein it remains open to the court to impose a 
high level of scrutiny on administrative decisions or those which stem from bodies 
which might be termed public authorities. For the purposes of this enquiry this 
appears to be a worrying prospect. In the realm of housing law this is particularly 
concerning. The courts have noted that local authorities are best placed to make 
decisions as to how their housing stock should be used.119 Applying Kavanagh’s 
conception of deference to such housing cases creates two problems. Firstly, it is 
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doubtful that, in cases dealing with the most extreme form of interference with 
art.8,120 such an approach would satisfy the procedural requirements of art.8 which 
have led to the recognition of the role of proportionality in English law. Secondly, as 
detailed in Chapters 3-4, there is no reason why the full ambit of art.8 should not 
apply to public authorities providing housing together with their private sector 
counterparts. In Kavanagh’s view deference arises where the courts are dealing with 
elected branches of the State, presumably local authorities would fall under this 
head given the democratic credentials of councillors. On this basis deference would 
presumably have no role in those matters involving private landlords. If this came to 
pass public authorities might be under a less onerous human rights obligation than 
private individuals, running counter to the intentions of the HRA 1998.121 Moreover, 
there is nothing within the HRA 1998 which supports this view of deference towards 
(un)elected State institutions.122 
In Kavanagh’s work the terms ‘weight’123 and ‘balance’124 often arise as part of the 
exercise to be completed by the courts when assessing the level of deference to be 
afforded to a decision-maker. The use of such terminology in itself lends support to 
Allan’s view that the idea of deference may already be accommodated within the 
existing doctrines which are open to a reviewing court. In the context of 
proportionality and the qualified rights (such as arts.8-11), the balancing of rights 
and weight are perennial considerations of the court. Kavanagh talks of balancing in 
terms of balancing substantive and institutional reasons; substantive reasons being 
the merits of the legal issues before the court and the institutional reasons being an 
assessment of the institutional merits of the case. However, it may be argued that 
these considerations are themselves accounted for within the HRA 1998. For 
example, ss.2 and 3 of the HRA 1998 require courts to take account of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights while s.4 recognises the 
institutional limitations within the UK constitution and seeks to retain the 
supremacy of Parliament. Therefore, it is unnecessary to have an independent test 
for determining deference given that this has already been achieved by the HRA 
1998. The question following this realisation becomes how the court may apply a 
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neutral model of proportionality which allows for the interests of the parties to come 
to the fore of litigation but without a priori weight being attached to either 
ownership of private property or alternatively to an individual’s home. 
Concerns around any impracticalities or cumbersome requirements of 
proportionality within possession lists at the level of the county court seem ill-
founded and an underestimation of district judges’ ability to develop routines and 
procedures to streamline legal processes. Furthermore, full proportionality analysis 
limits the differences flowing from personal judicial styles of individual judges.125 
The missing piece of Allan’s theory is structured and replicable proportionality. The 
application of full proportionality analysis would sit alongside the idea that judicial 
action must be exercised according to ‘the rules of reason and justice, not according 
to private opinion.’126 Full proportionality analysis focuses the judicial mind and 
draws out the pertinent aspects of the case relevant to proportionality.127 A further 
advantage of full proportionality analysis is its straightforward application to 
circumstances pre-issue. This would allow for the interests protected by art.8 to be 
more easily considered by landlords who, at present, may see art.8 as having little 
relevance upon their managerialised operations.128 In the discussion below the 
argumentative structure of full proportionality analysis is outlined to demonstrate 
its practical advantages. 
6.2.4 Bearing the Burden 
The above analysis of disparate models of proportionality, hierarchies of rights, and 
deference demonstrate trepidation from the courts to grasp the problems at hand 
and model a solution to the underappreciation of non-legal interests which attach to 
the home, the horizontal applicability of Convention rights, and the scope for art.8. 
In such cases the courts have not only struggled to formulate a principled approach 
to proportionality but have also failed to state where the presumptions as to 
proportionality will rest. Should the court adopt a ‘presumption of 
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proportionality’129 or should it be for the State to demonstrate the proportionality of 
a measure? 
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in Pinnock places a heavy preference on a 
landlord’s right to recover their property. In the case of a local authority this 
preference is strengthened due to the statutory duties owed to those in need of 
housing. The result of this is that the local authority’s aim in recovering possession 
should be seen as a ‘“given”, which does not have to be explained or justified … so 
that the court will only be concerned with the occupiers’ personal circumstances.’130 
This demonstrates the incredibly high bar a tenant must reach before a possession 
order will be disproportionate thereby essentially creating a presumption of 
proportionality in favour of a local authority landlord.131 This hurdle is more 
pronounced in the case of private sector tenants who have been blocked from 
utilising art.8 defences by the courts.132 The work of Rivers is useful in working 
through this impasse. Before detailing Rivers’s commentary, it is worthwhile 
reiterating what is meant by full proportionality analysis, which requires the court to 
ask whether: 
1. the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; 
2. the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally 
connected to it; 
3. the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary 
to accomplish the objective; and 
4. the measure strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and 
the interests of the community. 
Full proportionality analysis provides an ‘argumentative structure’133 for courts and 
litigants to work through when faced with human rights concerns. It is in this 
argumentative structure that the courts are able to assign the burden of proof 
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created by proportionality in a fair and reasoned fashion. Rivers’s work provides the 
following argumentative structure for assigning the burden of proving 
(dis)proportionality on both parties to the litigation: 
 … [O]nce a state measure has crossed the rational threshold by being 
shown, by the state, to pursue a legitimate aim (stage 1) by means 
which are rationally connected to that aim (stage 2), the burden of 
proof shifts to the claimant to demonstrate on the balance of 
probabilities either that an alternative measure is equally effective 
and less intrusive (stage 3), or that the measure is unbalanced in 
imposing an excessive cost to rights (stage 4).134 
Rivers talks of ‘state measures’ in the above excerpt showing his primary concern 
being proportionality as applied between the State and an individual. However, 
there is nothing in this passage which makes such an approach inapplicable to 
horizontal proceedings. This is evident in the two examples offered by Rivers as to 
when proportionality might be applied in this fashion. For the purposes of this work 
the most relevant example is ‘cases in which rights conflict’ and ‘decisions made 
under proportional sets of legal rules’.135 Conflicting rights is precisely the situation 
which may occur between private landlords and their tenants, art.1 of the First 
Protocol and art.8 respectively.136 For Rivers such situations call for a ‘presumption 
of proportionality’ for whatever outcome positive law prescribes. For the landlord 
seeking recovery of possession this would likely be via s.7(3) or s.21 of the Housing 
Act 1988 which allow for mandatory possession irrespective of the reasonableness of 
the order, in other words a ‘fact insensitive’137 approach, and therefore likely to raise 
questions of proportionality. Prior to Pinnock s.7 did not allow for any exceptions 
(but for procedural safeguards around notice procedures).138 Following the Anti-
Social Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act 2014 when assessing the probity of a 
possession order under s.7(3) the court must now consider the defences available 
due to the Human Rights Act 1998. This protection has not been included in the 
mandatory possession possible under s.21 of the Housing Act 1988. Therefore, 
whilst a general presumption of proportionality in certain cases may be attractive 
for Rivers such an approach does not make logical sense in the context of landlord 
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and tenant relationships, which are most likely to be assured shorthold tenancies 
with low security. Presuming the proportionality of a landlord’s actions fails to take 
account of the non-legal interests a person has in their home (irrespective of the 
institutional character of their landlord) and frustrates the arguments made in 
Chapter 3 and 4 as to the ability for human rights considerations to have a robust 
application to possession proceedings. Therefore, any presumption of 
proportionality must be rejected. This assertion draws weight from Gunn who 
accepts that the burden of proof in proportionality proceedings may shift from party 
to party.139 For Gunn, it is the circumstances of the case which dictate the 
assignment of the burden of proof apart from any presumption of proportionality 
for any party. The flaws with a shifting burden of proof attuned to the facts of the 
case are considered below however the strongest argument against any 
presumptions of proportionality is provided by Gunn stating that, in all instances: 
‘the party carrying the burden should be clearly articulated and should be put to its 
burden to prove the case.’140 Where there are such procedural safeguards in place 
the virtue of any presumption of proportionality seems misguided. 
Proportionality may ‘function as a defence, requiring the individual claimant to 
show some exceptional feature of his or her own case which makes the application of 
the rules unnecessary or unbalanced.’141 Adding this gloss to the assignment of 
burdens of proof unnecessarily tilts matters in favour of the State and damages 
Rivers’s assertion that the court ought to be neutral in its assessment of 
proportionality with the parties offering the court information to assist.142 The 
landlord is more often than not already in an advantageous position being able to 
state that she wishes to recover the property and use the most expedient legal means 
to do so. In this there is a legitimate aim, vindication of their property rights,143 
which the dispossession is rationally connected to. It will then be for the tenant to 
demonstrate that this is not necessary or that the measure would be unbalanced due 
to the cost imposed upon the tenant’s art.8 rights. This is already a significant 
threshold to cross without the further imposition of a presumption of 
proportionality in favour of the landlord. Rivers’s bare placement of the burdens of 
proof outlined above reasonably balance the competing interests of parties engaged 
in rights adjudication, whether those parties are public or private in archetypal 
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nature. These burdens can be accommodated within full proportionality analysis 
and allow the court to retain its independent character and engage ‘with the 
substance [of the prima facie infringement] without substituting the judge for the 
administrator.’144 Rivers’s initial apportionment of burden places the onus on the 
parties to (dis)prove the elements of full proportionality analysis and insulates the 
judiciary, as much as it is possible to do so, from reading their own views into the 
proportionality assessment. The shifting of the burden of proof from rights-infringer 
to claimant when assessing the third stage of full proportionality analysis is latent in 
the recent jurisprudence of the European Court.145 This is particularly the case when 
the complaint involves ‘interference with the private sphere’.146 Therefore, a revised 
approach to Rivers’s burdens of proof provides a structure through which judicial 
concerns regarding deference and horizontality fall away. These concerns have 
caused the courts to opt for passivity when dealing with art.8 for fears of 
overstepping their constitutional and institutional boundaries. 
Moreover, this approach to the argumentative structure of proportionality fits to 
some extent with the Supreme Court’s art.8 jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has, 
following Pinnock, reiterated the importance of considering personal circumstances 
when assessing the proportionality of a possession order.147 This same examination 
of personal circumstances is possible within Rivers’s argumentative structure. 
However, in assigning burdens of proof to limbs of full proportionality analysis the 
structure of arguments for and against a possession order take on a reasoned 
character making it more readily apparent to the court how the parties’ conflicting 
interests counteract one another. This is clear when the argumentative structure is 
applied to the component parts of full proportionality analysis as is done below.  
6.3 The Structure of Full Proportionality Analysis 
An advantage of ... [structured] ... proportionality analysis is ... that it 
unburdens the balancing exercise by introducing separate tests to 
assess the suitability and necessity [of a measure]. Asking three 
questions rather than merely an overall one, allows a better, but also 
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more intensive, assessment of the proportionality of a restrictive 
measure.148 
The discussions above have made the case that multiple approaches to 
proportionality are unwelcome due to the emergence of hierarchies of rights, 
variable intensity of review, and undue deference. However, the argument has not 
been made as to why full proportionality analysis is favoured over flexible 
unstructured proportionality such as that used in Pinnock, which asks simply 
whether ‘the eviction is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’149 This 
section argues that full proportionality analysis is ideally suited to assessing the 
proportionality of a possession order due to its ‘intuitive requirement of reason’.150 
Full proportionality analysis allows for the courts to identify the nature of the 
conflict before them and to determine the optimal outcome where it is impossible to 
reconcile conflicting interests.151 Full proportionality analysis is therefore an 
‘optimising’ conception of proportionality seeing proportionality as ‘a structured 
approach to balancing fundamental rights with other rights and interests in the best 
possible way’.152 
There is an inborn structure in assessing the balance to be struck between an 
individual’s rights and those of the community. The innate nature of this exercise in 
adjudication is demonstrated in the emergence of proportionality across 
jurisdictions; ‘where there is interpretation, there is proportionality.’153 Moreover, 
this pursuit of an optimal outcome is vital in ensuring that rights may exist in a 
single reactive legal scheme ‘as adapted to certain social conditions necessary for 
their enduring exercise.’154 However, this basic four stage structure is not explicit in 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights with the court struggling 
to annunciate the particularities of the proportionality test.155 The court have instead 
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ostensibly cultivated a three limbed approach to proportionality nominally omitting 
the first stage of full proportionality analysis.156 It is suggested here that the reason 
for this omission is the pre-emptory broad legitimate aims provided for within the 
qualified rights to the Convention. In the majority of cases a State may point to a 
legitimate aim contained in the Convention and at least prima facie demonstrate 
that its objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting the right in question 
thereby bypassing the first stage of full proportionality analysis. 
Furthermore, although proportionality is said to permeate the whole fabric of the 
Convention,157 there is no overt reference to proportionality in the text of the 
Convention and so the European Court has been left to develop proportionality on a 
case by case basis making a concrete structure difficult to discern.158 The European 
Court is not typically bound by precedent making the development of replicable 
tests less important than they perhaps would be to common law courts.159 In 
addition to this is the court’s approach to the margin of appreciation which seeks to 
afford Member States latitude to respect Convention rights within the confines of 
their own historical and constitutional traditions.160 These institutional peculiarities 
of the European Court give the judgments of the court a ‘broad-brush’161 character 
that is more in keeping with civil law traditions over the common law.162 
Notwithstanding these difficulties it is submitted that the European Court of Human 
Rights is applying full proportionality analysis in all but name.163 
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For instance, in cases concerning art.14 of the Convention the European Court has 
followed the same analytical path as full proportionality analysis in determining the 
proportionality of acts which have prima facie infringed Convention rights.164 This is 
visible in the Belgian Linguistic Case165 with the European Court stating that 
instances of unequal treatment must be assessed in light of the measure’s legitimate 
aim and its justification alongside with the proportionality of the means used in 
relation to the aim sought.166 All four steps of full proportionality analysis are 
present in this approach. Moreover, the European Court often states a measure 
must have an ‘objective and reasonable justification’167 this encompasses discerning 
the legitimate aim of the infringing measure168 together with the ‘reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be realised.’169 This reading in of structured proportionality is common in the 
literature around the European Court of Human Rights.170  
Full proportionality analysis is visible and accepted in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights notwithstanding the limited instances in which the court has 
overtly referenced the four-stage test.171 However, even in the absence of full 
proportionality analysis in the jurisprudence in the European Court of Human 
Rights it would remain open to domestic courts to develop and apply proportionality 
as understood within the common law. The effects of this will be recalled from 
Chapter 4 and critique of the ‘mirror principle’ which views the job of the domestic 
courts as being to keep pace with the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, ‘no more, but certainly no less’.172 The contemporary precedence of 
this view is now weakened in light of recent opinions suggesting that domestic 
courts may go beyond the bare protections of the Convention and the European 
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Court.173 This view is particularly pressing for proportionality, as not only may the 
domestic courts go beyond but it is arguable that they must: ‘the approach adopted 
to proportionality at the national level cannot simply mirror that of the Strasbourg 
court.’174 This view allows the domestic courts to develop an alternative conception 
of proportionality to that utilised in the European Court of Human Rights provided 
of course it did not fall below the standards required by the jurisprudence of the 
European Court.175 The viability of this position is reflected in the development of 
proportionality both before and after the enactment of the HRA 1998.176 
The ‘structured and stringent’177 nature of full proportionality analysis is in keeping 
with the aims of human rights adjudication and the traditions of the common law.178 
Unstructured proportionality such as that advocated in Pinnock frustrates the 
intentions of the HRA 1998 and the Convention by skewing the principle of fair 
balance in favour of the landlord. The pitfalls of unstructured proportionality are 
demonstrated by Hickman.179 For Hickman structured proportionality 
acknowledges the institutional particularities of courts and decision makers and 
recognises that what is in the public interest is not always necessarily proportionate. 
It is in determining proportionality that the courts will apply the fourth head of full 
proportionality analysis and ask whether there is a proportionate balance struck 
between the competing interests at work in the case.180 In the context of possession 
proceedings it is this stage which is sorely omitted from the analysis applied by 
English courts. For instance in Malik the word ‘balance’ features only twice in the 
judgment of Court of Appeal, each instance of which is contained in an excerpt from 
another case.181 Balance in such cases is assumed on the basis of the framework 
created by the various statutory interventions into security of tenure. In following a 
conflated view of proportionality in housing law the courts have only concerned 
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themselves with the ‘overall proportionality’182 of a possession order. That is to say 
the costs and the benefits of the prima facie infringement have been crudely 
assessed in a utilitarian fashion.183 In dispossession, the injury to a person’s art.8 
rights may be great, taking account of those interests recognised in Chapter 3, but 
the certainty of a landlord’s property rights together with the ability to then offer 
that property to another tenant might be considered to be within the wider interests 
of the community at large. However, the courts have failed to assess the ‘relative 
proportionality’184 of possession orders. In questioning relative proportionality the 
court should ask whether it is fair for the individual to withstand an interference 
with their rights notwithstanding the fact that there may be an alternative more 
onerous course of action for the infringing party.185 
In possession proceedings this query would focus the mind of the court on the 
significant pain and distress caused by eviction and force the court to ask whether 
an alternative course would achieve the landlord’s objective. These conceptions of 
proportionality, overall and relative, are incorporated in the third and fourth heads 
of full proportionality analysis respectively.186 It is only overall proportionality that 
is visible in the jurisprudence around possession proceedings. Hickman’s discussion 
of these perspectives of proportionality recognises the shortcomings in selectively 
applying certain limbs of full proportionality analysis and demonstrates the 
neutrality of proportionality itself.187 The value of full proportionality analysis will be 
visible when applied to decided possession cases in Part 3 below. The arguments 
made here in favour of full proportionality analysis should not be understood as 
suggesting that all courts and all judges would reach the same verdict in sight of full 
proportionality analysis. Even the most established and clear legal tests may lead to 
disagreement among individual judges.188 Progression of the common law and legal 
developments generally rely heavily upon this disagreement.189 What is in fact 
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suggested is that a replicable model for proportionality focuses the mind of the 
judiciary and the parties to proceedings to the pertinent contours of the case.190 
These assertions become clearer in the following paragraphs analysing the specifics 
of each head of full proportionality analysis. However, a brief comment ought to be 
made at the outset of this argument in favour of full proportionality analysis which, 
at stage 4, asks whether there has been a fair balance struck between the conflicting 
rights in play. Tsakyrakis argues that the balancing exercise is a doctrinal dead end 
due to the inviolable core of certain human rights.191 In such cases, ‘sledgehammers 
and nutcrackers are irrelevant; the court’s concern is to keep the nut intact.’192 In 
which case there is no proportionality exercise to be conducted. However, 
Tsakyrakis’s argument in these terms suggests that the full realisation of a right’s 
minimum core might co-exist with the minimum core of other rights. In the context 
of a landlord and tenant relationship this is difficult to conceive. It might be said 
that, for the purposes of this study, the minimum core of art.8 is the protection of a 
person’s home. Correspondingly the core of art.1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention is that no one may be deprived of their possessions but for where the 
deprivation is in accordance with law.193 For (public and private) landlords pursuing 
a possession order via the mandatory grounds for possession there is no apparent 
reason in positive law for the court to deny a landlord’s request. However, due to the 
interpretation given to art.8 by the European Court the proportionality of any 
possession order must be considered in order to recognise the importance of the 
home as protected by art.8. Therefore, the two minimum cores are mutually 
exclusive. In such proceedings the court is in essence being asked by each party to 
determine which right ought to prevail. In which case Tsakyrakis’s criticism of the 
balancing exercise misunderstands the nature of those rights that may come into 
conflict. Furthermore, seeking to distil rights to their minimum core is in itself a 
fraught exercise.194 
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6.3.1 The Objective is Sufficiently Important to Justify Limiting a 
Fundamental Right 
Stage one of full proportionality analysis expressed above refers to a ‘legislative 
objective’ this assumes that proportionality will be applied only in those instances 
involving a public authority (other than the court).195 In Chapters 3 and 4 it has been 
shown that human rights considerations may be equally salient in proceedings 
between individuals. In light of this any application of full proportionality analysis 
must account for the fact that measures leading to a prima facie infringement of 
human rights may not always concern a legislative objective as such. For instance, 
cases following the rule from Monk196 do not concern a legislative objective but 
rather the operation of a common law rule. In such cases the courts have been 
afforded the jurisdiction by s.6(3) of the HRA 1998 to develop the common law and 
therein apply full proportionality analysis.197 Moreover, asking whether the 
legislative objective is sufficiently important suggests that it is the proportionality of 
the legislation itself which is being tested rather than the act which has led to 
questions over proportionality. This is particularly the case in possession 
proceedings as the courts have confirmed that legislation allowing for mandatory 
repossession may be read to allow for an analysis of proportionality. Where this is 
done it is the proportionality of making a possession order that will be tested, the 
objective of which will be recovery of possession for the landlord. Therefore, in 
assessing whether an objective amounts to a legitimate aim reference to legislative 
objectives ought to be omitted.  
Instances in which there is no legitimate aim are rare.198 Nolan v Russia199 offers an 
example as to when there may be no legitimate aim for interfering with Convention 
rights. Nolan concerned art.9 of the Convention which protects a person’s ‘freedom 
of thought, conscious, and religion’. Much like art.8, art.9 is qualified and may be 
limited in certain instances detailed in art.9(2). The State in Nolan sought to rely 
upon art.9(2) to demonstrate that it was in the interests of national security to 
deport the applicant due to his religious beliefs. In assessing this the court found 
that national security was not listed in art.9(2) and so could not be a legitimate aim 
for the curtailment of someone’s religious freedom.200  
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Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria201 offers further discussion of legitimate aims 
within the context of art.9. Otto concerned the seizure and destruction of a film, Das 
Liebeskonzil. The satirical film depicted God, Jesus, and the Virgin Mary in a 
derogative light. The applicant alleged that the seizure and destruction of the film 
amounted to a breach of their freedom of expression under art.10 of the Convention. 
The State argued that the film was ‘disparaging and insulting’ to Christians and so 
censorship protected their rights and any disorder that might flow from protests 
against the release of the film.202 In assessing the presence of a legitimate aim in 
Otto the European Court noted the State’s positive obligation to ‘ … ensure the 
peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under art.9.’203 Therefore, this lended 
support for the proposition that censorship pursued a legitimate aim.  
For the purposes of landlord and tenant relationships Mago v Bosnia and 
Herzegovina204 offers some guidance on the circumstances in which it will be 
legitimate to deprive a person of their property notwithstanding art.1 of the First 
Protocol. In Mago the deprivation of property was carried out for the sole reason of 
awarding a benefit to another individual rather than in the public interest. The 
European Court found that only where such redistribution contributed to social 
justice would the public interest be served thereby creating a legitimate aim.205 
A legitimate aim in such circumstances was found in JA Pye v United Kingdom206 in 
which the European Court found that the limitation period for recovering land from 
squatters was ‘a legitimate aim in the general interest.’207 It is clear from this case 
law that the courts ought to firstly look to the qualifications within the relevant right 
itself in determining whether an infringement has pursued a legitimate aim. This is 
particularly pressing for the relationship between art.8 and art.1 of the First 
Protocol as each of these rights are qualified to account for the general interests of 
society. This will be relevant for any court considering the balance to be struck 
between these rights in a given case. However, demonstrating a legitimate aim in 
such cases is unlikely to present difficulties for a landlord seeking a possession 
order. This is particularly the case for private landlords who may rely upon art.1 of 
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the First Protocol to vindicate their property rights alongside their natural justice 
rights to be heard before being dispossessed of their property. Whereas a local 
authority will not be able to rely upon art.1 of the First Protocol perhaps indicating 
that a local authority must ensure that the legitimate aims within art.8(2) are clearly 
articulated to the court.208 In the case of a hybrid housing association or housing 
trust209 the extent to which art.1 of the First Protocol is applicable will depend upon 
the nature of the act being performed, be it public or private. Given each body’s not-
for-profit status and charitable nature210 it may be that an association or trust will be 
unable to rely upon art.1 of the First Protocol and so must instead fulfil their burden 
within the proportionality analysis by identifying a legitimate aim listed within 
art.8(2). These considerations are, however, likely to be more pertinent under stages 
3 and 4 of full proportionality analysis. 
6.3.2 The Measures Designed to Meet the Legislative Objective are 
Rationally Connected to It 
It has been common for courts to consider the legitimate aim of a measure alongside 
the measure’s connection with that aim. In doing this the courts are essentially 
asking whether the measure is suitable for the aim pursued.211 The conflation of the 
legitimate aim and suitability assessments is evident in Al-Fayed v United 
Kingdom.212 In Al-Fayed the European Court of Human Rights considered the 
investigative and reporting requirements of the Companies Act 1985 which had led 
to the applicants being investigated by the UK Government. The Government’s 
report alleged that the applicants had been dishonest with regard to their national 
origins and wealth. The report was later published with the applicants contending 
that, under art.6, this had damaged their honour and reputation without the 
opportunity to have the matter determined by a court. The European Court found 
that the UK Government’s actions in ‘ensuring the overall soundness and 
credibility’213 of company law in general and the associated investigation and 
publication pursued a legitimate aim in that the freedom of investigators was 
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essential to the furtherance of the social goal of maintaining confidence in the 
regime of company law. 
There is a duality at work in the approach used in Al-Fayed. Despite the court not 
overtly mentioning suitability in their judgment it is clear that in approaching the 
facts of the case the court has, firstly, established that the UK pursued a legitimate 
aim in seeking to maintain confidence in the regime of company law. Secondly, the 
European Court of Human Rights has then turned its attention to the means used in 
pursuance of that aim and asked whether the report in this case went some way to 
achieve that aim in other words whether it was suitable. On this point it ought to be 
borne in mind that suitability does not require that the measure in question is 
absolutely effective in achieving the legitimate aim, it need only go some way to 
realisation of its goal.214 
Taking another example, Paulic v Croatia215 demonstrates the role of suitability in 
possession proceedings. The applicant had been the tenant in a property owned by 
the Yugoslavian army with an option to buy the property. Following the fall of 
Yugoslavia the property was subsumed by the Republic of Croatia at which time the 
applicant applied to buy his home under Croatian law. This was rejected by the 
Croatian authorities who moved to recover possession of the property. The applicant 
submitted that this breached art.8 as the property was their home. The European 
Court’s preliminary questions expectedly centred on the applicability of art.8 to the 
circumstances of the case. The State argued that refusing the purchase was based 
upon the economic well-being of the country, a legitimate aim cited in art.8(2). 
However, at this point the court leapt ahead and asked whether ‘the interference 
was proportionate to the aim pursued’.216 This approach foregoes one of the two 
stages of full proportionality analysis which requires the State to defend its actions. 
Omitting either of these stages significantly tilts matters in the State’s favour. 
The prima facie infringing measure must have a ‘causal relationship to the aims 
pursued’217 by the State. In cases involving clear policy objectives with this causal 
link it is not difficult for an observer or the court to find that a measure is suitable in 
the pursuance of a legitimate aim. For example, in the above cases the investigation 
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of directors to ensure the propriety of companies operating in the jurisdiction and 
the recovery of housing stock for the economic well-being of the country as a whole 
were found to suitable for the aims pursued. Therefore, despite the European 
Court’s lack of overt commentary upon a structured proportionality test it would 
appear that the court is nonetheless requiring both a legitimate aim and suitability 
when applying proportionality.218 A similar approach to suitability is already visible 
in English law with Lord Hoffmann commenting as early as 1999 that any 
assessment of proportionality required that any measure which infringed 
fundamental rights must be suitable to achieve the purpose intended.219 
Therefore, a measure need not entirely succeed in achieving its legitimate aim but 
need only ‘contribute’ towards that aim. It is within this stage that the domestic 
courts have allowed for some institutional deference to decision-makers. However, 
this is unnecessary given the low bar that suitability creates for those arguing that a 
measure is rationally connected to a legitimate aim. In this it is suggested that the 
courts should bear in mind the placement of the burden of proof detailed above at 
6.2.4. In doing this the courts ought to observe the institutional balance built into 
full proportionality analysis, as conceptualised in this Chapter, and ensure that it is 
the parties at each stage of the analysis who provide detailed reasons and 
justifications of the arguments being made regarding (dis)proportionality. 
The causal link and the contribution necessary to satisfy suitability are considered 
by Alexy commenting that suitability precludes the adoption of any measure (M) 
which does not further a right (P1) as intended but has a negative effect on the 
realisation of another right (P2).220 Such an outcome is visible in Al-Fayed. In Al-
Fayed the aim of the Government was to maintain the credibility and openness of 
company law (P1). The investigation, production, and publication of the 
Government’s report (M) promoted P1, however, it may be argued M obstructs the 
realisation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial under art.6 (P2). The mere fact that 
M promotes P1 and is suitable for this purpose, and in M’s absence P1 would suffer, 
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is sufficient to demonstrate suitability under full proportionality analysis, 
notwithstanding the detriment to P2. 
6.3.3 The Means Used to Impair the Right or Freedom are No More 
than is Necessary to Accomplish the Objective 
Necessity is commonly referred to by the European Court of Human Rights and is 
the ‘textual peg’221 upon which the court hangs its general proportionality 
assessment.222 Therefore, necessity is the most overtly discussed aspect of 
proportionality in the European Court.223 Rivers conceives necessity in the following 
way: 
The test of necessity asks whether the decision, rule or policy limits 
the relevant right in the least intrusive way compatible with achieving 
the given level of realisation of the legitimate aim. This implies a 
comparison with alternative hypothetical acts (decisions, rules, 
policies, etc.) which may achieve the same aim to the same degree but 
with less cost to rights.224 
This approach to necessity accords with the European Court of Human Rights, with 
the court using different definitions amounting to some doctrinal uncertainty but 
following the same practical course. The problem with this is that the court has often 
allowed the necessity test to bleed into the balancing exercise which ought to be 
distinct. For example, Silver v United Kingdom225 demonstrates the court’s 
willingness to assume that a measure is necessary and jumps straight to the 
balancing exercise. Silver concerned the control of prisoners’ correspondence which 
had not been sent to their intended recipients for various reasons. The applicants 
contended that this amounted to a breach of their rights under arts.8 and 10 
together with art.6 due to the prison’s refusal to grant access to legal advice on the 
matter. 
In considering the issue of art.8 the European Court asked whether the interference 
was in accordance with law, pursued a legitimate aim under art.8(2) of the 
Convention and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’.226 On the first two points 
the court found that the UK legislation and the actions of the prison conformed with 
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the requirements of the Convention.227 On the meaning to attribute to ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’ the court held that the measure in question must align with a 
pressing social need and be proportionate to the purported legitimate aim.228 Based 
upon this, Rivers’s conception of necessity clearly does play a role within the 
European Court of Human Rights’ consideration. In pursuing full proportionality 
analysis, it is encouraging that the court has been clear as early as its judgment in 
Silver that any interference with a Convention right ought to be proportionate to the 
aim pursued. In this sense it would appear that what is meant by this in the eyes of 
the court is that the interference must not encroach upon an individual’s rights 
anymore than is necessary or in other words the court will ask whether there are less 
restrictive means to achieve the legitimate aim.229 This approach is demonstrated in 
Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria230 which shows the European Court of Human 
Rights’ distillation of the necessity principle. 
In assessing the necessity of the censorship undertaken in Otto the court drew 
attention to the central role of freedom of speech in the Convention, however, there 
is considerable disparity across Europe as to the significance of religion in modern 
European societies and for that reason the States would be given a certain latitude. 
Whilst this does not give the States a blank cheque when dealing with rights under 
art.10 the necessity of the interference must be ‘convincingly established’.231 Based 
upon this it is clear that, even in the absence of a common consensus, where the 
right in question is seen as central to the spirit of the Convention the bar for States 
to demonstrate that an action is necessary and not overly interfering with a 
Convention right is rather high.232 In Otto, ‘[t]he decisive point was whether the 
precautions taken by the cinema to prevent people from unwillingly being offended 
in their religious feelings were sufficient and thus represented the least restrictive 
measure to pursue the legitimate aim’ (emphasis added).233 In the case of Otto it 
was asked what other action the authorities could have taken in order to protect the 
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religious sensibilities of the majority of the population.234 In that sense it is 
unsurprising that the court found the interference to be necessary as there is no 
clear measure which would have been less injurious to the applicant’s art.10 rights. 
This approach to necessity is noteworthy in the context of possession proceedings as 
it would require the court to ask, and the tenant to argue, whether a possession 
order was the least injurious method of achieving their legitimate aim. This is 
discussed in further detail below at 6.4 alongside art.8 case law. 
The European Court has been criticised for not always applying the strictest test for 
necessity choosing to invoke the margin of appreciation, affording domestic 
authorities latitude for demonstrating the necessity of their measures.235 However, 
as discussed above at 6.2.3 the margin of appreciation has no application in 
domestic law rather it is deference towards other State institutions which has 
exercised the court in human rights adjudication. Applying full proportionality 
analysis in the method influenced by Rivers foregoes the need for deference and in 
such cases allows for the domestic courts to apply necessity in a manner which 
accords with the facts of the case at hand. If an individual can demonstrate to the 
court that another measure would have achieved the same result but with less injury 
to rights then the complained of measure must be disproportionate.236  
This approach to ‘least injurious method’237 is already visible in English law. In R 
(Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department238 the House of Lords found 
that the blanket policy of the Home Secretary which required all correspondence 
between a prisoner and his counsel to be examined by prison staff was 
disproportionate. The aim of these measures was to maintain prison security and 
order. The importance and suitability of the measure were accepted by the House of 
Lords, however, the measure infringed upon the applicant’s rights to ‘an extent 
greater than necessity requires’.239 Therefore, there was an alternative approach 
which would have achieved the same end but with no interference or in the least less 
interference with fundamental rights.240 This same conclusion was reached in De 
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Freitas in which the court found that a blanket infringement of rights went beyond 
what was necessary with the legitimate aim achievable through less onerous 
restrictions. Hickman suggests that asking whether a measure is the least injurious 
solution collapses: 
 …. the fundamental distinction between the roles of judges and 
public officials. By specifying that public authorities must adopt the 
least intrusive course of action, the test appears to remove any 
element of choice or discretion from public authorities and 
legislatures as to what measure will best accomplish the public 
interest objective sought to be achieved.241 
Hickman may be correct if one assumes that it is the public authority itself that must 
prove that a measure is no more than necessary thereby giving rise to a potential 
conflict between the opinion of the court and the authority. However, under full 
proportionality analysis this concern is ill-founded as it is the rights-holder who 
must demonstrate that a measure goes further than necessary. In this context the 
court maintains its institutional and adjudicative independence on the question of 
necessity with the court making a decision based upon the arguments put forth. A 
further criticism of the least injurious method from Hickman is its binary nature 
and the lack of a spectrum in which one can determine the least injurious action 
alongside the least effective way of achieving the aim. From the perspective of a 
rights-holder arguing that a measure is more than necessary the lack of a spectrum 
is irrelevant. If one can articulate a course of action which would have had a less 
injurious effect upon fundamental rights and yet still achieve the same objective, 
then it ought to be clear in the mind of the court that the measure goes further than 
necessary. In the absence of such submissions then the court may accept the 
submissions of the defendant as to the least injurious nature of the complained act. 
On this basis there is no reason why the least injurious method cannot play a part in 
domestic proceeding concerning proportionality when using full proportionality 
analysis. 
Christoffersen is also critical of the least injurious approach due to the principle’s 
purported omission in the jurisprudence of the European Court.242 This point will 
not be directly refuted here as to do so would reiterate the same comments made 
above in relation to the case law of the European Court. The same shortcomings 
noted with respect to Hickman’s work are applicable to Christoffersen with the 
importance of the argumentative structure of full proportionality analysis 
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unappreciated by Christoffersen. The primary argument made by Christoffersen 
against the use of the least injurious method or ‘strict necessity’ is based upon the 
aim of the Convention to provide a ‘minimum level of protection’.243 The first 
weakness in this argument is that it provides little guidance for domestic courts 
who, through domestic legislation in the case of the UK, have been tasked with 
upholding the HRA 1998 rights. In such cases it is open to the domestic courts and 
the domestic legislature to go beyond the protection afforded by the Convention in 
their own jurisdictions. Second, the minimum level of protection in all cases is the 
observance and respect for the rights in question within this is an expectation that in 
complying with Convention the States will seek to achieve the greatest realisation of 
those rights.244 If the State may have achieved the same legitimate aim via a suitable 
means in a way that was less injurious to rights then it seems counter to the spirit of 
the Convention to take the more injurious route. In doing this the court is not 
prescribing a particular course of action it is simply requiring that an individual’s 
rights are not excessively and unnecessarily infringed. In applying full 
proportionality analysis the task of the court in this regard is made easier by the 
burden placed upon the victim to demonstrate that a less injurious means would 
have achieved the same end. Therefore, it is not for the court to cast around the facts 
of the case to determine this it is for the victim to prove that a less injurious means 
was available. On this basis Christoffersen’s criticisms fall away. The least injurious 
method does not undermine the ‘implementation freedom’245 of Contracting States 
rather it serves to require States observe and realise rights to their fullest extent. For 
example, if there are three courses of action which lead to the same end and result in 
the equivalent level of interference, the State is free to follow any of these.  
6.3.4 The Measure Strikes a Fair Balance Between the Rights of the 
Individual and the Interests of the Community 
The final stage of full proportionality analysis requires the overall balance of the 
competing interests of the case to be considered.246 This final step is detailed by 
Klatt and Meister who, following Alexy’s work, find balancing to be the act of 
determining ‘whether the [offending] act represents a net gain, when the reduction 
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on enjoyment of rights is weighed against the level of realization of the aim’.247 In 
the context of the European Court of Human Rights it is ‘the balancing of divergent 
individual interests within the confines of what are considered the fundamental 
interests and values of the society at large’248 which occupies the court’s mind. The 
balancing of these interests strikes to the very core of constitutional law across the 
Council of Europe.249 Therefore, it is disappointing that the application of the 
balancing exercise within the European Court of Human Rights is doctrinally 
thin.250  
The lack of a consistent and discernible approach to the balancing of competing 
interests is demonstrated by Kay v United Kingdom.251 The case concerned the 
actions of a local authority which had granted licences to a housing trust who in turn 
would grant licences to residents. The authority later instructed the housing trust to 
replace its licences with assured shorthold tenancies, thereby giving residents 
additional security. Some years passed and the local authority sought to evict the 
tenants and recover possession of the property. In the domestic courts the county 
court made an order in favour of the local authority with appeals to the Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court being dismissed. The applicants alleged in the European 
Court of Human Rights that this amounted to a breach of their art.8 rights and 
respect for their homes. 
In assessing the effect of art.8 the European Court stopped short of any general 
pronouncements regarding proportionality in the abstract instead turning to its 
application in Kay, thereby contributing to the theoretical void cited by 
commentators.252 The European Court’s application of proportionality in Kay is 
equally bereft of precedential value.  
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The lack of a unified approach to the balancing of competing rights and interests is 
visible in other areas touching upon art.8. For example, in the area of privacy the 
European Court of Human Rights has been clear in the requirements of art.8 and 
art.10, however, as to how the interests ought to be balanced, the court has been 
silent. Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia AS v Slovakia253 demonstrates the difficulty 
of balancing these interests. The applicant in the case was a company who had been 
found liable for the publication of a story calling an individual dishonest. In the 
domestic courts the applicant was ordered to publish an apology and pay damages 
to the individual due to the falsity of the claims. The matter in the European Court 
of Human Rights centred around the domestic courts’ exclusive consideration of the 
individual’s art.8 rights without resort to art.10. In assessing the role of art.10 the 
court followed the same course as that in Kay. Namely, the court asked whether the 
interference with art.10 had been ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in accordance 
with a ‘pressing social need’ bearing in mind the margin of appreciation left to 
national authorities.254 However, as to the actual method which must be used where 
there are competing Convention rights the court’s focus will be upon the overall ‘fair 
balance’ struck.255 In light of this doctrinal gap English courts have taken it upon 
themselves to develop a tortious doctrine built atop the competing interests of arts.8 
and 10 which goes beyond the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
Given the lack of firm guidance from the European Court of Human Rights it is 
perhaps therefore not surprising that national courts have looked to other common 
law jurisdictions for clues as to how to apply proportionality when dealing with 
Convention rights.256 For the relationship between a landlord and tenant the 
jurisprudence of both the European Court and the domestic courts fails to provide 
guidance on how conflicting rights might be reconciled. In domestic possession 
proceedings the lack of a principled approach towards proportionality and then to 
balancing within that analysis is rooted in policy rather than in theoretical 
limitations.257 The next section of this Chapter will build a theoretical basis for the 
application of the final stage of full proportionality analysis in line with the legal 
theory of Alexy. 
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6.3.4.1 Balancing 
To force [judicial] analysis into a procrustean bed of proportionality 
review can leave one feeling that there is a certain arbitrariness in the 
weighing exercise. It is not obvious that adoption of a proportionality 
standard ... would make judicial reasoning more transparent, or 
subject it to more determinate legal constraints. In reality, in many 
contexts, what it would involve would be a mere transfer of the 
simple power to make a decision where a decision is required from 
democratically accountable executive organs to the courts.258 
The above passage summarises much of the criticism of proportionality in that 
proportionality purports to be a value-free judicial tool and yet it provides another 
veil through which the judiciary may hide their moral judgments.259 The idea of 
courts balancing conflicting rights has often been tabled as a step too far in human 
rights adjudication with the court stepping in to the territory of merits review, going 
beyond ‘the proper boundaries of judicial intervention’260 and into the realm of 
politics. However, it is not clear how the balancing of human rights differs from any 
other judicial exercise that the courts undertake.261 This is a necessary outcome of 
the various principles which are at play creating a legal landscape which is ‘in a state 
of constant conflict and must be balanced.’262 This ‘search for a fair balance between 
conflicting interests may be universally inherent in adjudication’.263 Therefore, 
lending an antecedent weight to a landlord’s rights, under art.1 of the First Protocol 
or the mandatory grounds for possession contained in legislation, falls short of the 
balancing exercise required by art.8 and full proportionality analysis as it foregoes 
the enquiry required by rights adjudication. Giving antecedent weight to interests 
frustrates a key advantage of balancing – the continual reappraisal of the content of 
rights.264 
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This organic ‘structuring’ of rights is common within the legal traditions of common 
law adjudication.265 What is needed in possession proceedings is ‘less obscure 
proportionality analysis … if art.8 is not to be emptied of all practical impact in this 
context.’266 Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights267 is helpful in securing this 
particularly when the question turns to the balance of rights.268 Alexy’s theory rests 
upon the idea of constitutional rules and principles which may be distinguished 
from one another in rights adjudication.269 Rules and principles are the ‘key to the 
resolution of central problems of constitutional rights.’270 For Alexy rules and 
principles are discrete norms which guide the application of constitutional rights. It 
is beyond the scope of this work to engage the volume of literature around the idea 
of jurisprudential norms.271 However, here the term norm will be used to refer to the 
idea of a ‘constitutional rights norm’: 
constitutional rights norms are those norms which are expressed by 
provisions relating to constitutional rights [such as art.8], and 
constitutional rights provisions are those statements, and only those 
statements, contained in the text of the … [HRA 1998].272 
On this definition it is clear that art.8 and art.1 of the First Protocol are 
constitutional rights norms. The follow up to this is the structure of constitutional 
rights norms, which encompass the idea of rules and principles which are in 
themselves norms as they each ‘say what ought to be the case’.273 A principle 
requires an end to be realised to the greatest possible extent legally and factually 
possible, an ‘optimisation requirement’,274 whilst a rule is binary, either fulfilled or 
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not.275 Therefore, this section is concerned with the optimisation or reconciliation of 
values in conflict.276 This optimisation ‘makes each constitution the best it can 
possibly be.’277 
The rights contained in the Convention and the HRA 1998 may be broadly grouped 
into those rights that are absolute such as the right to a fair trial under art.6 or those 
that may be qualified in certain circumstances under art.8. These broad groupings 
should not be taken to mean that absolute rights are rules whilst qualified rights are 
principles. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates 
that even those rights which on their face appear to be rules and therefore may be 
‘fulfilled or not’,278 such as the absolute rights, are actually principles. For example, 
art.6’s terms are largely absolute but for reservations regarding private hearings. 
However, in considering art.6 the European Court have utilised balancing to 
determine whether there has been a contravention of art.6.279 The same 
observations may be made regarding art.5.280 This supports Alexy’s approach to 
rules and principles and allows the Convention rights to be conceptualised as 
optimisation requirements. Conceiving art.8 in this way is supported by the 
qualifications built in to art.8(2) which allow for limitations to art.8(1) in certain 
prescribed circumstances therefore allowing the right to be realised to varying 
degrees.281 Similarly, art.1 of the First Protocol and the protections created for 
private property are qualified and allow for limitations upon art.1 in certain cases.282 
Therefore, art.1 of the First Protocol might also be described as a principle. Alexy’s 
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conception of rules may be equated to art.3 of the Convention which prohibits 
torture and ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. There are no 
qualifications to this right283 and in cases where treatment amounts to torture or 
inhuman treatment, degrading treatment, or punishment there will be a breach of 
art.3.284 
Once it is established that art.8 and art.1 of the First Protocol are principles in the 
context of Alexy’s theory the question becomes how competing principles might be 
reconciled. Any method which allows for consideration of competing principles 
must account for the fact that giving precedence to one principle does not render the 
counter principle invalid, rather it must recognise ‘the outweighed principle may 
itself outweigh the other principle in certain circumstances.’285 This view recognises 
that the rights contained in the Convention and the HRA 1998 are not accorded a 
priori weight and so do not create a hierarchy of rights.286 The weight accorded to 
such rights is dependent upon the facts of the case not the right’s inherent value 
within the framework of the Convention or the HRA 1998: 
This is what is meant when it is said that principles have different 
weights in different cases and that the more important principles on 
the facts take precedence.287 
Accepting this begs the question as to how the courts might conduct a balancing 
exercise in a replicable fashion within full proportionality analysis that is applicable 
by the county courts who stand at the coalface of possession proceedings.288 Alexy’s 
Law of Competing Principles offers insight on this. 
6.3.4.2 The Law of Competing Principles 
Courts must give effect to the maximum possible realisation of each principle within 
the confines of what is factually and legally possible. This aim is inherent in full 
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proportionality analysis which seeks to ensure the greatest realisation of rights.289 In 
so doing this Alexy proposes the Law of Competing Principles. 
The first step in the Law of Competing Principles is recognising the competing 
principles at play. The second involves determining where the general precedence 
rests in a given case. At this stage the court should bear in mind the values of society 
overall and the inherent fair balance in the Convention.290 In the third and final 
stage of the Law of Competing Principles the court will decide the actual weight to 
give to the principles in play thereby determining which principle will win out. For 
the purposes of this work these principles are visible in cases concerning both 
private and public landlords. In the case of a local authority landlord the competing 
principles are represented by a tenant’s art.8 rights and the rights and interests of a 
local authority and community at large in recovering possession of their property,291 
principle 1 (P1) and principle 2 (P2) respectively. Giving precedence to one of these 
principles requires the court to consider the conditions (C) under which would allow 
for P1 to outweigh P2.292 In instances where P1 takes precedence over P2 due to C 
then this legal consequence (Q) will amount to a legal rule which must be 
satisfied.293 Following such a finding, where similar circumstances arise, for 
example in future cases concerning mandatory possession proceedings, such 
instances ‘will be "subsumed" within the conditional relation of precedence’294 and 
provide a particularly useful starting point for lower courts. In other words a 
precedential principle will be ‘concretised’.295 
Applying this to possession proceedings involving a local authority would require 
the court to recognise the competing principles in play, a tenant’s art.8 rights (P1) 
and a local authority’s proprietary rights (P2). At stage 2 the court must decide 
where the general precedence lies for the conflicting principles. In determining this 
the court ought to determine whether the interests of the tenant in a typical case 
weigh heavier than the interests of the State in recovering possession. It is 
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submitted here that that general precedence should take account of the non-legal 
home interests identified in Chapter 3. This contrasts the position the courts have 
taken towards art.8 so far with a heavy preference for the interests of the 
landlord.296 However, this general precedence does not necessarily ‘determine the 
outcome of balancing.’297 Instead this is simply one of many variables which must be 
considered by the court when conducting the balancing exercise. In other words this 
gives the protection of a person’s home a character of rebuttable ‘prima facie 
trumping.’298 Finally, at stage 3 the nuances of the case will be felt via C, the 
conditions which would allow for one principle to take precedence over another. For 
instance in a case where a tenant is particularly vulnerable and unable to secure 
alternative accommodation then P1 might well take the status of a rule and be 
realised as such making it unlawful to dispossess the tenant of their home. 
Alternatively, in circumstances where a tenant has been particularly anti-social or 
violent towards neighbours, the court may find that P2 must supersede P1 due to the 
harm and distress which would be prevented by the vindication of the local 
authority’s property rights, and statutory right to recover possession.299 These 
examples recognise that ‘the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment 
to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other’.300  
Critics of the balancing exercise within full proportionality analysis fear that judicial 
balancing of conflicting interests will introduce merits review into rights 
adjudication.301 It is conceded that balancing does not lead to a ‘precise and 
unavoidable outcome’, however, this does not equate to the balancing exercise being 
an ‘irrational procedure’.302 Therefore, what full proportionality analysis seeks to 
achieve is not broad-brush certainty as to the outcome of a case but certainty as to 
the method by which that outcome will be reached. Dispossessing someone of their 
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home is a grave interference with art.8303 and so the reasons tabled for curtailing 
this right ought to be clear and well thought out.304 The courts are adept at such 
balancing exercises in various other areas of law, for example, tort,305 contract,306 
and equity,307 and so to suggest that the same exercise cannot be conducted in 
possession proceedings is baseless. 
A criticism made of proportionality generally is that it simultaneously invites and 
hides moral considerations in a legal method which purports to be morally 
neutral.308 This view misunderstands the nature of proportionality which is ‘as 
neutral as far as ... [a formal legal] structure ... ’309 may be.310 However, to give effect 
to any legal structure requires external judicial will encompasses ‘ ... moral 
arguments and considerations of weight and value that vary according to different 
perspectives ... ’.311 Therefore, the outcome of any review cannot ‘preclude a certain 
degree of infusion of the personality of the judge into his judgements.’312 The 
advantage of proportionality is that it edges judges towards the pertinent issues of a 
case upon which an unavoidable moral judgment will be made.313 These moral 
judgments do not arise out of proportionality but are rather an inherent result of 
any adjudication. 
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This same exercise in assessing competing principles is replicable in proceedings 
concerning private landlords.314 In the context of possession proceedings initiated by 
a private landlord the competing principles become the tenant’s art.8 rights (P1) in 
opposition to the landlord’s property rights under art.1 of the First Protocol (P2).315 
Recognition of P1 and P2 allows for the attribution of general precedence. In this 
example it is again suggested that general precedence takes account of the 
importance of the home for tenants as detailed in Chapter 3 and which may weigh 
‘significantly more heavily’316 than the landlord’s interest in private property. This is 
all the clearer considering the intensity of the infringement with P1, giving 
precedence to P1 will temporarily prevent a landlord from recovering possession of 
their property but will allow them to continue receiving rent and, should the 
conditions change, re-enter the property at a later date. Whereas giving precedence 
to P2 would irrevocably remove a tenant from their home. At the third stage of the 
Law of Competing Principles the particular circumstances of the case will be 
considered. It is here that the general precedence might be defeated. For instance, it 
is foreseeable that in some cases a tenant may be unable to continue paying rent and 
so for the court to refuse a possession order would be too great an interference with 
the landlord’s art.1 rights.317 It is here that the court will carry out an analysis akin to 
that used prior to the HRA 1998 in possession proceedings taking ‘into account all 
relevant circumstances as they exists at the date of the hearing … [in a] broad 
common-sense way … ’.318 
This principle has since been regularly echoed in the courts with the accepted 
guidance being that the court should bear the above in mind in considering the 
consequences which will flow from the making of a possession order or refusing an 
order.319 This consideration may, therefore, prove beneficial for the tenant or the 
landlord. Much like earlier possession proceedings what is being asked of the court 
in the Law of Competing Principles for the judiciary to look at ‘both sides of the 
same coin’.320 
The above analysis around the Law of Competing Principles within the fourth stage 
of full proportionality analysis might appear to contradict the allocation of the 
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burdens of proof outlined at 6.2.4, however, this is not the case. The argumentation 
structure advocated at 6.2.4 is an exercise which takes place during the hearing of a 
matter concerning proportionality and so therefore serves to provide a structure to 
litigation.321 Therefore, in possession proceedings it will be for the tenant to argue 
that a possession order would be disproportionate as the measure imposed too great 
an interference of their art.8 rights over and above the interests of the community. It 
will of course be open to the landlord to respond to these submissions but the 
burden will remain with the tenant within the third and fourth stages of the 
argumentative structure outlined above. Applying the Law of Competing Principles 
and arguing for a general precedence for art.8 does not alter this argumentation 
structure. Rather the balancing of competing principles takes place post-
argumentation and will be a matter for the judiciary. These considerations are 
therefore complimentary in their efforts to ensure a principled and rational 
structure to proceedings and judicial decision-making in matters concerning 
proportionality. Having established the nuances of the fourth stage of full 
proportionality analysis and the experience of the courts in conducting this test in 
all but name the next section of this Chapter will look to apply full proportionality 
analysis to three cases which have concerned art.8 in possession proceedings. 
6.4 Full Proportionality Analysis Applied 
The contours and propriety of full proportionality analysis in reconciling conflicting 
rights have been outlined above. The purpose of this section is to apply full 
proportionality analysis to three cases which have concerned the application of 
art.8. These cases have been chosen to demonstrate a cross-section of the parties 
and interests which may be in conflict during possession proceedings. The cases 
below also serve to illustrate that a principled application of full proportionality 
analysis does not bar landlords from recovering possession of their property should 
the facts of the case make a possession order proportionate. 
6.4.1 Manchester City Council v Pinnock 
The facts of Pinnock are well-known at this stage and might be recalled from 
Chapter 2. For the purposes of the case study the facts may be summarised as 
follows; Mr Pinnock was the demoted tenant of a local authority. Following 
continued anti-social behaviour on the part of Mr Pinnock’s family, some of whom 
lived with Mr Pinnock and some of whom did not, the local authority sought a 
possession order.  
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Full proportionality analysis applied to Pinnock directs the court’s attention to the 
substantive interests in play. First, is the local authority’s objective sufficiently 
important to justify limiting a fundamental right? The local authority’s objective in 
Pinnock was recovery of property in pursuit of its statutory duties including ‘the fair 
allocation of its housing … [and] the need to remove a source of nuisance to 
neighbours … ’322 (emphasis added). It appears in Pinnock that the Supreme Court 
accepted these aims given the statutory framework in the authority’s favour. 
Furthermore, these objectives match the qualifications in art.8(2) of the Convention 
thereby satisfying the first stage of full proportionality analysis. 
Second, ‘is the measure rationally connected to the objective?’ Like the first stage it 
is straightforward for the local authority to argue that the means used are rationally 
connected to their aim. It is difficult to think of other means which might be used to 
recover possession of the property in this case. This clearly ‘makes some 
contribution to the aim’323 pursued by the authority. 
Third, it would be for Mr Pinnock to show that dispossession is ‘more than 
necessary to accomplish the objective’.324 It is here that the courts are likely to face 
the most difficulty in assessing the proportionality of a possession order. In Pinnock 
the local authority’s objective was the recovery of possession in pursuit of the 
removal of Mr Pinnock’s family who had been the source of anti-social behaviour. 
On this basis it seems in the least arguable that removing Mr Pinnock from his home 
in order to remove his family and quell their anti-social behaviour is more than 
necessary to accomplish the council’s objective. Moreover, there is a counterpoint to 
this in that there is no evidence this would actually end the anti-social behaviour it is 
possible such behaviour would simply be exported elsewhere. In light of this it must 
be asked what other powers a local authority possessed to achieve their aim. In 2010 
when Pinnock reached the Supreme Court Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) 
were extant, therefore, Mr Pinnock logically argued that the correct course for the 
Supreme Court would be ASBOs or similar orders325 excluding Mr Pinnock’s 
children from the area thereby eliminating the opportunity for further anti-social 
behaviour.326 The court did consider this but reached the view that such an order 
would not prevent the anti-social behaviour.327 Bearing in mind the criminal liability 
which flows from the breach of an ASBO or similar order it is difficult to follow the 
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court’s reasoning when the problem is reassessed through the lens of whether the 
measure was ‘no more than necessary to accomplish the objective’ sought. If the 
possibility of criminal liability was not able to dissuade Mr Pinnock’s children from 
anti-social behaviour why should the responsibility for their actions rest with the 
innocent party, Mr Pinnock.  
Fourth, the balancing exercise, it is uncontentious that making a possession order 
amounts to a prima facie breach of art.8(1). However, in Pinnock the council might 
argue that an order would serve to protect the interests of the local community, 
including the art.8 rights of third parties living nearby. Balancing rights requires 
gains to community interests to be ‘at least as great as the cost to rights.’328 Proving 
this will turn on claimant’s ability to demonstrate that the measure is ‘out of line 
with the order of values expressed more widely in the law and public culture’.329 In 
this case it seems difficult for Mr Pinnock to argue that his art.8 rights ought to 
outweigh the art.8 rights of neighbouring tenants who have suffered due to his 
family’s anti-social behaviour and so there does not seem to be ‘an excessive cost to 
rights’.330 This is in accordance with the Law of Competing Principles as it would be 
for the court to firstly identify the competing principles at issue. Then turn to the 
general precedence of art.8 where a person’s home is at risk given the severity of 
interference instigated by dispossession. This general precedence will then, 
however, be assessed in light of the particular facts of the case. Due to the excessive 
cost of rights which would flow from Mr Pinnock’s continued residence (and likely 
continued actions of his family) any general precedence for art.8 would likely be 
defeated. 
Stages 1, 2, and 4 of full proportionality analysis have been demonstrably satisfied 
on the facts of Pinnock. However, the necessity of dispossession to quell the anti-
social behaviour is questionable. It is correct that Mr Pinnock’s family had been 
subject to ASBOs in the past and went on to breach the orders but to have Mr 
Pinnock lose his home for this seems disproportionate at stage 3 of full 
proportionality analysis. This is particularly so given that breach of an ASBO may 
attract a prison sentence of at least 6 months and up to 5 years.331 Mr Pinnock is in 
essence being dispossessed due to the wrongdoings of his family. Therefore, a 
possession order could in all likelihood be disproportionate in Pinnock. 
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6.4.2 Lawal v Circle 33 Housing Trust 
Lawal v Circle 33 Housing Trust332 concerned a housing association which assisted 
the local authority in housing those who were owed a duty to be housed under the 
Housing Act 1996.333 It is settled that in cases involving a hybrid authority, that is an 
authority which is not inherently public but may perform public functions, HRA 
1998 obligations may arise. There were numerous legal issues which arose in Lawal, 
however, for the purposes of this work the application of art.8 is most relevant.334 
The housing authority moved to recover possession of the property on the basis that 
it was under-occupied, with only Mr Lawal and his daughter residing at the 
property. This was in spite of the Mr Lawal being in ill-health, requiring assistance 
in day to day activities, and potentially being made homeless if dispossessed. In 
addition, if evicted, Mr Lawal’s daughter was unlikely to be able to afford 
accommodation in the private rented sector. 
In looking at the issues in Lawal, and applying the same unstructured test from 
Pinnock, the court found that it was proportionate to make a possession order. 
However, applying full proportionality analysis to Lawal leads to a different 
outcome. In applying full proportionality analysis it must first be asked whether the 
objective of the housing authority is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right. The burden for proving this will rest with the housing 
authority.335 The housing authority sought repossession on numerous grounds but 
the overarching objective of the housing authority was the recovery of an under-
occupied property which could be used by other people in need of social housing.336 
Given the qualifications built into art.8(2) it would be straightforward for a court to 
accept that stage 1 of full proportionality analysis has been satisfied. 
The second stage of full proportionality analysis is equally straightforward for the 
housing authority to demonstrate. The aim of the measure is to recover possession 
of the property so that it may be rented to those in need of social housing and who 
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would be able to fill the property to capacity. A possession order would clearly make 
some contribution to this aim. Turning to the third stage, it would be for the tenant 
to demonstrate that the measure is more than necessary to achieve the cited 
legitimate aim. The housing authority’s aim is vacant possession of the property this 
could not be achieved in any way other than seeking a possession order. 
By satisfying stages 1-3 of full proportionality analysis the final avenue for 
challenging the proportionality of a possession order is the overall balance between 
the rights of the individual and the interests of the community. The burden of proof 
for arguing this will rest with the tenant.337 There is no doubt force in the argument 
made by the housing authority as to the property being under-occupied. However, 
finding in favour of the local authority would require the gains to community 
interests to be ‘at least as great as the cost to rights.’338 Alongside this the court 
ought to consider the particular characteristics and vulnerabilities of the rights-
holder.339 These considerations can be assessed by the court using the Law of 
Competing Principles which would recognise the interests of the tenant and the 
interests of the community in having access to sufficient social housing. It appears 
that the facts of the case support a general precedence for art.8. It is submitted that 
this is due to the particular vulnerabilities endured by Mr Lawal who required the 
assistance of his daughter in day-to-day activities. It is this aspect of the case which 
potentially tips the balance in favour of Mr Lawal. This is all the more weighty given 
the lack of suitable alternative accommodation offered to Mr Lawal at the time of 
the hearing.340 In assessing the weight to attach to these competing interests 
required by stage 3 of the Law of Competing Principles the manner in which Mr 
Lawal and his daughter came to reside at the property must be considered. It will be 
recalled from above that Mr Lawal moved into the property into the property with 
his wife and, notwithstanding regular absences due to employment overseas, resided 
there with his family since 1974. Mr Lawal’s wife died in 2002 and in 2010 he 
appears to have retired and ceased regular business travel. Under-occupancy of the 
property has occurred out of circumstance. Notwithstanding the unquestionable 
benefits for the local community which would flow from vacant possession of the 
property, evicting Mr Lawal would cause severe physical and mental distress and so 
would have a disproportionate effect upon him. In other words, the costs of 
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dispossession significantly outweigh the gains. A failure at the balancing stage 
makes any possession order disproportionate. 
6.4.3 McDonald v McDonald 
If private power can, in effect, enable or constrain public rights, then 
the same legitimation needs which … underpin the appeal to 
proportionality in public law [ought to] resonate in private law.341 
McDonald v McDonald342 concerned parents who mortgaged a property for their 
daughter to live in as a tenant. The grant of the tenancy was in breach of various 
mortgage conditions. The tenant had a particular disorder which made changes in 
her environment acutely distressing. Sometime later the tenant’s parents (effectively 
her landlords) fell into mortgage arrears. The mortgagee subsequently appointed 
receivers who exercised the same powers as a landlord allowing the mortgagee to 
serve notice to quit and recover possession of the property. The aim of the 
mortgagee was to sell the property with vacant possession and secure a greater 
profit than with a property with a sitting tenant. The particular powers used by the 
mortgagee afforded the court no discretion as to the making of the order.343 In 
Chapters 3-4 it was demonstrated that art.8 is horizontally applicable and may apply 
to private landlords. The aim of this section is to demonstrate the versatility of full 
proportionality analysis outside those instances dealing with (core or hybrid) public 
authorities. This is particularly the case due to art.1 of the First Protocol which 
requires respect for private property.344 
Applying the first stage of full proportionality analysis to McDonald is 
straightforward. The objective of the mortgagee was the recovery of possession, 
thereby vindicating art.1 of the First Protocol, so that the property could be sold with 
vacant possession. It is difficult to argue that this is not a legitimate aim as the 
Convention seeks to protect this right in art.8(2) and art.1 of the First Protocol. It is 
equally straightforward to argue that the means used to achieve vacant possession 
are rationally connected to the legitimate aim. The ease with which stages 1 and 2 
can be fulfilled by the mortgagee ought to demonstrate the unnecessary 
consternation shown by the courts towards art.8’s application in possession 
proceedings. This uncomplicated application of stages 1 and 2 of full proportionality 
analysis doubts the a priori weight given to the interests of landlords and the 
assumption that Parliament has already struck the balance required by art.8 and 
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proportionality.345 It is correct that the burden of proving proportionality at stages 1 
and 2 rests with the party seeking to recover possession but this is far from an 
onerous task. 
It is at stages 3 and 4 which full proportionality analysis may begin to bite. Stage 3 
requires the tenant to demonstrate that the means used to impair art.8 (and 
vindicate art.1 of the First Protocol) go beyond what is necessary to accomplish a 
landlord’s legitimate aim. It is here that the actions of the mortgagee in McDonald 
become questionable. The aim of the mortgagee was the recovery of the debt 
(£200,000) secured against the property and owed by the tenant’s parents who had 
fallen behind with mortgage payments.346 Arden LJ in the Court of Appeal found 
that the mortgagee would be unable to recover this debt without the sale of the 
property.347 However, it is not clear how this is the case. Prior to the arrears arising 
the mortgagee was content to receive repayment of the mortgage debt in the usual 
fashion, monthly payments. These monthly payments were made using the tenant’s 
housing benefit.348 The financial difficulties which led to the mortgage arrears were 
a product of the tenant’s parents not the tenant. Therefore, there is nothing on the 
facts to suggest that the mortgagee could not have sought repayment of the debt in 
the same way which it was content to do prior to arrears arising as the tenant’s 
housing benefit payments could cover monthly mortgage payments. Further weight 
is given to this argument by the way in which the mortgagee sought to recover the 
property by excluding the discretion of the court as to whether a possession order be 
granted.349 If the mortgagee had pursued mortgage repossession proceedings the 
court would have been able to stay execution of any possession order to allow for the 
continued payment of the mortgage.350 With these issues in mind it seems self-
evident that the tenant would be able to argue that the measure sought by the 
mortgagee was more than necessary for the realisation of art.1 of the First Protocol. 
In assessing the final stage of full proportionality analysis applied in McDonald the 
following passage from Nield is notable: 
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There is no doubt that in striking a proportionate balance property 
rights will weigh very heavily [against home interests]. The question 
is whether, in the light of the particularly strong policy reasons of a 
given context, they should be the only weight on the scales. The 
answer should remember that under art.8 the home encapsulates 
values beyond property rights, which prompts the call for some 
mechanism by which these values can find expression and be 
accorded appropriate recognition.351 
The balancing exercise to be undertaken in McDonald differs from Pinnock and 
Lawal in that two individual rightsholders are competing for precedence, art.8 in 
the case of the tenant and art.1 of the First Protocol in the case of the mortgagee. 
This situation is nevertheless still open to the three stages of the Law of Competing 
Principles the first stage being the recognition of competing principles, P1 and P2 
respectively. Here, in the second stage of the Law of Competing Principles, it is 
suggested that general precedence must rest with sitting tenants where a mortgagor 
falls behind on arrears if as in this case the tenant continued to pay their rent 
therefore making the tenant innocent of any wrongdoing. The final stage of the Law 
of Competing Principles requires the particular facts of the case to be considered 
with the court asking whether the gain from the interference with rights is ‘at least 
as great as the cost to rights.’352 The tenant in McDonald suffered from a mental 
disorder making changes in her environment particularly distressing. Due to this 
disorder the tenant had been evicted from social housing and was unable to work.353 
The property in question served as something of a last chance saloon for the tenant 
who was unlikely to be able to find alternative suitable accommodation. Vindication 
of the mortgagee’s property rights therefore would amount to a great cost to rights 
with very little benefit, making eviction disproportionate at stage 4 of full 
proportionality analysis. The initial agreement between the tenant’s parents and the 
mortgagee is able to continue for as long as the tenant receives housing benefit. This 
agreement ought to subsist in light of the disproportionality visible at stages 3 and 4 
of full proportionality analysis. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter demonstrates the shortcomings of the English courts’ conceptions of 
proportionality thus far. The Supreme Court’s approach to proportionality in 
Pinnock fails to account for the fair balance inherent in the HRA 1998 and the 
Convention. Moreover, Pinnock tilts the balance in favour of landlords and 
essentially empties art.8 of any meaningful application. This misunderstands the 
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importance of the interests protected within art.8, explored in Chapter 3, for it is 
assumed that housing legislation itself strikes the correct balance between art.8 and 
competing rights. Full proportionality analysis shows the error in this and 
demonstrates that any concerns around the ability of the county court to expediently 
deal with possession lists are misplaced.  
Policy considerations are legion in the legislation and common law which govern 
landlord and tenant relationships. However, this is not a reason for the courts to 
evade questions as to whether fundamental human rights have been interfered with. 
Full proportionality analysis allows the parties to argue in favour of their respective 
interests whilst the court has the same task it does in most litigation as the arbiter of 
where balance ought to be struck. This endeavour is inherent in the courts’ 
jurisdiction. The implementation of full proportionality analysis should not deter 
landlords from entering new tenancies rather it requires that landlords are clear in 
their arguments in favour of dispossession that must be followed to demonstrate an 
order is proportionate. For tenants a robust application of art.8 and proportionality 
ensures that the principles of art.8 are borne out. Mandatory possession 
proceedings make up the majority of possession lists, full proportionality analysis 
protects those tenants who are particularly vulnerable or blameless and gives effect 
to non-legal home interests which would otherwise go unheard in determining 
whether a person should be evicted from their home. Full proportionality analysis 
therefore offers the framework through which the proportionality of any possession 
order can be tested. 
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7 Overall Conclusion 
7.1 Objectives of the Thesis  
The thesis has critically analysed the complex issues flowing from the following 
research questions: 
1. what is the underlying importance of the home as conceived by art.8(1) and 
how should this inform the application of art.8 generally; 
2. what is the legal and theoretical basis for arbitrarily limiting art.8’s 
application to local authority tenants; and 
3. what are the requirements of proportionality in possession proceedings. 
The prescience of these questions was demonstrated in the face of the case law 
explored in Chapter 2. Following Manchester City Council v Pinnock1 and resultant 
cases the domestic courts have accepted that it is open to a local authority tenant to 
rely upon art.8 to contest the proportionality of a possession order. However, it 
continues to be the case that: 
The most controversial issue at the intersection between the law of 
leases and human rights … [continues to be] … the role of the 
residential tenant’s article 8 rights in summary proceedings by a 
[public or private] landlord seeking possession of the subjects.2 
This controversy flows from a failure to engage with the substance of the protection 
guaranteed by art.8. This shortcoming is visible in the law reports of English courts 
and also in the literature surrounding art.8 and possession proceedings which has 
not engaged with the substance of art.8’s application. Therefore, in Chapter 3 the 
concept of the home was critically analysed alongside property theory. It was argued 
that the home ‘represents a complex and multi-dimensional amalgam of financial, 
practical, social, psychological, cultural, politico-economic and emotional interests 
to its occupiers’.3 In spite of the apparent focus upon strict legal interests within 
literature exploring ownership there are gaps within property theory which allow for 
these non-legal interests to be considered within the framework which has been 
developed by Fox, Radin, and others. For example, the work of Aquinas and the idea 
of common ownership allows for property rights to be reassessed by the courts in 
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light of an individual’s non-proprietary interests. These non-proprietary interests 
are recognised by Rousseau whose work leaves scope for human rights to temper 
property interests where it is necessary and within the interests of the wider 
community. If it is accepted that the rights contained in the Convention and 
reflected in the HRA 1998 amount to a body of interests which the wider community 
has deemed as worthy of protection then the argument can be made art.8 ought to 
have a robust application in possession proceedings. 
In exploring what non-legal interests and feelings attach to a person’s home the 
work of Radin develops the idea that the home is more than simply ownership and 
links personhood with the home. The home presents a prototypical example of 
personal property due to a person’s emotional investment in their home. This 
manifests in the great sense of loss a person is likely to feel when dispossessed. The 
primary critique of the property and personhood approach relies upon the lack of 
empirical evidence to support the theory. However, in Chapter 3 it was 
demonstrated that there is an empirical basis for Radin’s property and personhood 
perspective. 
For Radin the home serves as ‘a moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom 
of association’.4 Therefore, the home is not only linked with the individual but is 
facilitative in the realisation of human rights more widely.5 This creates a cyclical 
argument in which the home is deserving of protection via human rights and in 
service of the attainment of other rights. The x factors identified by Fox assist in 
categorising the non-legal interests alluded to by Radin. For Fox the home is more 
than a physical structure and encompasses a territory in which an individual’s self 
identity is anchored and developed within a social and cultural unit. However, Fox 
contends that it would not be possible to ‘conduct a case-by-case analysis on any fair 
grounds’6 and argues for policy changes that would take account of these non-legal 
interests.7 Policies which take account of these interests would of course be welcome 
but it is the contention of this work that it is open to the courts to consider these 
interests within the existing legal framework. Such judicial contemplation would 
assist the courts in assessing the proportionality of any possession order which they 
are already bound to consider. Therefore, the shortcomings in this area are not 
simply an omission or misunderstanding of the non-legal interests in play but also a 
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lack of judicial tools in which these interests are accorded weight. These interests 
exist independent of a landlord’s institutional character, therefore, Chapter 3 
considered the means by which home interests might be protected in horizontal 
proceedings given that these interests will arise irrespective of the institutional 
character of a tenant’s landlord. 
The domestic courts have for the most part been unreceptive to the idea that art.8 
may have a role to play in possession proceedings beyond those involving a local 
authority. Furthermore, the courts have on occasion speculated that if art.8 was to 
have horizontal effect then it would in any event be defeated by art.1 of the First 
Protocol due to the scope of proportionality.8 These findings are in spite of the 
courts accepting at least some form of the horizontal effect in other areas of law. 
There are also hints of horizontal effect within housing law in cases such as Poplar 
Housing & Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue9 which 
reinterpreted legislation applicable to horizontal relationships to find a HRA 1998 
compatible reading. 
In addition to the inconsistencies of the courts there are also great differences of 
opinion within the literature as to the nature of horizontal effect. There are those 
who advocate limited horizontal effect such as Buxton who claims the HRA 1998 is 
strictly concerned with limitation of State power10 as opposed to Wade who 
proposes direct horizontal effect allowing human rights to infiltrate all 
proceedings.11 There is of course a spectrum of positions between these two poles 
explored in detail in Chapter 4. However, utilising the work of Alexy it was 
demonstrated that the arguments proffered by the literature to date have been 
flawed in their mutually exclusive perspectives. Alexy’s contribution shows that the 
horizontal phenomena visible within the case law of the domestic courts exist within 
a single tripartite conception of horizontal effect encompassing: 
1. the level of state duties; 
2. the level of rights against the state; and 
3. the level of legal relations between private individuals. 
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This understanding obviates the arguments as to the precise form horizontal effect 
should take and allows for a pragmatic approach to applying art.8 depending upon 
the context of the case at hand. This is particularly advantageous in the realm of 
housing law which is made up of an amalgam of various statutory and common law 
rules. In such instances the question becomes not whether art.8 has any application 
in horizontal proceedings but rather how art.8 may have effect against competing 
interests such as art.1 of the First Protocol. This argument gains strength from the 
effects of art.14 of the HRA 1998 which prohibits unjustified discrimination in the 
application of HRA rights. 
If upon accepting that art.8 has some form of horizontal effect within the confines of 
the tripartite model advocated by Alexy there remains a theoretical hurdle to art.8’s 
application in all possession proceedings, the public/private divide. The 
public/private divide is a late development in English law after emerging alongside 
judicial review which has in turn demarcated an area of administrative law broadly 
aimed at ensuring the fair and legal use of State power. Judicial review has latterly 
been called upon in proceedings concerned with human rights. For example in Kay 
v Lambeth LBC12 judicial review was tabled as the method by which to test the 
proportionality of a possession order. However, judicial review has since been 
rejected in possession proceedings following Pinnock’s recognition of 
proportionality which provides a fact sensitive approach to acts which might 
contravene art.8. In order for this higher standard to reach into horizontal 
relationships the public/private divide must be reconceptualised.  
Chapter 5 argued that the public/private divide must be calibrated in terms of 
polycontextuality which sees the public/private divide as a spectrum rather than a 
binary construct. This approach acknowledges the work of Samuel and Harlow in 
particular in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of a public/private divide or 
the wholesale deletion of the same. The difficulty identified with the absolute nature 
of these perspectives was that they fail to account for the range of relationships 
which may arise in legal proceedings. Often these relationships do not easily fall into 
either public or private due to the distribution of power which rests at their core. 
Polycontextuality allows the courts to make this distribution of power determinative 
of the rules which might govern a particular case. This necessarily requires a context 
sensitive approach. However, given the common values which pervade the 
public/private divide outside of those archetypal cases mind must be paid to the 
spectrum of positions between public and private spheres of law. Thinking of the 
                                                        
12 Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465. 
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divide in this fashion allows for ideas from each realm to cross over into the other 
where the context of the case requires. For the purposes of this work, the home 
holds a special place in the life of the individual, the protection of which is 
increasingly necessary due to the lack of security given by statute and the common 
law. The reconceputalisation of public and private law detailed in Chapter 5 allows 
for public law considerations in the form of human rights to protect a defendant in a 
disadvantaged position. The position allowed for by polycontextuality is sensitive to 
the multitude of factual matrixes which might arise in possession proceedings. Most 
importantly polycontextuality allows courts to consider the proportionality of a 
possession order in all proceedings where a person’s home is at risk regardless of the 
institutional character of the litigants. However, understood through this prism 
art.8 rights do not become invulnerable to the competing interests of landlords 
whether they are a local authority or a private landlord. The question therefore 
becomes how these interests might be fairly and equally considered by the courts. 
Chapter 6 addressed these questions by providing a replicable model for 
proportionality in ‘full proportionality analysis’. 
Full proportionality analysis requires the court to ask whether the legislative 
objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right, whether 
the legislative objective is rationally connected to it, the means used to impair the 
right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective, and 
whether there has been a fair balance struck between the rights of the individual and 
the interests of the community. Full proportionality analysis stands apart from the 
general query utilised in Pinnock which asked ‘whether the eviction is a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’13 Full proportionality analysis 
not only provides an improvement over the current approach but also addresses 
general concerns as to proportionality such as variable intensity of review and the 
role of the margin of appreciation in domestic proceedings. Full proportionality 
analysis provides an argumentative structure through which the court may assess 
the competing interests at play in possession proceedings. This jettisons the idea 
that housing legislation and common law rules pre-emptively achieve the 
appropriate balance of rights thereby leaving the courts to assess the balance of 
rights in a given case. Full proportionality analysis undermines the worries the 
Supreme Court has around the ability of the county court to expediently deal with 
proportionality in a busy possession list. There is no reason why full proportionality 
                                                        
13 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104 [52]. 
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analysis cannot be used by a county court judge to assess the proportionality of an 
order given the argumentative structure and method provided.  
Full proportionality analysis allows both tenants and landlords to plead the 
particularities of their case and places the court in an inquisitorial role. This 
potential is evident in the case studies explored in Chapter 6. These case studies 
offer a cross section of the instances in which art.8 considerations might arise; in 
proceedings involving a local authority landlord, proceedings involving a housing 
association landlord, and proceedings involving a private landlord. These case 
studies illustrate the unnecessary trepidation over the effects of proportionality and 
show that consideration of art.8 does not prevent landlords (of any institutional 
character) from recovering their property provided an order would be 
proportionate. For instance applying full proportionality analysis to Pinnock, Lawal, 
and McDonald brings to light the shortcomings which might defeat a claim for a 
possession order. However, the argumentation structure provided by full 
proportionality analysis directs the minds of all parties to the pertinent hurdles 
which must be surmounted before a court will find it (dis)proportionate to make a 
possession order. These hurdles are interdependent upon the statutory or common 
law framework which provides a port of first call in possession proceedings but 
equally the protection given by art.8 provides a curtailment of the procedural 
marginalisation of those making their home in the rented sector. Therefore, this 
thesis has presented: 
1. a framework through which the underlying importance of the home may be 
appreciated and conceptualised within the context of an art.8 argument; 
2. a legal and theoretical basis for art.8’s application to all possession 
proceedings irrespective of the institutional character of the parties; and 
3. a replicable structured model of proportionality in full proportionality 
analysis that may be used in possession proceedings to take account of the 
disparate interests in play where human rights arguments are utilised. 
These findings contribute to the original contribution of this thesis in that the 
shortcomings of art.8 jurisprudence have been dealt with in a holistic fashion which 
has contributed to a practicable approach which might be readily applied by the 
courts. This is the first time such a detailed analysis of the relevant law and theory 
has been taken with regard to the intersection of housing law and human rights and 
such a conceptual framework has been developed. Therefore, the findings herein 
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provide an original contribution to the debate around the effects of art.8 on all 
possession proceedings involving a landlord and tenant.  
7.2 Conclusions 
The strengthening of art.8 and its associated requirements are not the conclusive 
change needed to produce a fairer rented sector in which tenants will be more 
secure in their home and protected from arbitrary or capricious evictions. The 
findings from Chapter 2 as to the burgeoning private sector raise wider questions as 
to the state of the country’s housing stock across all tenures. As at 2013-14 48% of 
young people (aged 25-34) privately rented their homes up from 21% in 2003-04. In 
the same period owner-occupation within this age group dropped from 59% to 
39%.14 The decrease in owner-occupation in this group might be attributed to a 
number of phenomena. The first is so-called ‘generation pause’15 in which young 
adults are planning to delay milestones (such as career progression or beginning a 
family) due to the expense and instability of rented accommodation. This grouping 
is visible in the deferral made by 18-34 year olds. For 18-24 year olds home 
ownership dropped from 36% in 1991 to 10% in 2011/12.16 Similarly, home 
ownership among 25-34 year olds dropped from 67% to 43% in the same period.17 
Alongside generation pause are the ‘boomerang’18 phenomenon which sees young 
people returning to their family home for a number of reasons including 
unaffordable rents and to save to eventually enter owner-occupation. These two 
groups might be encompassed alongside ‘generation rent’ which describes those 
young adults who make their home in the private rented sector for longer periods 
than previous generations due to the inaccessibility of homeownership and the 
public rented sector. The incorporation of proportionality into possession 
proceedings assists those who make their home in the rented sector and wish to 
enjoy some minimum level of security. This work does not make any assertions as to 
the virtue or otherwise of making one’s home in the rented sector as opposed to 
owner-occupation, after all, as was established in Chapter 3 the feelings an 
individual has towards their home exist largely independent of the legal tenure they 
                                                        
14 Department for Communities and Local Government, English Housing Survey (Headline 
Report 2013-14, 2015) 8. 
15 Shelter, 'The Great Home Debate' (Shelter, 2016) 
<https://www.greathomedebate.org.uk/> accessed 15 June 2016. 
16 P A Kemp, 'Private Renting After the Global Financial Crisis' (2015) 30 Housing Studies 
601, 610-611. 
17 Ibid. 
18 For consideration of the boomerang effect within the UK see J Sage, M Evandrou and J 
Falkingham, 'Onwards or Homewards? Complex Graduate Migration Pathways, Well-being, 
and the "Parental Safety Net"' (2013) 19 Population, Space, and Place 738.  
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enjoy (or endure). However, the aforementioned statistics show that there has been 
a reduction in the number of young people entering owner-occupation. Therefore, 
the reconceptualisation of art.8 within possession proceedings advocated in this 
work presents a solution to the underappreciation of the home in landlord and 
tenant relationships. This solution directs the minds of the judiciary to the pertinent 
queries when assessing whether it is proportionate to remove someone from their 
home and allows for the courts to draw on other areas of law in which ‘strong-form 
review’ has developed.19 
7.3 Future Work 
This thesis has made an important and original contribution to the fields of housing 
law and human rights. However, there are threads of this work which may be taken 
further. As alluded to above one of these avenues is the potential for the arguments 
made here to have some application in mortgage repossession proceedings. The 
feelings which arise between an individual and their home are as prescient for 
owner-occupiers as they are for tenants. For instance, full proportionality analysis 
could equally be used where a person’s home was at risk at the behest of a 
mortgagee. Of course the specifics of how the arguments made in this thesis would 
play out in mortgage repossession cases are something which would have to be 
tested against case studies similar to those in Chapter 6. However, there is no 
immediately apparent reason why the findings made here could not go on to have a 
wider application than landlord and tenant relationships. 
The public/private divide has been ever present in consideration of human rights 
and the role they ought to play where a person’s home is at risk. Chapter 5 argued 
for a modern reformulation of this legal construct to account for the common values 
that flow through much of the law. The focus of Chapter 5 was the standing of the 
home and art.8 within the divide. However, there is scope to explore the arguments 
made in Chapter 5 and ask whether the public/private divide is appropriately 
understood in other areas of law. For instance, there is potential to assess the role of 
the public/private divide in relation to contract law which might be considered a 
purely private area of law. Such a finding suggests human rights have no bearing 
upon contractual agreements in which the courts generally seek to give effect to the 
wishes of the parties. However, this is something worthy of further exploration given 
the common legal values identified in Chapter 5 and the similarities between a lease 
and contract. 
                                                        
19 M Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare in 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press 2009) 75. 
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Finally, the utility of full proportionality analysis as explored in Chapter 6 is worthy 
of further examination due to the potential for such a model to be used in all matters 
where human rights claims clash either with one another or with other legal rights. 
This might provide the starting point for a unification of the disparate 
proportionality tests which are currently used by the courts. 
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